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ABSTRACT

THE YOUNG AMERICAN VOTER
Michael J. Pomante II, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Scot Schraufnagel, Director
Since Converse’s work in 1971, political scientists have noted the abysmal level of
participation by young Americans on Election Day. One possible reason for the negative
comments by academics is their assumption that young people will react to socio-political and
economic contexts in the same manner as other segments of the voting population. A second
possible explanation for the negative reports is that not all relevant variables, which explain
deviation in youth mobilization levels, have been uncovered. The research reported herein
explores potential American voters between the ages of 18 to 24 with an eye toward uncovering
unique explanations for their lower levels of mobilization and possible new variables that
others have failed to consider. Specifically, the research demonstrates three ways in which
younger voters are different from the voting population 25 years of age and older. For instance,
it is widely recognized that economic hardship can influence democratic participation rates, this
research uncovers evidence to suggest a traditional definition of unemployment is not the best
measure for capturing the “economic hardship” of young Americans. With a new measure of
unemployment, which includes discouraged workers and the underemployed, I learn that the
youngest age group is mobilized to vote. Older individuals, on the other hand, continue to
associate with lower participation rates when economic hardship is higher. Second, the

research uncovers the overall detrimental effects of state laws which raise the relative costs of
voting. The research develops a wholly new Cost of Voting Index (COVI) to capture these
effects. Surprisingly, it does not appear that the COVI places any additional burden on young
Americans, but it is clear that everyone participates less when the costs of voting increase.
Third, using a classic experimental research design, and in-depth analyses of a dozen real world
elections, I uncover evidence in support of a previous unconsidered variable. Explicitly, I learn
that the age of candidates running for public office is a sufficient condition to mobilize youth to
cast a ballot on Election Day.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
“. . . non-voting among the young seems more important than non-voting among the very old
for the practical reason that it seems more remediable” (Converse 1971, 445).

This research addresses the extent to which different theoretically grounded variables
influence youth mobilization.1 In particular, this dissertation will focus on the varying rates of
youth mobilization as compared to other age groups or the remaining voting age population.
The broadest-normative focus is a concern for widespread participation in democracies to foster
republican accountability (see Cohen 1973; Pennock 1979). The more specialized motivation is
a more complete understanding of overall low levels of youth voter turnout in the United
States. This has been a concern of scholars for some time, evidenced by Converse’s work cited
above (1971), which draws data from elections held in the 1950s. Intriguingly, Converse’s
work on youth voter turnout predates passage of the 26th Amendment in 1971, which lowered
the eligible voting age from 21 to 18 years of age, and led to an even greater disparity in
turnout between the young and older cohorts (Burden 2000, 391).
Since the passage of the 26th Amendment, young Americans continue to be the least
likely to show up at the polls. Figure 1 demonstrates lower youth voter participation rates in
U.S. presidential elections, since 1972.2 From the figure one learns the phenomenon of lower

Throughout the dissertation the use of “youth” will reference individuals between 18 and 24 years of age.
Throughout this research I measure voter turnout as a percentage of the eligible voting population. Data gathered
from the Census Bureau website (http://dataferrett.census.gov/ last accessed 8/19/2014).
1
2

2
youth voter turnout has persisted into the 21st century. Empirically, the gap in voter turnout
between the youngest and oldest age groups has averaged around 26 percent since the late
1970s. The largest disparity in turnout between the youngest and oldest age cohorts occurred in
1996 and 2000 with 31.8 percent more of the oldest age group voting in those elections.
However, there is a second trend of interest in Figure 1 that is not obvious at first. Note less
variation in the line representing voter turnout of the age group most likely to vote (65 and
older). This compares to a line with comparatively more movement for 18 to 24 year olds. The
standard deviation of the 11 turnout values representing the group, ages 65 and older, is 2.9
percent, while the standard deviation of youth voter turnout is 4.8 percent. This extra volatility
in aggregate youth voting suggests there may be factors in play which influence youth voter
turnout that do not affect other age groups (standard deviation of all age groups equals 2.2
percent), or that some factors which affect all age groups have a unique influence on the
youngest eligible voters.
As one examines the vast research on voter turnout, a bleak picture is painted about the
political participation of young Americans (Campbell et al. 1980; Converse 1971; Nie, Verba,
and Kim 1974; Wattenberg 2012). Yet, research conducted by previous scholars, typically
works from the assumption that the effects of variables on voter turnout is equal across the
population (Burden and Wichowsky 2014; Gomez and Wilson 2003; Katosh and Traugott
1982; Sigleman and Berry 1982). So, the motivation here is two-fold. First, to determine which
variables are hurting youth mobilization, with the intention of moving away from a simple
condemnation of youth apathy to a better appreciation of contextual factors, if any, which
contribute to the lack of youth political involvement. And second, this research will try to
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Figure 1. Voter Turnout in U.S. Presidential Elections: 1972-2012

disentangle the dissimilar effect that a variety of variables have on potential voters representing
different age groups.
More specifically, the research will examine traditional variables, such as voting laws
and economic hardship, with an eye to uncovering how these considerations effect youth more
or less than other age groups. But, in addition to the traditional variables the dissertation also
dedicates considerable attention to a nontraditional variable, candidate age, in an attempt to
demonstrate how this consideration may be depressing youth electoral involvement. Overall, I
intend to demonstrate why it is important to examine youth mobilization through a different
lens, noting how they respond differently to both traditional and nontraditional variables.
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The research explored in the dissertation is important because electoral participation is
ranked high by those who seek to define and describe quality democracy (Dahl 1971; Powell
1982) and, moreover, it is widely recognized that political elites have less concern for the
policy preferences of non-voters (Almond and Verba 1963; Berelson 1952). By understanding
how traditional and nontraditional variables effect youth, specifically, practitioners may be
better able to implement policies targeted at increasing youth mobilization. Although, some
scholars suggest non-voters and voters do not differ appreciably, Arend Lijphart in his
presidential address to the American Political Science Association challenged this contention,
suggesting that if mobilized the class consciousness of nonvoters would increase and their
opinions would change (Lijphart 1997, 4). William Riker for his part argues, “the essential
democratic institution is the ballot box,” (1965, 25) and therein lies democratic accountability.
Others suggest, specifically, “because electoral engagement is an essential element of a strong
democratic system, youth disengagement harms the nation as a whole” (Ulbig and Waggener
2011, 544; see also Arendt 2013; Barber 1984; Lijphart 1997; Pateman 1970). If young adult’s
turnout to vote at a higher rate, arguably, initiatives and policies which address their particular
policy concerns would become more salient.

State Laws Regarding Registration and Voting

In much of the voting turnout literature, it is widely recognized that as one gets older,
participation rates go up, but gradually fall off very late in life (Brown, Jackson, and Wright
1999; Campbell et al. 1980, 494; Converse 1971; N. H Wolfinger and Wolfinger 2008; R. E.
Wolfinger and Hoffman 2001, 91; for generational effects on voter turnout see Lyons and
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Alexander 2000). Voter registration requirements are believed to be one of the prime culprits
(Converse 1971; Merrifield 1993) for this variation because of the burden they place on first
time voters, wary of the rational calculus or costs associated with voting (Blais 2000). Converse
uncovers a particular burden placed on young voters by voter registration laws that require
individuals to register to vote “at some other time than Election Day itself” (1971, 466; see also
Kaufmann, Petrocik, and Shaw 2008, 118).
Individuals who are 18 to 24 years of age are most likely to be participating in the
political process for the first time or have done so only once or twice. Because of their
previous lack of involvement in politics, they are more likely to be unaware of political events,
such as upcoming elections, until the event draws near. Most states require potential voters to
register with election officials some time before Election Day, with many requiring eligible
individuals to be registered 10, 20, or even 30 days prior to the election. A shorter deadline, as
it applies to registration, arguably lowers the cost of voting, making it more likely that
individuals will turnout (Vonnahme 2012, 766). Today, 15 states allow Election Day
registration, with the state of Minnesota being the first to adopt same day registration in 1970.
Consistent with their early adoption, Minnesota has consistently led the country in voter
turnout, both overall turnout (T. E. Patterson 2002) and turnout among those 18 to 24 years of
age.
While states that have implemented same day voter registration tend to have the highest
turnout throughout the country, some states have implemented laws which directly and aversely
effect young, potential, first time voters. Specifically, some states have started to implement
registration drive restrictions, which disproportionately affect new voters. These new
requirements have come about since the 2008 presidential election season when Democratic
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Party presidential candidate Barack Obama was able to successfully use registration drives to
turnout young Americans in record numbers. Registration drives have been shown to have a
greater effect on the mobilization of the youngest eligible voters, with approximately one in
every three 18-23 year-olds being registered through some form of registration drive (Cain and
McCue 1985, 1225).
Importantly, the number of registration drives which target younger voters and the
number of young Americans getting registered has increased since 1992, particularly as the
result of the “Rock the Vote” campaign orchestrated by the independent television channel
MTV, which appeals to young viewers (Hoover and Orr 2007, 148). New voter registration
drive restrictions create additional hurtles and have the potential to undo some of the gains
which have been made in this area. Specifically, some states have implemented laws which
require all individuals to take a state mandated class and receive an official state certification in
order to conduct a registration drive. Other new restrictions require groups to submit certain
documents to the state before they conduct a drive, as well as impose penalties for any violation
of the new rules. The effect of these laws has not received any significant attention by
scholars, but one can easily imagine these new laws will “make it harder for voter registration
drives to operate” (Brennan Center for Justice 2015), with the potential to undermine youth
political mobilization.
Although the previous example shows that some states desire to make it harder for
younger voters to register and vote, other states are implementing new preregistration
procedures, with the intention to make it easier or less costly for young Americans to get
registered. Preregistration is the act of signing up individuals before they become of voting
age, so that when they do turn 18 years old they will already be registered and eligible to vote.
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By reducing the costs and uncertainty of registering to vote, states which have implemented
preregistration have seen an increase in turnout of their youngest voting populations (Holbein
and Hillygus 2016; McDonald and Thornburg 2010). Laws range from, allowing 16 year-olds
to preregister to laws which allow individuals to preregister 60 days prior to their 18th birthday.
With just the little amount of research touched on in this section, it is apparent that state laws
have the ability to greatly affect the turnout rates of young Americans, in both positive and
negative ways.

Incomplete Youth Mobilization

As noted above, one area that has been lagging is direct contact or focused attempts by
the major political parties to turn out young voters. Both the Democrat and Republican Parties
are fond of saying that young voters are the future of their party (Shea and Green 2007 50-52),
but when it comes to mobilizing this segment of the population, less than one quarter of local
party organizations spend any time focusing on this group (J. C. Green and Shea 2007, 21).
Reasons behind the lack of willingness in both major parties to contact young eligible voters
can be explained by several factors. First, young voters do not have a history of voting, and
since voting is habit forming (Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003), there is little reason to believe
that they will cast a ballot in the next election. The second explanation, also deals with their
lack of voting history, but more with their political preferences. Overall, both parties tend to
contact and mobilize individuals whom they know are leaners or supporters of their party and
have a strong history of voting (Peck 2002, 48). Without a voting history, each party believes
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that their efforts are better spent on those they know something about than on young voters who
do not have a track record of supporting the specific political party.
A third reason the major political parties tend to ignore young voters is because young
adults are mobile and very busy. It is more difficult to track them down and to mobilize them
(J. C. Green and Shea 2007, 30). Scholars note, on average, youth are three times more
difficult to contact in get out the vote campaigns (Nickerson 2006), thus making it more
expensive and less appealing for parties to try and mobilize this age group. Most important,
perhaps, about this discussion of mobilization efforts by the major political parties is that
existing research has shown when younger voters are contacted by the political parties they are
as likely to turnout as older voters (Nickerson 2006). In a controlled experiment, D. P. Green,
Gerber, and Nickerson (2003) find that successful contact with young registered voters increase
the probability of these individuals turning out to vote by eight to 12 percent.
To see the effect that targeting the youngest population has on turnout, one just needs to
study MTV’s Rock the Vote (RTV) campaign, which was founded in 1990. As noted, the
television station began actively mobilizing young Americans for the 1992 presidential
election. In this election, youth turnout surged to its highest rate since the 1972 election, which
was the first that allowed 18 to 21 year olds the right to vote. Although, RTV was very
successful in 1992, it quickly became apparent that this new mobilization effort was limited
because in 1996 youth turnout dropped to its lowest level in modern history. Over the years,
RTV has had mixed results mobilizing youth to turnout rates above average for this group, but
also failing to encourage youth to vote in other years.
Besides direct, person to person contact, other methods have also shown to increase the
turnout of younger individuals. For instance, text messages to eligible voters has been shown
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to increase turnout by approximately three percent (Allison and Strauss 2007; 2009;
Montgomery 2008). Still others find students are more likely to vote when they are handed a
sheet with a reminder and instructions printed on a pink piece of paper as compared to a white
piece of paper (Ulbig and Waggener 2011). Overall, much existing research suggests the
youngest voting eligible population is similar to the rest of the voting population in terms of
what works when it comes to mobilization attempts. But, the research also calls attention to the
reality that this group is somehow different and affected in different ways by recruitment
efforts (Bennion 2005).

Education and Media Effects on Youth Political Knowledge and Mobilization

It is well-established that education influences individual (Milligan, Moretti, and
Oreopoulos 2004) and aggregate voter turnout (Jackman 1987; Powell 1986). A primary
concern when it comes to youth involvement in politics is the amount of variation in political
knowledge between individuals of differing ages (Delli and Keeter 1991; Galston 2004;
Jennings 1996). In particular, many worry about the lack of political knowledge among young
Americans and, consequently, their ability to participate in the political process in a meaningful
manner. Moreover, there is evidence that there has been a decline in the political knowledge of
all Americans (Converse 1975). Some argue that the causal mechanism in the decline in
political knowledge is the declining value of high school civics classes (Cogan 1997; Comber
2005; Eagles and Davidson 2001; Galston 2007). While, others note the reduced time young
adults spend reading newspapers (Wattenberg 2012, 25).
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Martin Wattenberg (2012) studies, specifically, the amount of time that younger cohorts
spend reading newspapers in comparison to older cohorts. With the passage of time, he notes
that each new generation is spending less time reading the newspaper than older cohorts.
However, the amount of time that young Americans spend gathering information about national
politics is approximately the same as older cohorts, who are reading the paper (15). Yet, even
though youth read about politics at a similar rate as older individuals, using sources other than
the newspaper, they are less knowledgeable when it comes to what is going on in the nation’s
capital or on the world stage. Wattenberg holds this is because the young consume less evening
television news. By the end of his research, he concludes the reason why young people do not
vote, is not because of their age, but because of the lack of exposure to politics (116).
Other scholars have also looked into what youth know about politics and, more
specifically about how they learn this information. Similar to Wattenberg (2012), Rankin
(2013) finds that youth have low levels of political knowledge, both textbook and surveillance,
but finds that their political knowledge greatly increases with salient events. In Rankin’s
examination of college-aged individuals, he finds that their surveillance knowledge 3 or
increases greatly during an election or right after a specific event, such as September 11 th, 2001.
He concludes that the best chance for college students to increase their political knowledge,
surveillance and textbook, is for political science professors to incorporate salient events into
course lectures and discussion.
Although substantial attention is given to what explains youth political knowledge, it is
possible that political scholars have too narrowly defined where an individual may obtain and
3

Surveillance knowledge is the ability to identify political leaders, which party has partisan control of Congress,
members of the Supreme Court, etc… Whereas, textbook knowledge is the ability to indicate that members of the
House of Representative serve for two years, the Senate for six, the presidency for four, and the Supreme Court for
life.
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consume substantive political information. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (and now with
Trevor Noah), is a popular comedy news program watched by young adults, which has been
shown to have the same level of substantive information as a broadcast network newscast (Fox,
Koloen, and Sahin 2007). Viewers of The Daily Show also report having greater confidence in
the understanding of political issues, but also demonstrate more cynicism toward the electoral
system (Baumgartner and Morris 2006). The precise effect that alternative news programming
may have on whether young Americans can be mobilized and participate in the political
process in a meaningful manner has yet to be determined.
It is not just the consumption of specific television shows which structure young
peoples’ thoughts about politicians and the political system. The popular book series, Harry
Potter, has shown to greatly affect young voters’ perceptions about politics and political leaders
(Gierznyski 2013). Fans of the popular series were more likely to disapprove of the Iraq War,
torture, the Bush Administration, and more likely to have voted for Barack Obama in 2008,
than nonfans. The research examined here demonstrates that it is just not the knowledge which
a young individual accumulates in a class or by reading a newspaper, their political knowledge
and perceptions come from salient events, soft news, and nontraditional media outlets, with
potential profound effects on youth mobilization.

The Role of Family and Geography on Youth Mobilization

In addition to the areas already discussed, an individual’s family has been found to have
a tremendous influence on youth, in regards to their political beliefs and their participation in
the political process (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Jennings and Niemi 1968; Jennings,
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Stoker, and Bowers 2009; Tedin 1974; 1980). The specific reason for this is that it has to do
with the manner in which parents raise their children with a specific set of “moral” guideposts,
which tend to influence their children’s political beliefs, thus increasing the likelihood the
children will identify with the partisanship of their parents and adopt similar voting behaviors
(Niemi, Ross, and Alexander 1978).
Within the study of family influence on the political motivations of young Americans a
significant amount of attention is paid to political socialization and, specifically, the likelihood
that young people will turn out to vote (Andolina et al. 2003; Jennings and Niemi 1968; 1974;
Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009; Sandell and Plutzer 2005; Tedin 1974). Researchers find
that a young adult’s political participation is largely influenced by their parent’s level of
political involvement, their parent’s political knowledge, and education level. If children see
their parents interested and participating in the political process, it is not surprising they are
also more likely to participate when they are eligible to do so.
Another species of research on voter turnout focuses on electoral conditions where
individuals live (Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006; Fauvelle-Aymar and Francois 2006; Gimpel,
Dyck, and Shaw 2004; Kenny 1992; Pacheco 2008; Pacheco and Plutzer 2008). Specifically,
the amount of electoral competition in a geographic region has been found to have a positive
effect on voter turnout of all age groups (Pacheco 2008) in both high profile (Kau and Rubin
1976) and second-order elections (Barzel and Silberberg 1976; S. C. Patterson and Caldeira
1983). For example, states which were considered battle grounds for the 2004 presidential
election had approximately a five percent increase in turnout over states which were
characterized by much less electoral competition (Bergan et al. 2005, 773). Overall, the
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influence of the family and where the family resides can have a resounding effect on the
political engagement of youth.

The Life Cycle and Life Events: Effects on Voter Turnout

As stated earlier, turnout generally increases with age before it starts to decline very late
in life. An argument for why this trend happens is twofold. One, when individuals
progressively experience unique life events they see politics as effecting their life in a more
significant way. Second, as one ages their sense of political efficacy, or the feeling that they
can affect things politically, increases. Unlike older voters, youth lack engagement in the
political process because the general feeling among this group is that they are politically
powerless (Agnello 1973). This feeling of powerlessness arguably dissipates later in life.
Although age has been identified as a key explanatory variable for why some
individuals vote while others do not, others argue that it is not primarily the age of an
individual which increases the likelihood they turn out to vote, but rather it is experiences
which one accumulates through the lifecycle (Highton and Wolfinger 2001; Nie, Verba, and
Kim 1974; Stoker and Jennings 1995). Lifecycle experiences which have been shown to
increase voter turnout among individuals are: residential stability, marriage, home ownership,
steady employment, higher education, and higher income (Highton and Wolfinger 2001, 205).
Each of these events are something an individual obtains over time, thus making it more likely
that they will cast a ballot on Election Day.
The first experience that a younger person might encounter, which has the potential of
increasing their political participation is moving out of the family home and getting a full time
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job. Along with a full time job comes the necessity of paying taxes. In many youth this is the
first instance they really experience the effect government can have on their pocketbook.
Although many youth today have jobs in high school and during college, they typically do not
make enough to owe taxes, with many receiving all or most of the paid income taxes back after
the annual filing. As income increases, taxes increase, and so does political participation
because people feel that they have a bigger “stake in the system” (R. E. Wolfinger and
Rosenstone 1980, 22).
Still more, the economic conditions of a specific geographical area has been found to
influence voter turnout (Rosenstone 1982; Stevens 2007). Most specifically, the unemployment
rate (Grant and Toma 2008, 182; Southwell 1988, 276-77) is believed to effect participation
rates. In an experiment, Lassen (2005) finds both public and private employment inversely
relates to voter turnout or being employed decreases the likelihood one votes. However, there is
little in the way of a consensus about the effect unemployment has on voter turnout.
Rosenstone (1982) argues unemployment can create deprivation, which depresses voter
turnout, while sociologists studying political mobilization in industrial societies recognize that
unemployment can prompt mobilization (Korpi and Palme 2000; Nedelmann 1987, 197).
A second experience that has the potential for increasing the political participation of a
young person is marriage. Although research has shown that those who are married vote at a
greater rate than those who are not married (Leighley and Nagler 2014, 34), this debate will
likely need to be modified because of new developments regarding same-sex marriage. Over
the last 40 years, or so, support for the Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT)
community has been growing along with support for same-sex marriage. The increased
tolerance has come at a large extent from young persons (Brumbaugh et al. 2008, 345).
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Correspondingly, it may be that if a young person is homosexual, or has a friend which is part
of the LGBT community, the salience of the debate may cause increased youth political
awareness and mobilization. The recent debates about the legality of same-sex marriage at the
state and national level might have a unique effect on youth mobilization that has yet to be
uncovered.
Next, a life-cycle change that is likely to influence young people occurs when some in
this group put down roots by buying a house in order to start a family. Individuals who have
greater ties to a community and are less mobile, which typically comes with purchasing a
home, are more likely to be registered to vote and cast a ballot (Squire, Wolfinger and Glass
1987). When individuals purchase a home, it is perceived that government has a greater
influence on them, as well as their community, as they perceive a government role in protecting
their property’s value. People typically become more involved because they want a say in
property taxes, what the school district does, as well as local economic conditions.

Change the Definition of Political Participation?

As just discussed, youth lack experience in life, education, political interest, as well as
many of the other characteristics scholars typically use to explain political participation.
However, youth might be considered more politically active if scholars expand their definition
of political participation (O’Toole et al. 2003; Quintelier 2007). Specifically, Ellen Quintelier
argues that young people do participate politically, just in ways in which scholars have yet to
examine at length. Some of the new political activities of youth include: “youth councils and
parliament, youth hearings, local community actions and campaigns, political consumerism,
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social movements, single issue politics, protest politics and peer support groups” (Quintelier
2007, 6).
“For many young people, service is becoming the new politics, a training ground for
leadership, a channel for a great deal of youthful energy and idealism, and – here’s the
worrisome part – a substitute for the accumulation and exercise of political power” (Eisner
2004, 74). Every September the Census Bureau adds questions about volunteering to its
monthly Current Population Survey. Since 2002, youth between the ages of 16 and 18
volunteer at or above rates of those 25 and older (CIRCLE n.d.). These young individuals’
volunteer rates have reached about 30 percent or nearly one in every three persons. However,
volunteering tends to drop off during the college years of 19 to 24, and then picks back up.
Particularly, worrisome is that volunteerism and individualism displaces voting and the
collective enterprise.
But volunteer work is not the only alternative way youth participate. The youth of the
new millennium have started to embrace newer forms of political activism that are traditionally
overlooked by older individuals, and by scholars (Settersten and Ray 2010, 146). Specifically,
young people are increasingly supporting causes, getting involved, and rallying around causes
through online social media outlets. Putnam (2000) has noted that over time, Americans have
decreased their participation in organized groups thus decreasing social capital. However,
more recent research shows that young individuals are increasing social capital through their
use of Facebook (Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe 2007). Facebook usage has also been found to
have a positive relationship between young peoples’ social trust, civic engagement, and
political participation (Valenzuela, Park, and Kee 2009).

17
Although scholars, such as Wattenberg (2012), have shown convincingly that youth fail
to read the newspaper at rates similar to generations before them, youth today are still getting
important political news but in ways that scholars are just now starting to study. In addition to
their use of Facebook and other similar sites, young social media users are more likely to blog
about political events and topics and forward an email with political content (Baumgartner and
Morris 2010). Increasingly, young people are relying more on social media for political
information and this will be an important development to track as it relates to youth
mobilization.
Although much of the work that follows will be guilty of focusing on a traditional
measure of political participation, voter turnout, I suggest it is important to study and
understand participation rates because this is the only way in which politicians pay attention to
a groups’ concerns. By understanding what motivates youth to participate in this traditional
manner, a form of participation with profound implications for democratic accountability,
actions can be taken to rectify the glaring disparity in the turnout rates of different age groups.
Even though youth feel that participating in the political process does not make a significant
difference, it needs to be realized that volunteering and online activism cannot address all of the
issues which concern youth. In the end, it is likely these alternative methods of political
participation will not motivate politicians to address issues which greatly impact youth at the
rate or in the same manner as the threat of being removed from office. For example, in the near
future a policy being adopted which addresses student loan debt is not likely to be prompted by
volunteering for non-governmental organizations nor by online activism. It will likely require
considerable turnover of the people currently in charge of the legislative process in this
country.
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Defining Youth, Data Sources, and the Dissertation Outline

Before starting this research the first question I had to answer was, who should be
considered “youth?” When one examines research focused on the youngest segments of the
voting eligible population, two age ranges are most commonly used: 18 to 24 and 18 to 29.
Throughout this work I decided to define youth as 18 to 24 year-olds. The primary reason is
consistency with a majority of earlier works and because it is an age demarcation commonly
used by the U.S. Census Bureau. However, there is evidence that the average age at which
individuals pass through the life cycle may be getting older 4 and if the trend continues it may
be necessary or reasonable to increase the age range at which individuals are still considered
youth to 29. To address this possible new development, in Appendix A, I report each of the
main models for each chapter using the turnout of those 18-29 years old as the dependent
variable. Importantly, this redefinition of “youth” does not alter in any fundamental way the
story being told in this dissertation.
With all the work just cited on voter turnout, generally, and youth voter turnout,
specifically, one might wonder why yet another exposé on the subject matter is necessary. The
research within the dissertation will examine traditional variables with the intent of uncovering
how they affect youth more or less than other age groups. In addition to the traditional
4

Thirty years ago the average young person moved out by age 19. However, in 2013 that number has grown
significantly. Individuals who attend and graduate college move out, on average by 23, on the other hand those
who do not go to college leave their parents’ home on average at age 31 (Songer 2013). In 1990 the average for
women to get married for the first time was 23 and 26 for men (Barkhorn 2013). By 2013 the average age for first
marriages increased from 27 for women and 29 for men. Besides getting married later in life, women are also
having their first child at an older age. Thirty years ago women had their first child at the age of 21, however in
2009 the average age has increased to 25, with an expectation that the age at which a women will have her first
child will continue to increase (Mathews and Hamilton 2009). The trend seen among these three life events is that
youth are delaying entry into “adulthood” later and later. Much of the delay into adulthood is the result, that nowa-days “young adults take longer to gain an education, [therefore] the job search is delayed. When [youth] take
longer to find the perfect job, their relationships are often on hold” (Settersten and Ray 2010, xxi).
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variables, the dissertation also dedicates considerable attention to a nontraditional variable,
candidate age, in an attempt to demonstrate how the presence of younger political candidates
increases youth electoral involvement. As a whole, the dissertation will demonstrate why it is
important to examine youth through a different lens when examining their political
participation.
The primary timeline which this research is focused on ranges from 1994 to 2012.
Choosing 1994 as the starting point is important for several reasons. First, in 1993 the
Census’s Current Population Survey (CPS) went through a revision which was implemented in
1994. This new data collection effort allowed the government to get a more accurate measure
of unemployment. Any inclusion of data pre 1994 would result in data which was collected
using a different measure of unemployment and would greatly affect any analysis which
crossed this threshold. Second, all data associated with the turnout of each of the different age
groups examined in this research was obtained from the Census Bureau’s Data Ferrett program,
which only has detailed information dating back to 1994. Third, in 1993 the National Voter
Registration Act was passed which required states to ease the voter registration process,
creating some minimal national standards, and consistency throughout the 50 American states.
Although the Act did not go into effect until January 1, 1995, many states were changing
policies in 1994 in order to comply with the legislation by the implementation date. This
fundamental change in the law would mean a pre-1994 analysis would have the potential of
contaminating a modern era analysis, and compromise the accuracy of policy prescriptions for
the contemporary period.
Chapter 2 begins the examination of how young voters are affected differently than the
remaining population as it relates to unemployment. The chapter begins with an examination
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of how the traditional measure of unemployment is insufficient as an explanation for youth
turnout in contemporary elections. I argue that because of the stage at which youth are at, in
the life cycle, the traditional measure should not be used as a variable for explaining their
aggregate turnout levels. Instead, I propose that discouraged workers and the underemployed
(those who have part-time employment but desire full time hours) should be included in a
measure of economic hardship for this youngest voting population. After all, that is what the
unemployment variable seeks to tap as an explanation for aggregate youth turnout. Using this
new measure, I find a statistically significant relationship between economic hardship and
youth mobilization that was not there when using the traditional measure. In addition to the
introduction of the new measure of unemployment, I also find that youth react differently to
economic hardship than their older counterparts. Specifically, young voters are mobilized
whereas older individuals, who are not of retirement age, withdraw from the electoral process
when faced with economic hardship. This finding is important because it lends support to the
withdrawal hypothesis, but only for those 25-64, while supporting my hypothesis that young
voters do not adhere to the same behavior.
Chapter 3 focuses on the electoral system and costs associated with voting. In the first
half of the chapter, I create a Cost of Voting Index (COVI) for each of the 50 American states
which takes into account registration requirements and other hindrances associated with casting
a ballot in elections from 1996 to 2012. A total of 35 different criteria were broken down into
13 issue areas and examined for inclusion in the COVI. In the second half of the chapter I test
the viability of the new index as an explanation for individual and aggregate turnout. The
results from each analysis indicate higher costs associated with registering and casting a ballot
depress turnout. Both the individual and aggregate level of analysis demonstrate that states
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with higher COVI values are less likely to have citizens participating in elections. A more indepth analysis reveals that the costs associated with casting a ballot are not equal across the
population, with various age groups being affected differently.
Next, Chapter 4 explores the nontraditional measure of candidate age and its effect to
either engage or disengage youth to cast ballots, through an experiment and a qualitative
analysis. The experiment uses photographs to examine the effect of younger looking
candidates on a commitment to vote by college-aged voters. After finding support for the
hypothesis in the experiment, several real-world races where younger candidates are running
against older individuals are examined. In total four presidential elections are examined, two
with the highest youth voter turnout and two with the lowest turnout. By looking at these
presidential races, I learn the two elections with the highest turnout among youth also had
candidates which were significantly younger than the average presidential candidate. Not only
did these two races have candidates which were significantly younger than their competitor, the
young candidates actively and aggressively targeted youth in ways in which had not been used
by candidates previously. Additionally, I look at eight state wide races, four senatorial races
where one candidate is below the age of 35, and four races (two senatorial and two
gubernatorial) where no candidate is below 35. For each case where a young candidate is
running at the top of the ballot, the top of the ballot electoral contest prior in each state is
examined for comparison. This analysis reveals that when a younger candidate is running the
gap between the youngest voting population and the remaining voting population is smaller.
That is smaller, when compared to races where no young candidate is running. An additional
examination revealed that none of the candidates made any real significant, sustained effort to
appeal to young voters. With variables being held constant, using intrastate comparisons,
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besides the presence of a young candidate present, little else is left to explain the increase of
youth turnout within these states, from one midterm election to the next.
Chapter 5 brings together insights obtained from Chapters 2 through 4 in a real-world
quantitative analysis, by examining the age of gubernatorial and Senatorial candidates at the
state level, and its effect on youth turnout. In the analysis I include the newly suggested
measure of youth unemployment explored in Chapter 2, the new Cost of Voting Index from
Chapter 3, and incorporate candidate ages, which were shown to influence the commitment to
vote in Chapter 4. The comprehensive model explored in this chapter revels that only the
COVI and the Candidate Age Gap are statically significant in their effects on aggregate youth
voter turnout.
After the real world analysis, Chapter 6, the final chapter will summarize the findings of
this project and its contributions to the field of political science, as it relates to the young
American voter. I will, then, examine future areas of research relating to youth mobilization,
answering the question, where do we go from here? Finally, I will examine the 2016
presidential election landscape, using what I have discovered in this work, to postulate the
turnout of youth in the upcoming election.

CHAPTER 2

UNEMPLOYMENT: A MOTIVATING FACTOR TO CAST A BALLOT AMONG VOTING
ELIGIBLE YOUTH?
The topic of “economic voting” has received significant attention in the field of political
science over the past half century. However, study of the effect of economic hardship on voter
turnout has failed to reach a consensus. The argument put forth by Radcliff (1994) that “a
weak economy…discourages the very people with the greatest interests in punishing
government from turning out,” (74) is supported by much of the early work on this subject
(Brody and Sniderman 1977; Rosenstone 1982; Southwell 1988). Yet, more contemporary
research posits that such findings are premature, demonstrating results to the contrary
(Arceneaux 2003; Burden and Wichowsky 2014). These scholars find that higher rates of
unemployment have a positive effect on turnout in presidential elections, although Arceneaux
places the caveat that the individuals who are mobilized to turnout are those who blame the
government for their job loss. Another possible explanation for the desperate findings is that
there is an age group effect or in other words, economic hardship has a unique effect on people
from different age groups.
One specific area of economic hardship which has received considerable attention is
employment status. For instance, Burden and Wichowsky (2014) focus on unemployment as it
relates to overall voter turnout but fail to take into account the effect of unemployment on
youth mobilization. To be certain, others have studied youth voter turnout or mobilization,
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specifically (Converse 1971; Wattenberg 2012), but, to date, there is no melding of the two
research paradigms. This chapter hopes to rectify this oversight by studying the effect
unemployment has on the mobilization of different age groups. We know that unemployment is
higher in certain age groups with the youngest Americans often experiencing the highest levels
of unemployment (Sincavage 2004, 37). One can easily imagine that these young adults who
are sometimes looking for their first job might react to their unemployment status differently
than individuals who have long histories of gainful employment, who subsequently are out of
work. A large portion of the younger group almost certainly lacks access to unemployment
insurance, while the other group might reasonably be expected to have this available to them.
There are other considerations regarding age groups that theoretically might change the way
unemployment predicts voter turnout. For instance, members of the 65+ group who find
themselves unemployed as they contemplate retirement are more likely to be a smaller segment
of their age group, because the vast majority of this group is already retired, while already
being predisposed to vote at higher rates because of their age (Campbell et al. 1980, 493-497).
Research suggests that one of the reasons why younger individuals vote at significantly
lower levels than the rest of the public is because of their lack of life experiences (Lipset 1963;
Nie, Verba, and Kim 1974; R. E. Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). As youth move through
life, the accumulation of experience increase their stake in society, thus making them more
politically active (Denver 2003). Additionally, it is well accepted by political scientists that
individuals who have voted in the past are more likely to vote in the future (Franklin 2004;
Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003). Importantly, individuals in the age group studied here,
commonly lack previous participation. Being unemployed at a young age arguably could be
one of the first of many life experiences which will encourage political participation. Therefore
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when young individuals experience unemployment after graduation, when many are seeking
full-time employment for the first time in their life, this experience may act as a mobilizing
agent.
Again, theoretically, unemployment will affect older age groups differently because
older individuals will have more variety of life experiences to use as a mobilizing (or
demobilizing) agent when it comes to whether or not they cast a ballot. Additionally, those in
the youngest group are less likely to be married, have a stable job, and have a more permanent
residence, all which can lead to greater voter turnout (Highton and Wolfinger 2001; Stoker and
Jennings 1995).
Throughout the Great Recession (2007-2009), youth unemployment increased at a
faster pace and ended up considerably higher than the national average. In April 2010,
unemployment rates of 16-24 year olds reached its apex at 19.6 percent (Bureau of Labor
Statistics 2014). This compares to rates of six to eight percent for other age groups at that time.
Although overall rates of unemployment have decreased since that time, current rates of
unemployment among the youngest voting population (18-24 year olds) continues to be more
than two times the rate of individuals 25 and older. Figure 2 shows the unemployment rate of
18 to 24 year olds compared to the total population, as well as other age groups.
Exploring the overall effects of unemployment on different age groups is important for
two reasons. First, finding that unemployment is influencing different segments of the
population in distinct ways can help explain the discrepancies in findings about the effect of
unemployment on voter turnout, generally. Second, any variation among age groups will
demonstrate that the youngest voting group should not be criticized by scholars when using
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traditional variables to explain turnout, because this group responds in a different manner when
compared to the voting eligible population in total.

Note: Unemployment rates are seasonally adjusted
Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Figure 2. Unemployment Rate for Total Population and by Age Group: 1994-2012

There was a great deal of academic attention to how unemployment in the United States
should be measured in the mid- 20th century (Hall, Gordon and Holt 1970; Lebergott 1954;
Norwood and Tanur 1994; Shepherd 1963; Summers 1981). This debate has died down some,
in the 21st century and this may be problematic. The current process, which is most common, is
the calculation of population weights and seasonal adjustments provided monthly by the US
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Current Population Survey (CPS). In order for an individual to be counted as unemployed by
the CPS, the individual must be currently without work, actively looking for employment, and
currently available for work.
These criteria pose problems for accurately measuring individuals who are currently in
a less than desirable employment situation. Unemployment data calculated by the government
does not include individuals who have become discouraged and have stopped looking for
employment or those which have part-time jobs but desire full-time employment, also known
as the underemployed. The exclusion of these individuals from the unemployment measure
should concern scholars who use the measure as a variable to predict voter behavior, either
voter turnout or vote choice. Rationale for this concern should stem from the fact that although
these individuals are not included in any measure which scholars use in analyses, these
individuals still possess the ability to vote and therefore should arguably be included. The
research reported in this chapter will do precisely this. An effort will be made to properly
define the “unemployed” and then apply this to the testing of different age groups. This new
tactic, in the end, will uncover insights into the relationship between economic hardship and
voter mobilization that previous research has missed.

Previous Research on “Economic Voting”

In order to develop a fully specified model of covariates with voter turnout, it will be
important to consider carefully the “economic voting literature.” Much of the scholarship is
unfortunately focused on vote choice (Erikson 2009; Fiorina 1978; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier
2000) with a much smaller number of scholars focusing on the effect of unemployment or
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economic hardship on political participation. Broadly speaking, the early works which focus
on unemployment/economic hardship on participation, reaches the conclusion that it has a
negative effect on turnout (Brody and Sniderman 1977; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Rosenstone
1982; Southwell 1988), setting up what is known as the withdrawal hypothesis. Although,
some contemporary work supports the earlier scholarship (Basinger, Cann, and Ensley 2012), a
number of scholars have come to refute the withdrawal hypothesis and have demonstrated a
positive effect between unemployment and voter mobilization (Killian, Schoen, and Dusso
2008). However, these works place caveats on the higher turnout rates, noting that effect is
primarily among those that are politically sophisticated (Gomez and Wilson 2003), blame the
government for poor economic performance (Arceneaux 2003), and that Republican
incumbents are especially held accountable (Burden and Wichowsky 2014). In line with
Gomez and Wilson (2003), Arceneaux (2003), as well as Burden and Wichowsky (2014), this
paper will demonstrate some validity to both the mobilizing and demobilizing research, by
showing that the effect of the unemployment rate is largely dependent upon which segment of
the population is being analyzed.
In addition, the conflicting findings related to the withdrawal hypothesis appear to be
linked to the methods used by researchers. Significant concerns surround the use of individual
versus aggregate level data, but also differences between presidential and midterm elections,
and whether the study is cross-sectional or uses multiple elections over time. One of the most
recent works on the topic, Burden and Wichowsky (2014), attempts to reconcile some of these
problems by using both aggregate and individual level data for presidential elections from 1976
to 2008. However, their analysis fails to take into account the issue of how the CPS measures
unemployment. Importantly, in early 1994, the CPS did institute a new questionnaire to try and
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better capture unemployment, these changes resulted in measurements of unemployment which
were much higher than results under the old questionnaire (Norwood and Tanur 1994, 287).
This research will use the aggregate work of Burden and Wichowsky (2014) as a starting point,
but will add a consideration of the different ways unemployment can be measured and the
effect unemployment has on different age groups.

Testing for the Effects of Unemployment on Voter Turnout

In order to test the effects of unemployment on turnout, data was gathered from the
Census Bureau’s monthly Current Population Survey (CPS), conducted in November of
election years.5 The unit of analysis for this study is the 50 American States and each unit will
be observed over ten election cycles. Before turning to a multivariate analysis of
unemployment and turnout, I take a first look at the bivariate relationship. Figure 3 exhibits the
correlation between the turnout rate of 18-24 year olds and the unemployment rate, and Figure
4 shows the relationship for those aged 25 to 90.
The correlation plotted in Figure 3 shows a small positive correlation of r = .05 (p <
.27), which fails to reach statistical significance. Between 1994 and 2012, unemployment
tended to be the lowest in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s with the highest rates of
unemployment climbing into 2010. In 2000 Connecticut had the lowest unemployment rate, as
defined by the US. Census Bureau, at 1.08 percent, with a youth turnout rate of 42.83 percent.
On the other hand the highest unemployment rate occurred in Nevada in 2010, topping out at
5

Data was only obtained dating back to 1994 because the monthly CPS underwent drastic change in early 1994 in
an effort to collect more comprehensive, relevant, and more accurate information and statistics regarding the
measure of unemployment (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014).
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14.08 percent, with an 18-24 year old turnout rate of 25.25 percent. Although these
unemployment scenarios are not extreme outliers they do not comport with expectations, and
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detract from the overall positive bivariate relationship with youth voter turnout.
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Note: Bivariate Correlation (r = .05, p < .27).
Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Figure 3. Correlation between Turnout of 18-24 Year Olds and Unemployment at the State
Level: 1994-2012

On the other hand, Figure 4 shows a stronger negative correlation (r = -.12) between the
unemployment rate and the turnout of those over the age of 25 and this association is statically
significant at the .01 level. Although the unemployment of the states which have the highest

31
and lowest rates has not changed, correlating it with the turnout of those over the age of 24,
paints a different picture. The increased turnout of this segment of the population is enough to

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

change the direction of the correlation in a statistically significant way.
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Figure 4. Correlation between Turnout of 25-90 Year Olds and Unemployment at the State
Level: 1994-2012

Moving to a more in depth analysis of the relationships between age, unemployment,
and voter turnout I will now examine voter turnout in the 50 American states over the five
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midterm and five presidential elections since 1994. I begin the analysis in 1994 in order to
keep consistency in the way unemployment is measured by the CPS, because of the change in
the survey methodology which was implemented in 1994. The dependent variable, voter
turnout, is measured as a percentage of the voting eligible population within each state. 6 In
addition to examining the effect of unemployment on the overall voting population, further
tests break the analysis down into four age groups (18-24, 25-44, 45-64, and 65-90).7 The key
explanatory variable, unemployment, was measured as a percentage of each states’ labor force.
In auxiliary analyses I also measure unemployment for the youngest population as a percentage
of individuals who are enrolled in school, as well as those who are not enrolled in school, a test
of these alternative measures can be found in Appendix B. When testing the effect of
unemployment on overall voter turnout, the overall unemployment rate was used, however,
when examining each specific age group, the unemployment rate for each corresponding group
was employed.
Several control variables are used in the analyses: percent black, percent college
graduates, same day voter registration8, as well as congruent senatorial and gubernatorial
elections, presidential elections, open seats, and an indicator of how competitive the election
cycle was. When examining turnout of different racial groups, Abramson and Claggett (1991)
show that African Americans consistently vote at rates lower than Caucasians. Therefore, the
variable percent black was calculated as a percentage of the state population which responded
as black when asked about their race. Also included is percent college, the percentage of each
6

Data on turnout was gathered from the Census Bureau website (http://dataferrett.census.gov/ last accessed
3/30/2015).
7
Age of respondents to the CPS has a maximum age 90, any respondents over the age of 90 are coded as 90 by
the Census Bureau.
8
Same day voter registration does not measure all considerations associated with the cost of voting. For a more
in-depth discussion of the costs associated with casting a ballot see Chapter 3.
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state population which holds at least a four year college degree. Since the 1980’s educational
attainment has had a magnifying effect on the ability to predict turnout, as well as the level of
one’s political knowledge (Burden 2009). Same day voter registration also has considerable
impact on the ability of individuals to vote, primarily youth, because of state variation in the
value of voting (Blais 2000; Converse 1971; Merrifield 1993). Same day registration is
measured as a dummy variable for each state which allows individuals to register on Election
Day. Other control variables such as simultaneous Gubernatorial Election and Senate
Elections, and a Presidential Election were measured as dummy variables because the
inclusion of more and higher order elections have been shown to increase turnout (S. C.
Patterson and Caldeira 1983, 685). Each state received a code of “1” if there was a concurrent
gubernatorial and Senate race and if it was a presidential election, and “0” otherwise. Also
included was the Number of Open Seats, which was calculated by the total number of open
seats in statewide elections. Elections which were considered for open seat considerations were
president, governor, and senator because open seat races have been shown to be a mobilizing
factor for voters (Clucas 2003). Last, the Most Completive Race of all state wide elections was
taken into consideration because perceived competition increases the likelihood of voters
turning out to vote (Cox and Munger 1989). This measure was calculated by using post hoc
election results for each of the state wide races, and then choosing the closest race. Smaller
values represent more competitive races and are expected to have a negative relationship with
state voter turnout levels.
When I run the analysis, I adopt a Random Effects Generalized Least Squares (GLS)
model because my data are organized over time as well as across the 50 American states.
When data are organized in this manner, there is the possibility that the residuals will be
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correlated with one another in a nonrandom fashion.9 Results from the Hausman Specification
statistical test revel no systematic difference between the coefficients, therefore a Fixed Effects
GLS is not necessary.
In order to determine if higher unemployment causes youth to vote at different rates
compared to other age groups within the population, it is best to examine the overall effect of
unemployment on the entire voting eligible population, first. To get a baseline effect of
unemployment on the total population I adopt the following model.
Model 1: Overall Voter Turnoutit = constant - βUnemployment Rateit + βPercent Blackit +
βPercent Collegeit + βSame Day Voter Registrationit + βGubernatorial electionit + βPresidential
electionit + βNumber of Open Seatsit + βMost Competitive Raceit + between errori + within
errorit
Note: “i” indicates each of the American states and “t” indicates each of the ten time periods
analyzed (1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012).
When I run Model 1 for overall voter turnout, using 477 observations,10 I find that
unemployment as a whole, has a negative effect, but fails to reach statistical significance at the
95 percent confidence level, but comes close with a p < .06. A failure to acknowledge the
small difference between the t value of this coefficient and the arbitrary level of statistical
significance used by scholars opens the possibility of committing a type two error. Table 1
reports the findings for Model 1. The substantive significance is not dramatic, with every one
percentage increase in the unemployment rate it reduces overall voter turnout by one fifth of
one percent, on average. This finding, however, does lend support to earlier works on the

In an effort to produce coefficients that are the “best linear unbiased estimator(s)” the GLS model was adopted
(Gujarati 1995, 362). I ran a Hausman Specification test to determine if there are any systematic variations
between coefficients when running either a Random Effect or Fixed Effects specification. The Hausman test
produced a Chi2 of 14.53; p <.07, which indicates that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two coefficient
vectors are equal. Therefore it is safe to adopt the use of a Random Effects specification.
10
There is a possible sample size of 500 (50 states x 10 election periods), however some cases have been dropped
because no state-wide elections were held in some midterm election years.
9
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influence of unemployment on voter turnout, which have argued for a demobilizing effect
(Brody and Sniderman 1977; Rosenstone 1982; Southwell 1988). Many of the control
variables also return statistically significant coefficients. For instance, the percentage of the
population with a four year college degree, same day registration, presidential elections, and the
most competitive state wide race all return statistically significant coefficients in the expected
direction.

Table 1
Overall Voter Turnout and Unemployment for Midterm and Presidential Elections: 1994-2012
Variable Name
Unemployment Rate
Control Variables:
% Black
% College
Same Day Registration
Gubernatorial Election
Presidential Election
Number of Open Seats
Most Competitive Race (smaller margins)
Constant
Chi2
R2
n

Random-Effects Coefficient (s.e)
-.21 (.11)t

.03 (.05)
.29 (.04)***
.02 (.01)*
.01 (.00)
.13 (.00)***
.004 (.003)
-.001 (.0002)***
.44 (.01)***
1627.22***
.65
477

Note: Random-effects Generalized Least Squares regression. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; t < .10 (two
tailed tests)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau

Yet, taking a look at the next set of models (Models 2 through 5) a different set of
findings emerge. In these models the unemployment rate for each age group is used. Footnote
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7 reports the correlations between the unemployment rate for each age group and overall
unemployment.11 The following models are adopted to test the effect unemployment has on
each of the four age groups:
Model 2: 18-24 Voter Turnoutit = constant + βUnemployment Rate of 18-24it + β25-44
Turnoutit + β45-64 Turnoutit+ β60-90 Turnoutit + + βPercent Blackit + βPercent Collegeit +
βSame Day Voter Registrationit + βGubernatorial electionit + βPresidential electionit +
βNumber of Open Seatsit + βMost Competitive Raceit + between errori + within errorit
Model 3: 25-44 Voter Turnoutit = constant - βUnemployment Rate of 25-44it + β18-24
Turnoutit + β45-64 Turnoutit+ β60-90 Turnoutit + βPercent Blackit + βPercent Collegeit +
βSame Day Voter Registrationit + βGubernatorial electionit + βPresidential electionit +
βNumber of Open Seatsit + βMost Competitive Raceit + between errori + within errorit
Model 4: 45-64 Voter Turnoutit = constant - βUnemployment Rate of 45-64it + β18-24
Turnoutit + β25-44 Turnoutit + β60-90 Turnoutit + βPercent Blackit + βPercent Collegeit +
βSame Day Voter Registrationit + βGubernatorial electionit + βPresidential electionit +
βNumber of Open Seatsit + βMost Competitive Raceit + between errori + within errorit
Model 5: 65-90 Voter Turnoutit = constant - βUnemployment Rate for 65-90it + β18-24
Turnoutit + β25-44 Turnoutit + β45-64 Turnoutit + βPercent Blackit + βPercent Collegeit +
βSame Day Voter Registrationit + βGubernatorial electionit + βPresidential electionit +
βNumber of Open Seatsit + βMost Competitive Raceit + between errori + within errorit
In each of these models, the turnout of the other groups has been added as a control.
Once I control for the turnout of the other groups, I find mixed effects of unemployment across
the different age groups. Table 2 displays the output. Only the test of the youngest age group
returns a positive coefficient. On the other hand, the effect that unemployment has on the two
middle age groups is negative, and both tests are statistically significant at conventional levels.
Although the findings show mixed results across the four groups, it is not surprising that the
overall effect on turnout is negative because the groups of 25-45 and 45-64 year olds make up

11

Bivariate correlations between the overall unemployment rate and the unemployment rate of each group: 18-24
(r = .79; p < .001), 25-44 (r = .91; p < .001), 45-64 (r = .86; p < .001), 65-90 (r = .39; p < .001).
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the overwhelming majority of the labor force, with many 18-24 year olds in school and a large
percentage of the 65-90 year old population retired.
The variation in the effect unemployment has on turnout across the different age groups
is perhaps what has been causing mixed findings regarding economic hardship and voter
turnout. When examining the effect across groups, the largest effect is on the 45-64 year old
group, with approximately a decrease of one third of one percent in turnout for every one
percent increase in unemployment. The second largest effect across the groups is the 25-44
year old group, with an approximate decrease of one fifth of one percent for every one percent
increase in unemployment. The youngest age group sees the only positive coefficient but it
fails to reach an acceptable level of statistical significance. But, this might be the result of how
unemployment is measured. Current measures of the unemployment rate, for this age group,
might not capture the true nature of the “economic hardship” young adults are facing. The
lifecycle may influence the “best” way to measure unemployment and test its relationship to
political participation in the form of voting. Therefore this research turns to testing,
theoretically sound, alternative measures of unemployment or economic hardship.

Testing a Different Measure of Unemployment

Of particular concern to this research is how traditional measures of unemployment may
fail to capture economic hardship experienced by young adults. A growing number of
individuals between 18 and 24 years of age are attending post-secondary schools and are
employed part-time. When these individuals graduate, they might not be able to find full-time
employment but either continue with or take on new part-time employment. Doing so excludes
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Table 2
Voter Turnout and Unemployment by Age Group for Midterm and Presidential Elections:
1994-2012

Key Explanatory Variable
18-24 Unemployment Rate
25-44 Unemployment Rate
45-64 Unemployment Rate
65-90 Unemployment Rate

Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
18-24 Turnout 25-44 Turnout 45-64 Turnout 65-90 Turnout
(s.e)
(s.e)
(s.e)
(s.e)
.09 (.06)
-.19 (.09)*
-.36 (.09)***
-.02 (.06)

Controlling for Age Group:

18-24 Turnout
25-44 Turnout
45-64 Turnout
65-90 Turnout

.30 (.03)***
.62 (.06) ***
.14 (.07)
.06 (.06)

.56 (.04)***
.11 (.03)**

.14 (.04)**
.21 (.05)***
.02 (.01)**

.10 (.03)***
-.03 (.03)
.01 (.01)

.07 (.03)**
.47 (.04)***

.03 (.04)
.15 (.05)**
.38 (.06)***

.26 (.03)***

Additional Control Variables:

% Black
% College
Same Day Registration
Gubernatorial Election
Presidential Election
Number of Open Seats
Most Competitive Race
(smaller margins)

Constant
Chi2
R2
n

-.10 (.02)***
.06 (.03)

-.003
(.006)
.07 (.01)***
.004 (.004)
.0001
(.0002)

.003
(.004)
.04 (.01)***
-.001 (.003)
-.0004
(.0002)**

-.005 (.006)
-3.4e-06
(.004)
-.01 (.01)
-.002 (.002)
-.0003
(.0001)

-.23 (.04)***
2222.68***
.83

-.04 (.03)
3587.77***
.89

.23 (.02)***
2147.69***
.84

-.17 (.04)***
.11 (.04)**
.02 (.01)
-.002
(.005)
.01 (.01)
.0007 (.003)
2.6e-05
(.0002)
.34 (.03)***
779.71***
.68

477

Note: Random-effects Generalized Least Squares regression. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 (two tailed tests)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
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these individuals from the unemployment measure. On the other hand, some students will
continue on with an advanced degree if employment is not found within a timely fashion or
relative wage offers are too low (Gustman and Steinmeier 1981, 559).
To account for the particular hardship experienced by young adults, I develop a new
measure of unemployment which includes any individual who is unemployed (traditional
definition), discouraged, or employed part-time but desiring full-time employment. By using
this new measure, I include discouraged workers and those who are underemployed with a part
time job.12 The measure is calculated by adding the number of part-time workers desiring full
time employment to the number of unemployed and to the number of discouraged individuals
divided by the total of individuals in the labor force including those who are discouraged. 13
This new measure (Model 6) is tested against the traditional measure (Model 1) and reported in
Table 3.
Model 6: Overall Voter Turnoutit = constant – βNew Unemployment Measureit + βPercent
Blackit + βPercent Collegeit + βSame Day Voter Registrationit + βGubernatorial electionit +
βPresidential electionit + βNumber of Open Seatsit + βMost Competitive Raceit + between errori
+ within errorit
The results in Table 3 show some minor but important differences. Most specifically,
the coefficient for Model 1 (the traditional measure of unemployment) was previously
insignificant at the 95 percent confidence level. Now, the coefficient with the standard error

12

Bivariate correlations between: the overall unemployment rate and the new measure of economic hardship for
the entire population (r = .96; p < .001), 18-24 unemployment and the new measure for 18-24 year olds (r = .88, p
<.001), 25-44 unemployment and the new measure for 25-44 year olds (r = .94, p <.001), 45-64 unemployment
and the new measure for 45-64 year olds (r = .95, p <.001), 65-90 unemployment and the new measure for 65-90
year olds (r = .79, p <.001).
13
(Part time workers who desire full-time employment + unemployed + discouraged) / Labor force (including
discouraged workers)
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Table 3
Comparison of the New Measure of Unemployment against the Traditional
Measure of Unemployment on Overall Voter Turnout: 1994-2012
Model 1
Variable Name
Unemployment Rate
New Measure of the
Unemployment Rate
Control Variables:
% Black
% College
Same Day Registration
Gubernatorial Election
Presidential Election
Number of Open Seats
Most Competitive Race
(smaller margins)
Constant
Chi2
R2
n

Model 6

-.21 (.11)t
-.15 (.06)*

.03 (.05)
.29 (.04)***
.02 (.01)*
.01 (.00)
.13 (.00)***
.004 (.003)

.03 (.05)
.30 (.04)***
.02 (.01)*
.01 (.00)
.13 (.01)***
.004 (.003)

-.001 (.0002)***

-.001 (.0002)***

.44 (.01)***
1627.22***
.65

.44 (.01)***
1627.58 ***
.65
477

Note: Random-effects Generalized Least Squares regression. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; t < .01 (two
tailed tests)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau

falls within the standard range of statistical significance with the new calculation for
unemployment reported in Model 6. Overall, the results for Model 6 are essentially unchanged,
especially when considering the control variables, between the two models.
With the new measure showing improvement over the traditional measure of
unemployment, I continue to test this new measure to examine its potential as a substitute
measure for economic hardship and its relationship to voter turnout for each of four different
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age groups. The following models were tested against models two through five, which used the
traditional measure of unemployment.
Model 7: 18-24 Voter Turnoutit = constant + βNew Measure of 18-24 Unemploymentit + β2544 Turnoutit + β45-64 Turnoutit+ β65-90 Turnoutit + βPercent Blackit + βPercent Collegeit +
βSame Day Voter Registrationit + βGubernatorial electionit + βPresidential electionit +
βNumber of Open Seatsit + βMost Competitive Raceit + between errori + within errorit
Model 8: 25-44 Voter Turnoutit = constant – βNew Measure of 25-44 Unemploymentit + β1824 Turnoutit + β45-64 Turnoutit+ β65-90 Turnoutit + βPercent Blackit + βPercent Collegeit +
βSame Day Voter Registrationit + βGubernatorial electionit + βPresidential electionit +
βNumber of Open Seatsit + βMost Competitive Raceit + between errori + within errorit
Model 9: 45-64 Voter Turnoutit = constant – βNew Measure of 46-64 Unemploymentit + β1824 Turnoutit + β25-44 Turnoutit + β65-90 Turnoutit + βPercent Blackit + βPercent Collegeit +
βSame Day Voter Registrationit + βGubernatorial electionit + βPresidential electionit +
βNumber of Open Seatsit + βMost Competitive Raceit + between errori + within errorit
Model 10: 65-90 Voter Turnoutit = constant – βNew Measure for 65-90 Unemploymentit +
β18-24 Turnoutit + β25-44 Turnoutit + β45-64 Turnoutit + βPercent Blackit + βPercent Collegeit
+ βSame Day Voter Registrationit + βGubernatorial electionit + βPresidential electionit +
βNumber of Open Seatsit + βMost Competitive Raceit + between errori + within errorit
Table 4 reports the findings for Models 7 through 10. Model 7, which focuses on
turnout of 18-24 year olds is of particular interest. At first glance the substantive significance
of the coefficient does not change much, however the new measure becomes statistically
significant at the p < .05 level, which the traditional measure of unemployment failed to
achieve. Although the coefficient does not seem large, if one considers a one standard
deviation increase in the new measure of unemployment, or a change from 15.5 percent to 22
percent, the coefficient derived from the test of the youngest voting bloc suggests a
corresponding increase in youth voter turnout of over two percent, when all other variables are
held constant. This number is all the more impressive when one recognizes that average youth
voter turnout is only a little over 31 percent. In other words, turnout for the youngest group
would increase by just under 10 percent. These results also demonstrate that youth voters are
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the only group to be mobilized by unemployment. It seems that when youth are unable to find
a full-time job after graduation, it mobilizes this group to take action in the form of voting,
perhaps for the first time.

Table 4
A New Measure of Unemployment and Voter Turnout by Age Group in Midterm and
Presidential Elections: 1994-2012

Unemployment Variable
Overall New Measure Rate
18-24 New Measure Rate
25-44 New Measure Rate
45-64 New Measure Rate
65-90 New Measure Rate

Model 7
18-24 Turnout
(s.e)

Model 8
Model 9
Model 10
25-44 Turnout 45-64 Turnout 65-90 Turnout
(s.e)
(s.e)
(s.e)

.10 (.04)*
-.12 (.06)*
-.25 (.06)***
.03 (.05)

Controlling for Age Group:

18-24 Turnout
25-44 Turnout
45-64 Turnout
65-90 Turnout

.30 (.03)***
.63 (.06)***
.15 (.07)*
.06 (.06)

.55 (.04)***
.11 (.04)**

.07 (.03)*
.47 (.04)***

.03 (.03)
.15 (.05)**
.38 (.06)***

.26 (.03)***

Additional Control Variables:

% Black
% College
Same Day Registration

.13 (.04)**
.19 (.05)***
.02 (.01)*

Gubernatorial Election
Presidential Election
Number of Open Seats
Most Competitive Race
(smaller margins)

-.003 (.01)
.07 (.01)***
-.004 (.004)
.0001
(.0002)

Constant
Chi2
R2
n

-.24 (.04)***
2246.27***
.83

.10 (.03)***
-.03 (.03)

-.10 (.02)***
.06 (.03)*
-.005 (.01)

-.17 (.04)***
.10 (.04)**
.02 (.01)

-.01 (.01)*
-.003 (.004)
.04 (.01)***
-.002 (.003)
-.0005
(.0001)**

.0006 (.004)
-.01 (.01)
.001 (.003)
-.0003
(.0001)

-.002 (.005)
.005 (.01)
.0006 (.003)
3.9e-5
(.0002)

-.04 (.03)
3583.15***
.89

.23 (.02)***
2163.72***
.84

.33 (.02)***
780.72***
.68

477

Note: Random-effects Generalized Least Squares regression. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 (two tailed test)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
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The effect of the new measure is similarly negative for the two middle-age groups.
Coefficients for the new measure suggest a substantively similar decrease in voter turnout as
what was obtained in the overall voter turnout model. The statistical significance for each of
the remaining models stays the same as the unemployment coefficient for the corresponding
group. Additionally, the trend found in the analysis of the unemployment and the different age
groups also holds, with the youngest group experiencing an increase in voter turnout and those
25-44 and 45-64 seeing a decrease in the likelihood they show themselves at the polls.
This new measurement did not produce significantly better results for all age groups
however, the measure of economic hardship became statistically significant when compared to
the unemployment measure for the entire population and the youngest age group. It is not
surprising that this new measure does slightly better because it captures a larger portion of the
voting population who are experiencing economic hardship.
I am not the first to suggest the way in which unemployment is measured is not suitable
for the young adult population. In the past, other scholars have suggested alternative measures
of economic hardship for young people (Singell and Lillydahl 1989). But previous research
had only suggested alternative measures and did not attempt actual tests. This research provides
a test of nine of Singell and Lillydahl’s (1989) measures and these can be found in Appendix B.
These alternative models lend support to my arguments put forth in this chapter. Results from
testing Singell and Lillydahl’s suggested measures demonstrate that the way in which youth
economic hardship/unemployment is calculated has a significant impact on the statistical
significance of the correlation and youth voter turnout. Only three of the nine measures tested
reported statistically significant coefficients, each of the measures which returned these results
only took into account the unemployment status of those not enrolled in school. Additionally,
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the reported coefficients were positive, showing an increase in the unemployment rate of nonenrolled youth increases the rate of turnout among this voting segment. Each of these three
measures suggest that youth voter turnout will increase from one fifth to one quarter of one
percent, when there is a one percent increase in the suggested measure.

Conclusion

The research presented here sought to do two things. First, contribute to the discussion
about the overall effects that economic hardship has on voter turnout by showing that
unemployment can be both a mobilizing and a demobilizing factor, dependent upon which age
group is examined. Second, reinvigorate a discussion about better ways to measure economic
hardship, in the aggregate; particularly for the youngest subsection of the population.
When elections were examined from 1994 forward, higher rates of the traditional
unemployment measure result in an overall demobilization of voters. However, when the
population is broken down, the effect varies by segments of the population, most specifically,
by age. The demobilizing effect, which was argued by earlier research, was found in the
analysis only with the 25-44 and 45-65 age groups. Using the traditional measure of
unemployment and testing the turnout of the 18-24 and 65-90 age groups I do not obtain
statically significant results. In an effort to address this deficiency I put forth my own new
measure of unemployment. The new measure includes individuals in the traditional measure of
unemployment, those who are currently out of work and seeking employment, while also
taking into account those who are discouraged and those who are employed part time but desire
full time hours.
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Although the new measure, which took into account the number of unemployed,
discouraged, and those with part-time employment who desire full-time employment did not
produce significantly better results for every age group examined, it did produce statistically
significant results for the overall voting population and the youngest age group. The model
with my new measure of unemployment generated a coefficient of .10, suggested that turnout
among the 18 to 24 year-old population would increase by 1 percent for every 10 percent
increase of the new measure. These results do not seem dramatic by any means, but as one
considers that this segment of the population suffers from high unemployment rates, two times
greater than the rest of the public, and that they already vote at much lower rates, the findings
become more notable.

CHAPTER 3

THE COST OF VOTING IN THE AMERICAN STATES: CREATING A
COMPREHENSIVE INDEX

Over the past 30 years there have been significant reforms to the American electoral
system, with legislation being passed at both the state and national level. Some of these
changes, such as the 1993 National Voter Registration Act, have been implemented in an effort
to reduce the cost of voting, while others, such as voter identification laws passed by some state
governments, increase the cost of voting. The relative cost of voting has received significant
attention by scholars for a considerable time now. Anthony Downs (1957) may have spurred
discussion when he argued; citizens will abstain from voting if the benefits do not outweigh the
costs (Chapter 14). When examining the calculus of voting, Riker and Ordeshook (1968) argue,
the likelihood of an individual voting is based on the equation R = (BP) – C, and it is deemed
rational to vote when the value of R is positive (25).
R = the reward which an individual receives from voting
B = the differential benefit which an individual voter receives when their
preferred candidate wins
P = the probability that the citizen will bring about the benefit by voting
C = the cost to the individual for voting
In order to increase or decrease the likelihood of an individual voting, and affect overall
voter turnout, the value of ‘C’ is consequential. The American states have the ability to change
the value of C through modification of election laws, which influence the relative convenience
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of casting a ballot. Voter registration laws have been a favorite policy arena for practitioners
who wish to alter the rational calculus of voting, but other laws are also written or repealed,
which deal specifically with the act of voting on Election Day. With the ability to either
increase or decrease the costs associated with voting, each state maintains the ability to affect
voter turnout both at the individual and aggregate level. From a purely theoretical perspective,
if one assumes the values of B and P vary randomly across a population, any increase in the
value of C will alter the value of R making it less rational to vote. The primary focus of this
research is to create a single variable capable of capturing the various institutional policies of
the American states to determine the extent to which individual states either encourage or
discourage voting.
The importance of this topic should not be left unstated. Electoral participation is
ranked high by those who seek to define and describe quality democracy (Dahl 1971; Powell
1982). Many have long recognized that political elites have less concern for the policy
preferences of non-voters (Almond and Verba 1963; Berelson 1952). Moreover, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the level of citizen engagement has reciprocal effects on civic
culture, the quality of governance, and ultimately the quality of life in each of the American
states (Putnam 1993; 2000). Although, some have suggested non-voters and voters do not differ
appreciably, Arend Lijphart challenges this contention, suggesting if mobilized the class
consciousness of nonvoters would increase and their opinions would change (Lijphart 1997, 4).
William Riker argues, “the essential democratic institution is the ballot box,” (1965, 25) and
therein lies democratic accountability. Accordingly, failure or success in approaching the ballot
box, because of the variable costs of voting, arguably has important implications for competent
representation.
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Previous Work on the Cost of Voting

Costs associated with voting can be broken into two types, non-institutional and
institutional (Fernádez and García 2008). Non-institutional costs will vary between individuals
and are based on interest but also perceptions about the influence an election will have on
someone’s personal wellbeing. Institutional costs, on the other hand, are requirements set out
by government, which restrict or enhance the ability of an individual to cast a ballot. It is the
institutional costs of voting this research is focused on. Because voting is a two-step process in
the United States, institutional costs can be broken down even further to include the costs of
registering to vote and the costs of actually casting a ballot. Scholars have long recognized that
registration requirements in the United States have been a major deterrent to voting (Gosnell
1927; 1930, 203-205; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 230) and it is found that the amount of
time in advance of the election that one has to register to vote, is of consequence when
explaining voter turnout rates (Ansolabehere and Konisky 2006; Mitchell and Wlezien 1995, R.
E. Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).
In the past, scholars studying the cost of voting have taken into account a fairly limited
number of institutional arrangements (Katosh and Traugott 1982) with much of the attention
being paid to voter registration requirements (King 1994; Leighley and Nagler 2014; R. E.
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).14 Missing from the literature has been a comprehensive
accounting of all the varied and nuanced state laws, which potentially change the rational
calculus of voting. Moreover, previous scholarship on voter registration has tended to focus on
14

In previous research which focuses on voter registration, a good number of researchers exclude North Dakota
because of its lack of a registration requirement. This research, however, will keep North Dakota because the
research extends beyond the mere cost of registering to vote. When considering the cost of registering, North
Dakota will simply be scored “0.”
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only three criteria: the closing date; the length of time before one is purged from registration
rolls for nonvoting; and the number of places an individual can go to register to vote (King
1994). Although these three considerations, in the past may have been paramount, legislation
passed by the national government in 1993 changed things considerably. The National Voter
Registration Act (NVRA) standardized some of the relative costs associated with voter
registration in the contemporary period, but importantly, states have written a myriad of other
laws since that time, which have offset the expected increase in voter turnout which was
supposed to occur as the result of NVRA. 15
Prior to the passage of NVRA, states had various laws allowing electoral districts to
purge registration rolls of ‘nonvoters.’ Previous researchers (King 1994), consequently,
included purging in their analysis of the cost of voter registration, focusing on time in years or
the number of elections before one could be removed from voter rolls. Since the passage of
NVRA, states are no longer able to purge for nonvoting in federal elections (although states
have found other reasons for purging). Likewise, it had been common for scholars to pay
attention to whether states allowed voter registration by mail. Because of NVRA this is now
permissible in all 50 states. Today, mail-in voter registration has been replaced as an important
consideration, by whether states allow voter registration via the Internet. In all, legislation
passed by the American states since NVRA continues to shape the cost of voting.
Consequently, efforts by researchers to measure the cost of voting can and do become quickly

15

The legislation required states to accept mail-in registration as well as allow individuals to register to vote at
state offices which issue divers licenses or sign individuals up for public assistance programs. Since its passage,
the ‘Motor Voter’ legislation has been shown to increase overall turnout rates (Knack 1995) as well as increase the
probability that an individual under the age of 30 and those who moved within two years of Election Day will
register and turnout to vote (Highton and Wolfinger 1998; Rugeley and Jackson 2009). The success of the NVRA
spurred Highton (2004, 512) to conclude that “[t]here is now little room for enhancing turnout further by making
registration easier.” This research, in the end, will take exception to Highton’s contention.
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outdated. It is becoming increasingly apparent there is a need for a contemporary calculus of
the institutional cost of voting; one that can be updated both routinely and comprehensively. It
is the intention of this research to fill this void.
After the construction of the index and the testing of its construct validity, the COVI
will be used to examine the effects of the costs associated with voting on different segments of
the population. Specifically, each of the four different age groups used throughout this
dissertation will be examined to assess the extent to which each group is affected.

A Comprehensive Cost of Voting: Examining the Variables Included in the Index

To create a Cost of Voting Index (COVI) I first examine 35 different institutional
arrangements. These 35 concerns were further grouped into 13 different issues areas. Many of
these initial observations were discredited for a variety of reasons, which will be explained
below or in the Chapter’s Appendix. Ultimately, five issue areas representing 19 different
considerations are included in the Index. The Index spans presidential election years from
1996 to 2012, inclusive. Because state laws were continually being created and amended during
the time period studied, there is some variability in the issue areas included in the construction
of the Index for each presidential election year.
The first half of Table 5 displays the variables which ultimately are included in the
COVI. The bottom half of the table exhibits three issues areas, represented by eight different
considerations, which were deemed ‘allowances’ and not restrictions. Hence, these are not
included in the cost index. When I move to test the relationship between the COVI and voter
turnout in the American states I will control for these in the modeling, as each is expected to
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influence voter turnout positively. As noted, there are some considerations left out of the Index,
and subsequent modeling, for theoretical reasons. These considerations are listed in Appendix
C, which elaborates explanations for their exclusion.16 It should be emphasized that with each
update of the COVI there is the possibility that additional considerations, from this listing, will
be incorporated to keep pace with the dynamic nature of state election laws.
In order to create the index I rely on Principle Component Analysis (PCA), to best
capture the costs associated with voting. All included considerations are coded so that larger
values indicate a greater level of restriction or an increased ‘cost.’ For the first four issue areas
displayed in Table 5 (Voter Registration Restrictions, Registration Drive Requirements,
Absentee Voting and ID Restrictions), Correspondence Analysis is first used to combine a
series of binary considerations into correspondence scores. 17 With the fifth issue area, Poll
Hours, the minimum and maximum number of hours polls are open in each state are averaged.
In the paragraphs that follow I will elaborate on each of the five issue areas included in the
Index, noting precisely how the different considerations are measured.

Voter Registration Restrictions

Previous research on registration deadlines has come to a consensus that the further out
the closing date for registration, for an upcoming election, the lower voter turnout is expected
to be (Brians and Grofman 2001, 171; Fournier et al. 2004; Gimpel, Dyck, and Shaw 2004;

16

Often times these considerations, identified by other researchers, have become dated and are no longer relevant.
The additional step of creating correspondence scores for a subset of variable components at first seems
unnecessary because principle component analysis (PCA) ultimately condenses many variables of numerous
components into one variable. However, when using PCA, dummy variables cannot effectively be utilized in the
process (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008).
17
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Table 5
List of Variables Included in the Cost of Voting Index and ‘Allowances’
Issue Areas

Cost of Voting Considerations
No. of days prior to election in-person reg. must occur.
Election Day registration allowed for all elections.
Election Day registration allowed in pres. elections. 18
Election Day registration located at polling locations.

Voter Registration Restrictions

Registration Drive Requirements

19

Official certification required by state.
Participation in state training course required.
Group required to submit documents/paperwork to state.
Penalties imposed for any violation of deadlines or rules.

Absentee Voting

Ask once – always able to vote absentee. 20
No excuse required for absentee voting.
Excuse required for absentee voting.
In-person absentee voting.

ID Restrictions

No identification needed to cast a ballot.
ID required - not-strict; non-photo
ID required - not-strict; photo required
ID required – strict; non-photo
ID required – strict; photo required

Poll Hours (avg.)

Minimum polling hours.
Maximum polling hours.

Voting Allowances

Preregistration

Online Voter Registration

Preregistration of 16 year of age.
Preregistration of 17 year of age.
Preregistration of 17.5 years of age.
Preregistration within 90 days of 18 years old.
Preregistration within 60 days of 18 old.
No preregistration.
Voter registration allowed on-line.

Mail Voting
All voting done by mail.
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures and compiled by author.

18

Rhode Island passed and implemented Election Day registration for presidential elections in 2011. Therefore
this consideration is not included in the Registration Deadline issue area prior to 2012.
19
Not included in indexes in elections prior to 2012, because these policies were not enacted until after 2008.
20
The first election where permanent absentee voting status was available is 2008, therefore, this consideration
is not included in the Absentee Voting issue area prior to this year.
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Gopoian and Hadjiharalambous 1994; Vonnahme 2011). States which have no deadline for
registration or have Election Day Registration (EDR) tend to have higher levels of voter turnout
(Brians and Grofman 2001; Leighley and Nagler 2014). Moreover, more lax registration of
deadline policies have been shown to increase turnout rates for younger voters and those who
have recently moved (Knack and White 2000).
Specifically, a registration deadline is the last day an individual can register to vote for
an upcoming election in order to be eligible to vote in that election. The first consideration in
this issue area is the number of days before the election that an individual must register. Any
state which allows same day voter registration is scored “0” and all other states receive a
number corresponding to the number of days they set out for in-person registration. Because of
the primacy of this consideration in previous research, in the PCA analysis which follows, this
consideration will stand alone as one of the components that make up the Index.
The other considerations in the voter registration issue area are measured with binary
variables and will be subject to correspondence analysis. As previously mentioned Election
Day Registration has been found to have a profound effect on voter turnout because it removes
the need to act twice in the process of voting. Any states which do not allow EDR in all
national government elections are scored “1,” and each state which did allow EDR is scored
“0.” Because one state, Rhode Island, allows EDR only for presidential elections, an additional
indicator was added to account for this. States which do not allow EDR during presidential
elections were scored “1” and those which did were coded “0.”21 The third binary
consideration is whether the state allows EDR at polling locations. This is different from the

21

This policy was implemented in 2011 for the upcoming 2012 presidential election, therefore this consideration is
not included in the calculation of the correspondence scores for elections prior to 2012.
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same day registration because not all states which allow EDR, allow registration at polling
stations. Any state which does not allow same day registration at the polls is coded “1” and
those which do are coded “0.”22 The three binary considerations, just elaborated, were
subjected to correspondence analysis and a correspondence score is used in the PCA.

Registration Drive Requirements

Because of their relative newness, Registration Drive Requirements, have not yet
received significant attention from scholars; 23 however, the Brennan Center for Justice (2015)
has been paying attention (Kasdan) and notes, “more than half of the states [now] have some
laws governing community-based voter registration drives.”24 These efforts have always been
a popular tool of the political parties, and other organizations. Yet, it seems the successfulness
of the voter registration drive efforts of the Barack Obama campaign during the 2008
presidential election cycle caused many state legislatures to take note and pass restrictions. The
relative newness of systematic restrictions in this issue area means the variable will not be
included until the 2012 COVI.
Table 5 elaborates the four registration drive restrictions that have been adopted, in
varying degrees, by the American states. These are: the need for a group to be officially
certified by the state before conducting a registration drive; registration drive training through a

22

Since North Dakota is being included in the analysis, I must give values for each variable which deals with
registration in order to obtain a Cost of Voting Index score. Because North Dakota does not require any form of
registration, values of “0” were given for each consideration to indicate the lowest cost associated with registering.
23
For an exception, Nickerson (2015) has shown that registration drives significantly reduce the cost of
registration for some segments of the voting population.
24
http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/state-restrictions-voter-registration-drives (last accessed December
21, 2015)
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state mandated course; certification of the group followed by the submission of group activity
reports; and the imposition of penalties for any violation of certification deadlines or rules. 25
States were scored “1” for each restrictive voter registration drive policy that is in place and “0”
if they did not have the specific policy. Any restrictions in the ability of groups to conduct
registration drives is expected to, theoretically, make it more difficult for individuals to get
registered and increase the cost of voting. The four binary considerations are subjected to
correspondence analysis and it is determined that they can reasonably be combined into a single
correspondence score for use in Principle Component Analysis.

Absentee Voting

Absentee voting allows individuals, already registered to vote, to cast a ballot at some
time prior to Election Day. National law holds that all states must allow for absentee voting.
However, some states write laws that effect how easy it is to avail oneself of this opportunity.
Making it more difficult to vote absentee, theoretically, increases the cost of voting. However,
previous research suggests that an increase in voter turnout will only happen when absentee
liberalization is combined with party mobilization efforts (Oliver 1996).26

25

Wyoming and New Hampshire do not allow any registration drives whatsoever. Their argument is that
registration drives are no longer necessary because the state has adopted Election Day Registration. When coding
the four different registration drive restrictions, it was imperative that Wyoming and New Hampshire receive
values and since both states still require that individuals be registered, the inability for groups to hold registration
drives is very restrictive. Therefore both states were coded “1” in each of these four considerations, to indicate the
most restrictive possible policy. North Dakota, on the other hand, received the score of “0” for all four
considerations, representing the least restrictive policy, because the state does not require voter registration.
26
Biggers and Hanmer (2015) study state adoption of different absentee voter laws and find three distinct reasons
for the adoptions of these laws. First, states tend to adopt early voting when they have a significantly large
population which would benefit from such policies. Second, no-excuse absentee voting has tended to be adopted
in a regional dynamic, with states in the west most likely to adopt this policy. And third, the willingness of
legislators to adopt any absentee policies are most likely to do so when the electoral threat is minute.
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An examination of all 50 states’ absentee voting laws turns up three considerations to
take into account from 1996 to 2008 and four considerations after 2008. The first two
considerations are somewhat nuanced versions of a similar practice, but sufficiently distinct
that I treat them as two different considerations. First, some states allow registered voters to
vote absentee without an excuse. A nuanced inversion of this consideration are state laws
which restrict absentee voting to only those individuals who have a state accepted excuse. In
reality some states do not have “no excuse” absentee voting; but do not require a “state
accepted excuse.”27 Third, states vary on whether they allow in-person absentee voting, and
last, some states, only since 2008, have begun to allow registered voters to ask for and receive
permanent absentee voter status. Each of the four considerations is coded as a dummy variable.
States that do not have “no excuse” absentee voting are score “1,”while those states which
require a state accepted excuse are scored “1.” States which do not allow in-person absentee
voting are scored “1,” while states that do not allow voters to sign up for permanent absentee
status are scored “1.” The four binary variables are subjected to correspondence analysis and a
correspondence score is obtained.

Identification Restrictions

The fourth issue area which theoretically effects the cost of voting is ID Restrictions.
Scholars argue voter ID laws discourage voter participation, particularly among certain
segments of the population. Research has shown these laws adversely affect minorities, the
27

In addition, the considerations of no excuse and excuse required, for absentee voting, are not perfect opposites
because of the caveat that some states have in-person absentee voting. Some states still require an excuse for
absentee voting by mail while no excuse is required for in-person absentee voting.
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elderly, women, the disabled, and those who speak a minority-language (Sobel and Smith
2009). In the last two decades, more and more states have begun requiring identification in
order to cast a ballot. Proponents of these laws argue, requiring individuals to prove who they
are at the polls combats voter fraud.
Identification requirements range from a state-issued photo ID to anything that has the
voter’s name on it, such as a library card or a credit card. Moreover, states vary considerable in
the extent to which these laws are enforced, with some states being much stricter than others.
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) defines a “strict” state as one which
gives voters provisional ballots if they do not have proper identification. When an individual
receives a provisional ballot, the ballot is not counted until the voter returns with an acceptable
form of identification. Voters casting provisional ballots are typically given several days to
locate and present their identification, however, if this is not done within the state’s specified
time, the ballot is ‘spoiled’ or not counted. A ‘non-strict’ state allows for other forms of voter
validation, such as the signing of an affidavit, or having a poll worker vouch for the voter,
ultimately reducing the need for provisional ballots.
I treat this issue, again, with Multiple Correspondence Analysis before it becomes part
of the Principle Component Analysis. States which do not require any identification to cast a
ballot are scored “0.” Each of the other four considerations are scored “1” if the state has the
restriction and “0” otherwise. If a state has the most restrictive policy, it is scored “1” for each
variable representing a less restrictive policy. The four policies from least restrictive to most
restrictive are as follows: state requires an ID, but it does not need to be a photo ID, and
according to the NCSL an official ballot can still be cast if the voter signs an affidavit; state
requires a state approved photo ID, but again, a voter can still cast an official ballot if
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identification is obtained by some other state approved manner; state allows voters to get by
with a non-photo ID card, but voters who fail to provide any type of acceptable identification
are given a provisional ballot; and last, state requires a state approved photo ID and a voter’s
provisional ballot is not counted until they provide the appropriate identification. The five
categories employed are exhaustive; that is all 50 states fall into one of the categories.

Poll Hours

The last consideration included in the COVI are polling hours. Scholars find that polling
stations open for fewer hours decrease the likelihood that hourly wage earners will cast a ballot
on Election Day (Eisner 2004, 122; T. E. Patterson 2002). Polling location hours are not
mandated by the national government and there is considerable variation from state-to-state.28
Moreover, several states allow for individual electoral districts to determine their own polling
hours as long as they fall within state guidelines. In some instances, state law allows electoral
districts to be open for as little as half of the maximum number of hours allowed by the state.
For example, in North Dakota, state law allows the least populated districts to be open for only
seven hours, while the maximum number of hours a polling station can be open is fourteen
hours.

28

In the two states which have all mail voting, Oregon and Colorado, there are not conventional polling locations.
However, both states allow individuals to drop off their ballot at predetermined locations instead of mailing in the
ballot. Some precincts only allow people to drop off between 8am and 5pm while others allow drop off from
midnight to 8pm on Election Day. I score these two cases 20 hours, representing the maximum number of hours
allowed in the other 48 states, because people are given the opportunity to mail in their ballots and have access to a
mail box all hours of the day. In each of the two states the ‘polling hours’ or the hours of the drop off locations
vary throughout the state. My first instinct was to score each of these two states ‘24’ but with some variation in the
drop off procedure on Election Day, the decision was made to score both ‘20’ consistent with the least restrictive
state.
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To measure the restrictive quality of each states poll hours, I use the average between
the minimum number of hours and the maximum number of hours that state law indicates polls
must be open. Using this tactic North Dakota receives a score of 10.5 ((7 + 14)/2)). States with
no minimum or maximum consideration simply receive a score equal to the number of hours
the polls are open. Because coding in this fashion is not consistent with coding in other issue
areas where larger numbers indicate a higher ‘cost’ the average number of hours was reversed
for each state and the values are turned into Z-scores before PCA is conducted.

Constructing the Cost of Voting Index (COVI)

Creating the COVI requires combining and weighting each of the five issue areas just
elaborated. As eluded to, previous work which created a state voter registration difficulty index
used an additive formula, giving equal weight to each consideration (King 1994). This is
problematic because theoretically different consideration have unique implications for the cost
of voting. In the analysis reported below each component part of the index is weighed in a nonarbitrary fashion using PCA. As noted four of the six component parts of the Index are
themselves derived from sub-indicators using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). MCA
is a generalization of PCA that can be used when the variables given are categorical instead of
continuous (Adbi and Valentin 2007). In creating the Index, five variables are used for the
elections from 1996 to 2008 and six variables are used for the 2012 Index.29

29

One of the five issue areas, Voter Registration Restrictions, is captured by two variables; 1) the number days
before Election Day that one must be registered and 2) the correspondence score representing the three other
registration laws. Note also, the correspondence score for Registration Drive Requirements is not used until the
2012 Index.
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Table 6 demonstrates that each group of sub-indicators in the four issue areas that were
subjected to MCA can be summarized by a single latent variable. Inertia in MCA measures the
total variance of the data matrix employed. The principal inertia reported in each cell in Table 6
is equivalent to eigenvalues in Principle Component Analysis. In the parentheses, I report the
cumulative percentage of explained variance (inertia) by the principal dimension. As we can
see, all the indicators load well on their respective principal component, except for ID
Restrictions from 2004 to 2012. The explained variance by the principal component is below
60 percent in these three election cycles. Nevertheless, adding more principal components
improves the cumulative percentage by at most six percentage points. The principals I derive
on this dimension, for these three years, are not ideal but are by the far the best available.
Descriptive statistics of the six different variables used in the Principle Component
Analysis are reported in Table 7. The minimum and maximum values are shown along with the
mean value in parentheses. Note, four of the six considerations are correspondence scores, and
like factor scores and/or Z-Scores these variables have a mean of “0” and a standard deviation
of “1.” The table displays poll hour values as they exist in the real world, but these are reversed
prior to conducting the PCA.
As noted, I rely on PCA in the multivariate examination of the six variables displayed in
Table 7. For the elections between 1996 and 2008, two components have eigenvalues greater
than 1. Combined, these two components explain 64 percent of the variation in the original
data. For 2012, three components have eigenvalues greater than 1 and 77 percent of the
variation is accounted for. Mathematically, I could construct a reasonable index using just two
and three variables for the two time periods, respectively. Nevertheless, I chose to use all the
variables since first, theoretically, all these variables are relevant to the cost of voting; and
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Table 6
Multiple Correspondence Analysis Statistics: Principle Inertia (Cumulative percentage of
explained variance)
Issue Areas
Voter Registration Restrictions
1. Election Day registration allowed
for all elections.
2. Election Day registration allowed
in pres. elections. 30
3. Election Day registration located at
polling locations.
Registration Drive Requirements
1. Official certification required by
state.
2. Participation in state training course
required.
3. Group required to submit
documents/paperwork to state.
4. Penalties imposed for any violation
of deadlines or rules.
Absentee Voting
1. Ask once – always able to vote
absentee. 31
2. No excuse required for absentee
voting.
3. Excuse required for absentee
voting.
4. In-person absentee voting.

1996

2000

2004

2008

2012

0.68
(100)

0.68
(100)

0.68
(100)

0.72
(100)

0.76
(100)

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0.22
(94.37)

0.38
(88.62)

0.40
(89.87)

0.40
(89.87)

0.45
(92.68)

0.16
(83.82)

0.20
(66.98)

0.07
(49.94)

0.03
(40.22)

0.02
(33.91)

ID Restrictions
1. No identification needed to cast a
ballot.
2. ID required - not-strict; non-photo
0.20
3. ID required - not-strict; photo
(66.98)
required
4. ID required – strict; non-photo
5. ID required – strict; photo required
N/A: Not Applicable, no policies present.
Source: Data collected by author

30

Rhode Island passed and implemented Election Day registration for presidential elections in 2011. Therefore
this consideration is not included in the Registration Deadline issue area prior to 2012.
31
The first election where permanent absentee voting status was available is 2008, therefore, this consideration is
not included in the Absentee Voting issue area prior to 2012.
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Table 7
Descriptive Statistics of Sub-Indicators for the Final Index: Minimum Value/Maximum Value
(Mean Value)
Days Prior to Election Person
Must Register
Voter Registration Restrictions
Registration Drive Requirements

1996
0/30
(21.68)
-0.39/2.87
(0)

2000
0/30
(21.64)
-0.39/2.87
(0)

2004
0/30
(21.14)
-0.39/2.87
(0)

2008
0/30
(20.62)
-0.42/2.6
(0)

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

-1.23/1.05
-1.27/1.02
-1.27/1.02
(0)
(0)
(0)
-0.47/2.16
-0.47/2.16
-0.75/1.46
ID Restrictions
(0)
(0)
(0)
10/15
10/20
10/20
Poll Hours
(12.47)
(12.60)
(12.64)
Source: Data collected by author from individual state election office websites.
Absentee Voting

-1.46/0.86
(0)
-0.84/1.36
(0)
10/20
(12.68)

2012
0/30
(18.64)
-0.48/2.21
(0)
-3.18/0.66
(-8.34e-09)
-1.16/1.69
(0)
-1.01/1.24
(0)
9 (VT)/20
(12.71)

secondly, given the smaller number of variables at this stage, there is not a significant gain in
efficiency computationally by dropping variables.
With regard to weighting the variables, I decide to let the data speak for itself and use
the proportion of variance explained by each part as the weight for each component. For the
time between 1996 and 2008, the weights are (0.4, 0.24, 0.19, 0.12, and 0.06); for 2012, they
are (0.37, 0.18, 0.16, 0.12, 0.09, 0.07, and 0.02).32 Based on these weights, I use a linear
weighted average as the aggregation method. The resulting Index for the fifty states is reported
in Appendix C. In the Appendix, I report values for all 50 states in all five elections cycles
considered,33 as well as their rank by year, median rank, and change in rank over time.

For example the calculation of a state’s index score in 1996 = (first component value * 0.4) + (second
component value * 0.24) + (third component value * 0.19) + (fourth component value * 0.12) + (fifth component
value * 0.06).
33
The smallest COVI value was calculated for Utah in 1996 at .177 and the largest value was for Montana in 2004
at .896. It should be noted that the range of the COVI does not span from 0 to 1 completely. Therefore, throughout
the discussion I continually note that the overall effect of the coefficient noted in the regression model tables is
32
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Table 8 lists each state in order according to their COVI rank. Washington had the
lowest COVI value in 2012. It is ranked one because it has the lowest institutional costs
associated with casting a ballot. On the other hand, Hawaii has highest COVI values and is
ranked 50. Included in the Table is also the rank for each state, in accordance with its overall
voter turnout rate in 2012. The state with the highest overall voter turnout was ranked one, and
the state with the lowest turnout was ranked 50. The theory put forth in this chapter, suggests
that as the COVI increases, turnout should decrease. A pairwise correlation will act as a simple
validity check on the Index for 2012. With the rankings as described, a positive correlation is
expected. Although there are some inconsistent findings, for instance Wyoming has the fifth
lowest COVI but only the 38th highest turnout, the correlation between the two rankings is
statistically significant and positive (r = .38; p < .01).
COVI values, in 2012, range from a low of .190 for Washington and a high of .739 for
Hawaii. Larger values indicate a set of institutional arrangements in the state that make it more
costly to vote. Of particular note is North Dakota, although the state received the least
restrictive score for the two considerations related to voter registration, the state does not
receive a particularly low cost of voting score. This occurs because the state has a fairly strict
photo ID requirement, a restrictive absentee voting procedure, and poll hours are only open for
an average of 10.5 hours. Noting the top five least ‘costly’ states, there are several common
themes. Four of the five have Election Day Registration and registration is allowed at polling
stations in all four of these states. Additionally, four of the five states do not require any type of
ID to cast a ballot. Each of the five states also have significantly long polling hours, with the

only a fraction of what is reported, when doing so I am referencing the range between the minimum and maximum
values of these two states.
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Table 8
Cost of Voting Index Rank and Voter Turnout Rank by State: 2012
COVI
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

State
Washington
Colorado
Oregon
New Hampshire
Wyoming
California
Nebraska
Iowa
Wisconsin
Vermont
New York
Connecticut
Delaware
West Virginia
Minnesota
Massachusetts
Maine
Nevada
New Jersey
Maryland
Alabama
Montana
South Dakota
New Mexico
Idaho

Voter Turnout
Rank
16
5
10
6
38
42
31
7
2
23
39
25
11
50
3
4
9
41
28
17
27
15
34
32
21

COVI
Rank
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

State
North Carolina
Utah
Illinois
Pennsylvania
North Dakota
Rhode Island
Mississippi
Kansas
Virginia
Texas
Missouri
Florida
Indiana
Louisiana
Ohio
Arkansas
Arizona
Georgia
Oklahoma
Michigan
Tennessee
Kentucky
Alaska
South Carolina
Hawaii

Voter Turnout
Rank
8
43
33
30
20
26
1
22
12
46
19
35
37
14
24
47
44
29
48
13
45
36
40
18
49

Note: Bivariate correlation between COVI ranking and turnout ranking (r = .38, p < .01).
Source: COVI constructed by author. Turnout ranking determined by turnout rates reported by the U.S. Census
Bureau.

shortest average time being 11 hours in New Hampshire. On the other hand, the five states with
the highest COVI values, have registration deadlines at least 29 day away from Election Day,
and each has a voter ID law.
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Construct Validity Check

Since the COVI was constructed in a manner in which larger values indicate a greater
restriction on voting, I expect a negative relationship between the two variables. To test the
validity of the Index, I run a pairwise correlation between Index values and the turnout of
eligible voters in each of the 50 states over the five elections cycles (n = 250). The correlation
between the two variables is statistically significant and negative (r = -.34; p < .001),
suggesting the Index does comport with expectations. The reason the correlation is not higher,
perhaps, is that the ‘cost of voting’ does not measure anything about the ‘benefits’ of voting.
For instance, it is widely recognized the perceived benefit of voting increases when there is
greater electoral competition. In the following sections I will examine the effect of the COVI
on voter turnout, at both the aggregate and individual level, after controlling for other
considerations known to influence voter turnout.

Using the COVI to Predict Aggregate Voter Turnout in the American States: 1996-2012

In this section, I examine the relationship between the COVI and aggregate voter
turnout in presidential elections in the American states over the last 20 years, using each state
as the unit of analysis (n = 250), while controlling for other predictor variables. It is important
to realize that the ‘benefits’ of voting are largely held constant by virtue of a 50 state analysis
that mimics a most similar case research design. Different party systems and electoral
arrangements, which are generally assumed to influence the benefits of voting, are being held
constant in the analysis because these do not vary across the 50 American states. However, as
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noted above, the probability of casting the deciding ballot is perceived higher when the
outcome of the contest is in question (Aldrich 1993, 252). Hence, in the modeling I take into
account the Most Competitive Race on the ballot. Specifically, I use the post-hoc vote margin
of the race for president, governor, or senator which was the closest in each state, during each
election cycle as a predictor. A smaller margin will suggest a closer race at the top of the ticket,
which is assumed to motivate higher voter turnout in the aggregate. A negative coefficient is
expected for this test.
In addition, I control for the three allowances, which appeared in Table 5. The first is
Preregistration. In Table 5 I identify six different variations associated with preregistration
laws, ranging from no preregistration to allowing individuals as young as 16 to preregister.
However, it is my belief that only those states which allow individuals to preregister at a time
which is greater than one year before they turn the age of 18 are truly embracing the rationale
behind the policy. Therefore, I break down these policies into a binary measure, coding states
which allow individuals as young as 16 and 17 to preregister as “1,” and any state which does
not allow preregistration, or only allows individuals to preregister a maximum of six months or
fewer are coded as “0.” As eluded to, this is not a restriction but an allowance some states have
begun to use. The test should return a positive coefficient. Second, is Online Voter
Registration, and third is Mail Voting. Both are dummy variables and the test of these
allowances should also return positive coefficients. But, because there are so few observations
scored “1” for each of these considerations (little variation on the independent variable) it is not
likely the tests will return statistically significant coefficients. Theoretically, these are
important considerations and if more states adopt these allowances in the future, they likely
will influence voter turnout positively in years to come.

67
Table 9 reports the results. Because data are arrayed over time, and across states, one
might consider a Generalized Least Squares regression model; however, I employ Ordinary
Least Squares regression because the elections are spaced four years apart, which arguably
interrupts any time dependent serial correlation of error terms. More importantly, a plot of the
residuals show no evidence of either autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity. 34
I can note straightaway from the results reported in Table 6 that the test of the COVI is
statistically linked in a robust manner to aggregate state voter turnout in the hypothesized
direction. More specifically, the test suggests overall turnout will decrease by 14.8 percent for
every one unit increase in the COVI. To illustrate, the difference between the least restrictive
state (Washington) and the most restrictive state (Hawaii) is .549 on the 2012 COVI. Hence,
voter turnout in Hawaii is expected to be 8.11 percent lower (-14.78 * .549) than in the state of
Washington, because of the policies Hawaii has in place which increase the costs of voting.35
It is worth noting the lack of statistical significance for each of the variables identified
as allowances. As noted, the lack of variation on the latter two considerations likely explains
why we must accept the null hypothesis. Throughout this time period, there are only two states
which allowed mail voting, Colorado and Oregon, and Oregon only implemented the policy in
2000 and Colorado in 2012. Considering online voter registration the first years this was
allowed was 2002 in Arizona. Therefore there is no variation in 1996 and 2000, representing 40
percent of all observations in the analysis. Still more, preregistration is a relative new
phenomenon and is only recently gaining traction. The test returns a negative coefficient, which

34

After running the model as an Ordinary Least Squares regression, I employ a Breusch-Page/Cook-Weisberg test
for heteroscedasticity. The test reports a chi2 of 1.03 with a p < .31. Failing to achieve a statistically significant
chi2 value means that I have to accept the null hypothesis that there is constant variance in the error terms.
35
The coefficient value obtained from the test is actually the effect of the COVI, on average, over five election
cycles and a test of the COVI in 2012, only, would better illustrate the effect it has on voter turnout in 2012.
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Table 9
The Cost of Voting and Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections: 1996-2012

Variable Name
Cost of Voting Index

Coefficient (s.e.)
-14.78 (2.49) ***

Allowances
Preregistration
Online Voter Registration
Mail Voting

-1.90 (1.10)
1.45 (1.27)
.02 (2.49)

Benefit of Voting
Most Competitive Race (smaller margin)

-.11 (.04) **

Constant
F-Statistic
Adjusted R2
n

71.61 (1.48) ***
8.99 ***
.14
250

Note: Ordinary Least Squares regression Model36 *** p < .001; ** p < .01 (two-tailed tests)
Source of voter turnout data: U.S. Census Bureau.

Is unexpected. However, with these policies targeting those under the eligible voting age, it is
logical to believe that the effects from this policy will take time, as those who preregister move
into the voting population. The benefits of voting, as captured by a close election at the top of
the ticket is statistically significant and negative, as expected, and the coefficient suggests a ten
percent increase in the victory margin (less competition) associates with about 1.1 percent
lower aggregate voter turnout, on average.

36

I also run this model as a between-effects Generalized Least Squares regression model to test the effect of interstate variation in the COVI has on voter turnout. Results for this model are as follows: Cost of Voting = -23.41
(4.04), Preregistration = -1.81 (3.58), Mail Voting = -5.85 (6.86), Online Voter Registration = 7.20 (3.64), Most
Competitive Race = -.23 (.07), Constant = 77.31 (2.54), F-statistic = 8.01, Between Effects R2 = .48.

69
Using the Cost of Voting to Predict Individual Voter Turnout: 1996-2012

Next, the Cost of Voting Index (COVI), will be put to test by analyzing voter turnout
using individual voters as the unit of analysis. Specifically, I draw data on reported voter
turnout from the American National Election Study (ANES) in presidential election years:
1996-2012.37
To best determine if the COVI has an effect on the probability of an individual turning
out to vote I use a logistic regression because the dependent variable, Vote, is dichotomous.
Individuals who reported voting38 in presidential elections where coded “1” and those which
reported that they did not vote were coded “0.” The COVI values (from Table 5 and Appendix
Table C2) were added to the data, corresponding with the year and each respondent’s state of
residency.39 Since this chapter is focused on the costs associated with voting, as in the
aggregate analysis I have also included measures of several other policies which states have
implemented, as allowances. Specifically, online registration, all mail voting, and
preregistration have been added to the model. Other considerations where added to the logistic
regression as controls: the respondent’s party affiliation, home ownership status, marriage
status, education, household income, and campaign participation. And since voting is not just

37

Although the ANES does not sample at the rate the Bureau of the Census does for the Current Population
Survey (CPS), it asks questions associated with an individual’s involvement in the election which has been
reported to affect individual electoral participation (Shaffer 1981; Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Lake and
Huckfeldt 1998).
38
"Self-reported turnout is a poor way to measure overall turnout rates. However, the use of self-reported turnout
to analyze the correlates of voting and changes in turnout levels is much less problematic (Brady 1999; Highton
2005, 113; Katosh and Traugott 1981; Sigelman 1982).
39
Each state was represented in the survey, with respondents from Washington D.C. being dropped from the
analysis. Because the COVI values for individual states are repeated I use the Variance-Covariance Estimate
(VCE) option and cluster the errors by state, which specifies that the standard errors allow for intragroup
correlation, relaxing the requirement that the observations be independent, but controlling for any with-in group
correlation.
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dependent upon the costs associated with casting a ballot, I also include the most competitive
race, as a benefit of voting.
As argued in Chapter 1, age is not the primary reason for increasing an individual’s
probability of voting, but rather it is dependent upon other life experiences which are
accumulated throughout one’s lifetime (Highton and Wolfinger 2001; Nie, Verba, and Kim
1974; Stoker and Jennings 1995). Therefore instead of using age as a control in the model, I
opt for the inclusion of an individual’s home ownership and marriage status. Each variable was
coded as “1” if the respondent responded that they owned a home or were married and a “0”
otherwise.
Education was broken down into two dummy variables, one which designates if an
individual has less that a high school diploma and the other is if they have at least a 4 year
college degree. Respondents were scored “1” for the category in which their education fit, and
a “0” in all other categories. By using these two measures of education, the coefficient reported
in the model are in comparison to individuals who have a high school diploma but not a four
year degree. Research over the years has demonstrated a strong positive relationship between
education and voter turnout (Campbell et al. 1980).
Household income was added to the model through the use of two dummy variables.
The first dummy variable controlled for income below 33 percent. A code of “1” was used for
each instance of income placing the individual in the lowest 33 percent of income, any income
above the 33 percent threshold was coded “0”. Next, a dummy variable was created for those
with a household income in the top 5 percent. Any individual with an income which placed
them in the top 5 percent was coded as “1” and all incomes below was coded as “0”. By
including these two dummy variables in the analysis it allows me to compare the effect of each
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category to the “middle class.” Individuals who have lower levels of income tend to have
lower levels of political participation than those who have higher levels of income (Leighley
and Nagler 1992; 2014).
For the construction of my next control variables I create a scale based upon the
political participation of an individual, since it has shown to increase the likelihood of one
turning out to vote (McClurg 2003; 2006). Each respondent was asked if they had worked for a
party or candidate, went to any political meetings or rallies, if they wore a campaign button or
put a sticker on their car, if they gave money to a party or candidate, and if they tried to
influence others during the campaign. For each activity an individual responds in the
affirmative, I code “1” and a “0” otherwise. I then created a zero to five scale, increasing the
score by one for each activity that an individual participated in. The lowest score on the scale
is 0, for those who did not do any political activity, and a max of 5, for those who participated
in every activity. I then break the scale down into three separate categories (None, Low, and
High), coded as dummy variables. Any individual that responded in the negative to all of the
campaign involvement questions received a “1” for Campaign Involvement: None, all others
which responded with at least one affirmative received a “0”. Any individual that responded
as participating in one, two, or three activities were coded “1” for Campaign Involvement: Low,
a code of “0” was given to all other scores. Lastly, any individual which responded to
participating in four or more of the campaign activities were coded “1” for Campaign
Involvement: High, any score less than 4 on the scale received a “0”. In the model I only report
the coefficients for those with no campaign involvement and high campaign involvement,
effectively comparing those to individuals who had moderate campaign involvement.
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In each year examined every state held a presidential election, while others also
included races for the Senate and/or the Governor’s seat. Because of the Electoral College and
the partisan preferences of particular states, the Most Competitive Race among the three
previously listed races was included. Since it is argued that there is both a cost and benefit to
voting (Riker and Ordeshook 1968), this variable helps include some measure for a possible
benefit for some segments of the population. It is possible that due to the partisan leaning of a
particular state, one of the previously mentioned races may not provide a benefit to some voters
because of the expected win/loss margin of one particular candidate in one particular race.
Whereas, another race may be perceived as closer by the electorate therefore increasing the
benefit an individual may feel by voting. Smaller values for this measure are associated with a
more competitive race.
I run the following logit model and report the results in Table 10:
Model 1: Vote = constant + βCOVI + βOnline Registration + βAll Mail Voting +
βPreregistration + βStrong Democrat + βDemocrat + βIndependent Leaning Democrat +
βIndependent Leaning Republican + βRepublican + βStrong Republican + βOwn a Home+
βMarried + βEducation: Less Than a H.S. Diploma + βEducation: At Least a 4 Year College
Degree + βHousehold Income: Lowest 33 Percent + βHousehold Income: Top 5 Percent +
βCampaign Participation: None + βCampaign Participation: High + βMost Competitive Race +
error.
Table 10 reports the model estimates and percent change in odds for the logistical
regression. The first thing to note is that the COVI coefficient is statistically significant using
the standard 95 percent confidence level. The percent change in odds shows a decrease of
52.52 percent in the dependent variable for each unit increase in the COVI. Recall the COVI
only varies by .549 in 2012, so this represents a 28.83 percent decrease in the likelihood that an
individual will vote when moving from the least restrictive to the most restrictive state.
Additionally, the majority of the control variables are highly statistically significant in the
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Table 10
Model Estimates and Model Summary for COVI and Individual Voter Turnout in Presidential
Elections: 1996-2012
Variable Name
Key Explanatory Variable
COVI

Coefficient (s.e.)

% Change in odds

-.75 (.31)*

-52.52

.02 (.08)
.16 (.07)*
-.07 (.18)

16.78

1.35 (.08)***
.80 (.09)***
.50 (.08)***
.59 (.09)***
.79 (.10)***
1.28 (.11)***

284.30
121.63
63.98
81.12
121.17
257.65

.60 (.06)***
.16 (.06)***

82.86
17.81

-.67 (.08)***

-48.55

.65 (.05)***

91.02

-.22 (.05)***

-19.49

-.23 (.11)*
-1.60 (.04)***
.80 (.25)***

-20.71
-79.79
121.54

Benefits of Voting
Most Competitive Race
(smaller margins)

-.01 (.00)***

-.93

Constant
Wald chi2
Pseudo Rr
N
State Fixed Effects

1.25 (.22)***
4218.57***
.19
12936
Yes

Allowances
Pre-Registration
Online Registration
All Mail Voting
Party Identification
Strong Democrat
Democrat
Ind. Leaning Democrat
Ind. Leaning Republican
Republican
Strong Republican
Additional Controls
Own a Home
Married
Education: less than a H.S.
Diploma
Education: at least a 4 year
College Degree
Household Income: Lowest 33
Percent
Household Income: Top 5 Percent
Campaign Participation: None
Campaign Participation: High

Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01;* p < .05 (two-tailed tests)
Source: COVI constructed by author. Remaining individual level data collected from the
American National Election Surveys.
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hypothesized direction. These include: online voter registration, both education considerations,
low income, no campaign participation, high campaign participation, and the most competitive
race. Notably, state pre-registration policies and all-mail voting do not effectively predict voter
turnout at the individual level after controlling for other considerations.
Figure 5 shows the predicted probability and the 95 percent confidence interval of an
individual voting in a presidential election, since 1996, based upon the cost to vote in their
state. The predicted probabilities were calculated from 0 to 1 in order to capture the entire
breadth of the COVI scale.40 When an individual resides in a state with a value closest to 0 on
the COVI it can be expected that the probability of that individual voting is approximately
57.65 percent, whereas if the individual resides in a state with a COVI score closer to 1 the
probability of them voting drops to 39.26 percent. These predicted probabilities show an 18.39
percent decrease in the likelihood of an individual showing up to cast a ballot, based solely on
the policies which a state has implemented, when holding all other variables constant.
Throughout this section I have demonstrated that the COVI effects voter turnout in the
manner hypothesized. Both aggregate and individual voter turnout are negatively associated
with a greater COVI score. Now that I have demonstrated a proof of concept, I will move on to
examine how the cost of voting affects different segments of the population in various ways.
The next section of this chapter will be dedicated to exploring the cost of voting on each of the
four age groups used throughout this dissertation.

40

When calculating the predicted probabilities values, each of the control variables were held constant at their
modal values when the variable is dichotomous, and at their mean value when the variable is a ratio measure:
online registration = 0, preregistration = 0, all mail voting = 0, strong Democrat = 0, Democrat = 0, independent
leaning Democrat = 0, independent leaning Republican = 0, Republican = 0, strong Republican= 0, home=1,
married=1 education: less than a high school diploma = 0, education: at least a four year college degree = 0,
household income: below 33 percent = 0, household income: top five percent = 0, campaign participation: none =
1, campaign participation: high = 0, and most competitive race = 11.85.
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Source: COVI constructed by author. Remaining individual level data collected from the American
National Election Surveys.

Figure 5. Predicted Probabilities of the Cost of Voting Index in Presidential Elections:
1996-2012

Examining the Effects of the Cost to Vote on Different Age Groups

In previous work on the costs associated with registration and voting, Katosh and
Traugott (1982) note that costs should vary across the population (362). However, to date no
research has explored any variation among the population in any way. This next section, I will
examine the effect the cost of voting has on aggregate voter turnout, on four different age
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populations, in presidential elections in the American states over the last 20 years, using each
state as the unit of analysis (n = 250).
Given what I have learned about state laws and the costs associated with different
policies, in the construction of the index, it is my expectation that the youngest voting
population will bear the greatest burden associated with the cost of voting. For example, youth
(those 18-24), are the least likely to have experience with the voting process. Because of their
lack of experience with the voting process these individuals may find the practice of
registering, finding a polling location, or requesting an absentee ballot too confusing and
overwhelming (Blais 2000; Converse 1971, 446; Kaufmann, Petrocik, and Shaw 2008, 118).
Because of their lack of familiarity with the registration process, this group is typically the
group most benefited by registration drives (Cain and McCue 1985, 1225) and now that some
states are implementing restrictions on these drives, it should increase the costs for young
voters. In addition to their lack of familiarity with the voting process, youth also tend to be the
most mobile group of the population, which in turn decreases the likelihood that they will
register because of their lack of connectedness with the community in which they reside
(Highton 2000; Putnam 1995; Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass 1987). On the other hand, the
other three age groups are more likely to be more rooted in their community, by owning a
home, having a stable career, perhaps a family, more likely to have voted in the past, and have
more knowledgeable about the voting process (Highton and Wolfinger 2001; Leighley and
Nagler 2014; R. E. Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).
Yet, one must remember that as one ages and moves into retirement, some aspects of
the cost of voting may become more of a burden. For example, some individuals, late in life
have to move to a senior community or moving in with family, uprooting them from their

77
previous home, thus requiring them to register once again. Registration could once again
become an issue if a significant amount of time has passed since they last registered. New
methods of registration may have come into practice to reduce registration costs, like online
registration, but may not be an option for less technically savvy seniors. Identification
requirements may also come into effect, if a senior is no longer able to drive. Lacking the
ability to drive, it is conceivable that some of these elderly individuals may no longer have a
photo identification card. Absentee rules may also come into effect or the length of poll hours,
if they have to rely on a working individual to drive them to the polls on Election Day.
To begin the examination of the COVI on aggregate turnout I run pairwise correlation
between the index and turnout rates of each of the four age groups. Earlier in the work I
examined the pairwise correlation between the overall turnout and the index, and the
relationship correlated at a negative 34 percent. However, for the reasons argued above I
expect the relationship to vary over different age segments of the population. Table 11 reports
the pairwise correlations for each of the age groups along with its statistical significance.

Table 11
Pairwise Correlation between Voter Turnout of Different Age Groups and the Cost of Voting
Index Values
Voter Turnout
18-24
25-44
45-64
65-90

Correlation
-.19**
-.28***
-.40***
-.34***

Note: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
Source of voter turnout data: U.S. Census Bureau
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Looking at the Table it can be noted that voter turnout of the age group 45 to 64 is most
significantly correlated with the COVI. Although the correlations show that the COVI affects
the turnout of all age groups negatively, the extent of their correlation varies greatly, with the
weakest relationship between the index and the youngest voting population. These correlations
do not give support for my hypothesis. However, in order to examine the full effect of the costs
associated with voting, I run the turnout of each age group through the same OLS model that I
did for overall voter turnout (Table 9). The results of the OLS model are reported in Table 12.
Similar to the pairwise correlation result, the OLS output shows that youth are the group
least affected by the costs associated with voting. Once all variables are controlled for,
individuals in the 45-64 year-old group experience the greatest burden. Aggregate turnout of
those 45-64 years-old is expected to decrease by 16.85 percent with every increase of one in the
COVI. On the other hand, youth are the least affected, with a decrease of 13.1 percent for
every increase of one in the index. However, it must be remembered that the entire expanse of
the COVI does not span from 0 to 1 completely, depending on the year. Therefore the overall
of the effect on turnout will be a fraction of the COVI coefficient reported in Table 12.
Although my hypothesis is disconfirmed, an interesting aspect of the OLS results are in
the adjusted R2 values. Looking at each R2 value, it is noticeable that the amount of variation
explained by this model is the smallest with those 18 to 24. Only five percent of the variation
in youth aggregate voter turnout is explained by this model, compared to the high of 19 percent
for those 45 to 64. Such a deviation suggests that there are other explanations for the
seemingly low turnout of potential young voters.
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Table 12
The Cost of Voting and Voter Turnout of Various Aggregate Age Groups in Presidential
Elections: 1996-2012

Variable Name
Cost of Voting Index
Allowances
Preregistration
All Mail Voting
Online Registration
Benefits of Voting
Most Competitive Race
(smaller margins)
Constant
F
R2
n

18-24
-13.10
(4.07)***

25-44
-14.88
(2.99)***

45-64
-16.85
(2.39)***

65-90
-15.11
(2.64)***

-2.61 (1.80)
6.30 (4.06)
1.83 (2.07)

-1.12 (1.32)
-2.11 (2.98)
2.44 (1.52)

-1.54 (1.05)
-.88 (2.38)
1.05 (1.21)

-1.85 (1.17)
-1.36 (2.64)
.15 (1.35)

-.13 (.06)*

-.15 (.04)***

-.09 (.03)**

-.03 (.03)

50.38
(2.41)***
3.7**
.05

67.84
80.01
(17.71)***
(1.41)***
7.46***
11.34***
.12
.19
250

80.51
(1.57)***
7.17***
.11

Note: Ordinary Least Squares regression *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 (two-tailed tests)
Source: Voter turnout data from U.S. Census Bureau. COVI constructed by author.

Conclusion

Previous attempts to construct a cost of voting index have been incomplete and are now
outdated. Here, I have constructed a comprehensive Index, for each state from 1996 to 2012,
which began with an examination of 35 different considerations that, theoretically, relate to the
relative convenience or inconvenience of voting in the American states. After combining
considerations which are similar to one another, a total of 13 issue areas were identified for
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possible inclusion in the COVI. Of the 13 issue areas a total of five were ultimately used in the
construction of the Index for the most recent presidential election. Although five issue areas
may not seem substantial, it must be remembered that each of these issues areas is constructed
using as many as five different considerations, with a total of 13 different variables being
included in the index for presidential elections from 1996-2004, 14 variables for 2008, and 19
variables for 2012. Besides the increased number of issue areas which have been taken into
account in this Index, this COVI also deviates from previous indexes because each component
part of the index is weighted according to the percentage of variance explained.
Considering all presidential election years used for the construction of this index, the
COVI has a low value of .177 for Utah in 1996 and a high value of .896 for Montana in 2004.
In 2012, states which received the lowest COVI values tended to have Election Day
Registration and no voter identification laws. On the other hand, states which received the
highest values on the COVI tended to have registration deadlines closer to 30 days and had
strict voter ID laws.
Although passage of the NVRA decreased some costs associated with registering to
vote, states still have significant opportunities to increase or decrease the convenience of
voting. Some recent policies which have been put in place include registration drive
restrictions, registration deadlines further out from the election, and photo identification
requirements. On the other hand, policies have been recently implemented in some states
which, theoretically, are allowances and should prompt greater voter turnout. These are mail
voting, online voter registration, and pre-registration policies. Still more, in order to decrease
the costs associated with voting, and to increase the youth voter registration rates, 13 states
have implemented preregistration for those under the eligible voting age.
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What is clear from the analysis of aggregate voter turnout is that states with higher
COVI values witness less voting. In 2012, turnout was probably about eight percent lower in
Hawaii than Washington because of the electoral institutions each state has in place. Although
Highton (2004, 512) concluded that there was little that we could do in an effort to increase
turnout after the passage of NVRA, this research has identified numerous policies which states
could adopt to increase turnout at the aggregate level. If states desire higher citizen
participation rates, policies such as those which existed in Utah in 1996 should be adopted.
Not only has this chapter identified policies which both increase and decrease the costs
associated with voting on the overall voting population, it has also demonstrated the varied
effects across different age groups. Comments by previous scholars suggested that the cost of
voting will not be consistent throughout the voting population and different segments will bear
greater costs than others. Specifically, each of the four different age group were run through
the same OLS regression as the overall voting population. The findings were somewhat
surprising.
With young voters being identified as the group most likely to have low voter turnout
due to their mobility, and the costs associated with registering and reregistering with every
move, as well as restrictions on voter registration drives, this group was hypothesized to bear
the greatest costs associated with voting. However, both the pairwise correlation and the OLS
regression demonstrate the contrary. After taking into account each of the allowance and the
benefits of voting, individuals in the 45-64 year-old group bear the greatest costs associated
with voting, followed by those 65 and older, and then those 25-44. Overall youth were affected
the least. Although the OLS model reported youth as the least affected group, it also reported
that the amount of variance explained by the costs, allowances, and benefits of voting was the
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smallest. This lack of explanation suggests that there other variables which also contribute to
explaining variation in the turnout rate of youth. The next chapter, puts forth a nontraditional
variable for explaining youth turnout, candidate age.

CHAPTER 4

CANDIDATE AGE AND YOUTH VOTER TURNOUT: AN EXPERIMENT AND
ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL, SENATORIAL, AND GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS
Against the normative backdrop of quality representation born of higher youth voter
turnout, this chapter uses elements of Social Identity Theory (SIT), which has been tapped to
explain the electoral behavior of Latin Americans (Jackson 2011), African Americans (Bobo
and Gilliam 1990), women (Dolan 1998; Matson and Fine 2006), and individuals of a generic
identity (Bassi, Morton, and Williams 2011). Specifically, SIT suggests people will vote for
and support candidates who are like themselves or are members of the same group (Conover
1984; Greene 1999; Huddy 2001; Oakes 2002; Tajfel et al. 1971). Groups can be defined as
individuals with like demographic characteristics, individuals with similar views, or simply
people who belong to the same organization. Here, I use the logic of SIT to theorize that
potential young voters will be more likely to identify with younger candidates and this
increased connectivity will cause greater youth mobilization. Traditionally, identities examined
through the lens of SIT are static, yet age is fluid. However, I feel age can work as an “identity”
and a rallying agent similar to race and gender empathy. I suspect this might especially be the
case when there is considerable disparity in the age of candidates.
At the heart of this chapter is a controlled experiment that isolates the influence of
candidate age on a commitment to vote by young adults. Specifically, college students in
general education classes at a midsized-public-Midwestern university are asked to report their
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likelihood of voting after viewing pictures of older and younger looking candidates in
hypothetical elections. In order to deal with possible imbalance across randomly constituted
groups, in the statistical tests which follow, I control for the age and partisanship of the
students. I also use two sets of pictures to help address the possibility that a particular set of
candidate photographs is driving the results.41 In the end, regression results suggest college
students are more likely to commit to vote when younger looking candidates are running.
Also in this chapter, I look at four presidential elections and eight state-wide races in an
effort to uncover the extent that candidate age effects voting turnout of youth. The cases
selected for presidential elections are based upon the dependent variable (youth voter turnout),
with two races examined for their high turnout and two for their low turnout. In the end, this
analysis suggests that age is an antecedent variable while mobilization efforts are intervening.
Yet when eight state-wide elections were examined, which were chosen based upon the
independent variable (candidate age), no evidence of mobilization efforts of youth were found
among any of the candidates. However, when each of the elections containing a young
candidate running for office was compared to the previous election in the same state which did
not have a young candidate running, youth turnout drew closer to the turnout rate of individuals
over the age of 25. With both this in-depth analysis and the experimental results, it is
determined that age is indeed a sufficient condition for increasing youth voter turnout.

41

Colleagues who were scrutinizing my work noted the first set of photos I was using depicted older candidates
that were not sufficiently-obviously “old” and that there was a problem with inconsistent photo backgrounds;
hence, in the models that follow I control for the set of pictures used and anticipate that the first set of photographs
will associate with a weaker commitment to vote, all else being equal.
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An Experimental Test of Youth’s Commitment to Vote and Candidate Age

As noted above I use college students to conduct the experiment, and to be certain there
has been long-standing academic uneasiness about external validity when using college
students in social science experiments. In this instance, the concern is whether college students
between the ages of 18 and 24 accurately represent the population of others the same age who
have not attended college. In this case, if there is a bias, it would likely function in a manner
which would cause me to underreport evidence of SIT. To illustrate—one might imagine
students in college being more politically sophisticated, on average, than those not enrolled in
college and consequently less likely to use a simple heuristic such as candidate age to
determine whether they will turn out to vote. If this were the case results might produce Type II
error or the tendency to accept a null hypothesis when the reality is that a relationship exists.
Conversely, if testing returns a positive relationship within the college educated sub-sample we
should have greater confidence that the relationship truly exists. In addition, it is possible to
note recent research which argues that external and internal validity are not necessarily
compromised by student participants (Druckman and Kam 2011, 41).42 Researchers using
simulations, suggest student participants do not pose an appreciably greater “treatment effect”
than do other less homogeneous participants (Druckman and Kam 2011, 50). Taken together, I
feel reasonably confident that using college students as my sample to test the SIT thesis is not a
problem and if anything I might be underreporting the value of an age voting cue.

42

The students who participated in the experiment were enrolled in a public university with total admission of
about 21,000. The university’s student body is 60 percent white, 17 percent African American, and 13 percent
Hispanic. Students enrolled in the university had an average American College Testing score that is very typical,
less than one point higher than the national average.
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In support of my suppositions about candidate age and youth mobilization it can be
noted that researchers have found appearance plays a role in citizen evaluations of candidates
for public office (Banducci et al. 2008, 904). But more specifically, I build on the work of
Sigelman and Sigelman (1982) to test whether a younger looking candidate will lead younger
people to commit to vote at a higher rate, these authors expose undergraduate students to
written descriptions of fictional political candidates of different ages, gender, and race. The
Sigelmans uphold a “similarity hypothesis” (267), and suggest there is “ageism” in America’s
youth, or that young voters are prejudiced against older candidates. My research differs from
the Sigelmans appreciably, because my concern is a commitment to vote rather than vote
choice. Consistent with others (Banducci et al. 2008), but distinct from the Sigelmans, I use
photographs as opposed to a written narrative to answer the research question.43
In the analysis which follows, I test respondent’s commitment to vote in a race with two
old candidates running, a race with one old and one young candidate running, and a race with
two young candidates. A total of 784 students participated in the experiment, but I eliminate
incomplete surveys and responses by students 25 years of age or older. I had no respondents
less than 18 years of age. I exclude the older group for the sake of being consistent with the age
designation (18 to 24) most commonly used by the Census Bureau and other investigators of
youth voter mobilization. This yields a useable sample of 691, representing 88 percent of

43

Unfortunately, the use of photographs creates problems. Previous research suggests “more attractive candidates
can be judged more favorable and be more likely to win” (Todorov et al. 2005; see also Budesheim and DePaola
1994). Particularly, researchers show attractiveness is a function of age, my key explanatory variable. Mathes et al.
(1985) find a negative relationship between age and attractiveness for all groups, except females judging the
attractiveness of males (163). I address this concern by purposefully selecting photos of men who are all smiling
without any distinctive level of attractiveness. Copies of the photos used are available in Appendix D. This
research acknowledges that age is linked with attractiveness and the ability to parse out the effects of either one in
the experiment is difficult. However, I hold any concern over attractiveness is muted by my primary focus, which
is not the respondent’s preferred candidate; but simply a commitment to vote.
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participants. Approximately one-third of the students saw each of the three pairs of
photographs.44 The experiment took place in general education, freshman-level courses, over
three academic semesters. Students were told they were involved in research on candidate
image. The survey instrument is provided in Appendix D.
All photos were of white males to control for possible racial and gender effects on a
commitment to vote.45 As mentioned, the experiment uses two sets of six photographs to
control for the possibility that a particular set of pictures drives the results. I control for the 1st
Set of Pictures in the modeling that follows and expect a commitment to vote will be lower
with the first set of pictures because a post-hoc analysis determined that the second set of
photographs depicted “older” candidates that looked older. As a screen for the experiment’s
true test, students were asked which candidate they would be more likely to vote for, 46 and
then, their likelihood of voting in each race on a scale ranging from ″1″ to ″10″ with ten
representing the strongest commitment to vote.
Table 13 provides summary data on the dependent variable and explanatory variables
employed in the experiment. Concerning the dependent consideration, Commitment to Vote, the
sample returned a mean value of 6.03 with a one standard deviation of 2.55 points. Concerning
the treatment—photos of candidates of varying age—I use the hypothetical race with two older
looking candidates running as the reference or control group. Hence, I have a variable for Old
44

Once my useable database was defined, 243 students saw photos of an old versus an old candidate, 230 students
saw photos of an old versus a young candidate, and 218 students saw photos of a young versus a young candidate.
45
I use photos of actual state legislators from a different state, but in the same geographic region of the country
that the experiment took place in.
46
I can report in the sample of cases that had both a young and an old candidate, 62 percent of respondents were
more likely to pick the young candidate (142/228). Two students in this group did not report which candidate they
preferred. When I break down a preference for the younger candidate by party affiliation, I learn self-identified
Democrats picked the young candidate 71 percent of the time (88/124), Republicans 48 percent of the time
(28/58), and Independents 58 percent of the time (26/45). One student in this group did not report her partisan
identification. In this subsample of cases of a young versus an old candidate there is no correlation between a
preference for the younger candidate and a commitment to vote (r = -.02; p < .78).
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v. Young and a second variable for Young v. Young. My expectation is that there will be a
stronger commitment to vote when there is at least one young candidate running and the
strongest commitment to vote when there are two young candidates running.

Table 13
Summary Data Youth Commitment to Vote Experiment

Dependent Variable

Min.
Value

Max.
Value

Mean

Stnd.
Dev.

Commitment to Vote

1

10

6.03

2.55

Treatment Variables
Frequency
Old v. Young

0

1

230/691

Young v. Young

0

1

218/691

0

1

201/691

Control Variables
1st Set of Pictures

Participant Age

18.00

24.83

Mean

Stnd.
Dev.

20.27

1.58

Frequency
Strong Party
Identifiers

0

1

61/691

Republican

0

1

192/691

Independent

0

1

129/691

n

691

89
I begin with simple bivariate tests of the association between a commitment to vote and
the two treatment groups and the control group. Table 14 displays these results. There is a
statistically significant negative relationship between a commitment to vote and the
photographs with two old candidates running. There is a positive bivariate relationship between
a commitment to vote and the set of pictures which exhibited two young candidates facing off.
Third, there is an insignificant positive relationship when considering a hypothetical race with
one young candidate running against an old candidate. Each of these correlations reasonably
meets expectations, the negative and significant correlation between a commitment to vote and
the race with only old candidates running, in particular, seems to comport with a social identity
thesis.

Table 14
Bivariate Relationships between a Commitment to Vote and Different Groups
Treatment Groups

Exp. Sign

Pearson r; p-value

Sample Size

Old v. Young

+

.02; p < .35

230

Young v. Young

+

.07; p < .03

218

-

-.09; p < .02

243

Control Group
Old v. Old
Note: p-values based on a one-tailed test

I will now turn to a regression analysis which will control for the set of pictures used,
but also Participant Age, Strong Party Identifiers, a Republican Party affiliation, and an
Independent party identity. The logic of random-assignment in an experiment suggests these
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control variables may be unnecessary; however, a regression with theoretically important
variables included ought to sharpen the estimates. The dependent variable values are
proportional scores obtained by dividing a respondent’s commitment to vote by 10 and I use an
Ordinary Least Squares regression. However, I also run the model using an Ordered Logit
regression, discussion to follow.
Participant age I hold will be positively associated with a commitment to vote (mean
age = 20.27; one standard deviation 1.58). In controlling for the partisan preference of
respondents I use assumptions informed by previous research and measure party affiliation
using a seven point Likert scale analogous to the one used by the American National Election
Study (see Appendix D). First, I suspect Strong Party Identifiers (either Democrat or
Republican) will be more likely to commit to vote (Campbell et al. 1980; Abramson and
Aldrich 1982). Second, I hypothesize that self-identified Republicans will be more likely to
commit to vote (Conway 1985; Mangum 2003) and, last, that self-identified Independents will
be less likely to commit to vote (Keith et al. 1992), all else being equal. I use all three types of
Republicans to define the Republican variable (leaners, Republicans, and strong Republicans)
and use pure Independents to test the thesis that independent individuals are less likely to
engage the political process. I run the following Ordinary Least Squares model and report the
results in Table 15:
Model 1: Commitment to Voting = constant + βOld v. Young + βYoung v. Young + β1 st Set of
Pictures + βParticipant Age + βStrong Party Identifier + βRepublican + βIndependent + error.
First, and foremost, I learn from the model run that, on average, when there is a young
candidate running there is a stronger commitment to vote on the part of student participants.
Moreover, based on the size of the coefficients and the level of statistical significance, the
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greatest commitment to vote occurs when there are two young looking candidates running. This
is consistent with the hypotheses laid out earlier and the logic of SIT.
Considering the control variables, I learn that participant age is positively associated
with a commitment to vote but it is not statistically significant. Minimal variation on this
variable undoubtedly contributes to the lack of a statistical relationship. The first set of pictures
used, which depicted, younger looking old candidates, are statistically linked to a weaker
commitment to vote as anticipated. Last, two of the three partisan hypotheses are confirmed. I
find Republicans are more committed to vote and Independents less committed. Strong party
identifiers, contrary to expectations, are not more likely to commit to vote, on average, after
controlling for other considerations.
I also run the model as an Ordered Logit to substantiate my findings and to gain some
insights into the substantive significance of my tests. With the Ordered Logit regression I
preserve the 1-10 scale representing a commitment to vote. These results are reported in
Appendix E, Table E1. The results are consistent with the OLS model run. Moreover, I learn
the odds of moving from one value of the dependent variable (a commitment to vote) to the
next value in a positive direction are 1.33 times greater when there is one young candidate
running. This grows to 1.49 times greater when there are two young candidates running, ceteris
paribus. The odds of moving up one value on the scale are 2.02 times greater if the student is a
Republican and .54 times more likely when the respondent is an Independent.47

47

An odds ratio less than “1” for Independents suggests this is an inverse or negative relationship.
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Table 15
Youth Commitment to Vote and Young Candidates: An Experiment
Exp.
Sign

Coefficient (s.e.)

Old v. Young

+

.40 (.22) *

Young v. Young

+

.57 (.23) **

1st Set of Pictures

-

-.96 (.21) ***

Participant Age

+

.06 (.06)

Strong Party Identifiers

+

-.01 (.33)

Republican

+

.89 (.22) ***

Independent

-

-.86 (.26) ***

Treatment Variables

(Old v. Old Omitted Group)
Control Variables

Constant

4.67 (1.24) ***

F-Statistic

9.76 ***

Adjusted R-Squared

.08

Sample Size

691

Note: Ordinary Least Squares regression
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 (one-tailed tests)

An Examination of Real World Races

With the experimental results supporting my theory that young voters will commit to
vote at greater rates when a younger candidate is present, I forge ahead to examine real world
elections. The following section is dedicated to a qualitative analysis of four presidential
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elections and eight state-wide (6 Senatorial and 2 gubernatorial) races. Each of the four
presidential elections were selected based upon variation on the dependent variable (youth
voter turnout) in an effort to find evidence of the effect of the key explanatory variable
(candidate age). Two of the presidential elections had the highest levels of youth turnout and
the two comparison cases had the lowest levels of youth turnout, since the first election after
the 26th Amendment was passed.48 Because there are so few presidential races to choose from
it is imperative that I choose cases in this manner to assure there is a reasonable amount of
variation on the dependent variable to account for. Moreover, in the analysis of presidential
races, the key explanatory variable if left-censored because of the constitutional mandated
minimum age of 35 years. However, when I turn to an analysis of eight state-wide elections
there is a much larger sample to choose from and I am able to choose cases, in a more
acceptable manner, based on candidate age or variation on the key explanatory variable.
Additionally, in the state level analysis I look for elections where candidates are under
35 years of age so it is not simply the case that a candidate is perceived to be “young” but the
candidate is actually quite young. During the time period of this study (midterm elections
from 1994-2012), defined in part by the availability of comparable data, there are 230 elections
for either governor or senator in the available midterm election cycles. I use midterm elections
to avoid the age of candidates in a more high profile presidential race from contaminating the
analysis. I also use races at the top of the ballot (governor and Senate races) under the
assumption that these elections are the most salient and most likely to produce public
awareness of personal candidate qualities. Specifically, I find four races with a candidate under

48

I wait to begin the comparison in 1976 to remove the bias associate with seminal elections when voting
opportunity is significantly altered (Burden 2000, 391).
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35 years of age running. In order to perform a controlled comparison of these elections, I
examine youth turnout in each state in the election preceding the campaign which had a young
candidate running, hence, a sample size of eight. I begin, however, with a comparison of youth
voter turnout in presidential elections.

Presidential Elections

Table 16 reports the turnout and election years for the four cases chosen. By examining
the data in Table 16, affirming evidence can be found in three of the four cases selected. Most
specifically, as the age gap between the two major party presidential candidates decreases, so
does the turnout of the 18-24 year-old group.

Table 16
Youth Voter Turnout and Candidate Age Difference in Presidential Elections: 1976-2008
Year
Youth Voter Turnout

Candidate Age
Difference

Record High Turnout
1992

42.1

22

2008

44.3

25

Record Low Turnout
1996

34.3

23

2000

32.3

2

Source of voter turnout data: U.S. Census Bureau
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Turning to an analysis of these four specific elections one learns that the two elections
which stand out for their higher than average youth voter turnout, 1992 and 2008, also had
significant age gaps between the candidates. In 1992, President George H.W. Bush was
running against Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton. The turnout of youth in this election was the
highest since the seminal election in 1972, at 42.1 percent of the voting eligible population that
were 18 to 24 years of age. Importantly, the age gap between the two major party candidates
was significant. Bill Clinton was 46 and George H.W. Bush was 68 on Election Day. Then in
2008, turnout of the 18-24 year old group once again reached a much higher than average level.
In this election a 47 year-old Barack Obama was running against 72 year-old John McCain.
Although 46 and 47 may not sound like especially young candidates when the group being
analyzed does not exceed 24 years of age however, when looking at presidential elections in the
modern era these ages are considerably below average. From 1972 to 2012 the average age for
presidential candidates is 58.8 years of age with a standard deviation of 8.5 years. So, both
Clinton and Obama were more than one standard deviation younger than the average candidate
while the age of their challengers where also more than one standard deviation higher than
average. Theoretically, a significant spread in age between major party candidates makes the
uncommon age of each individual more salient with the younger voting public.
However, as I previously noted the relationship between the age gap and youth voter
turnout only works for three of the four elections. With the 1996 election failing to conform to
expectations, it suggests that something else may be contributing to variation in youth turnout.
Although it is theoretically possible that age primarily drives the increase in turnout among
youth in these elections, there may be other factors which contribute to their mobilization. As I
will show it is possible that age is an antecedent variable for a candidates’ mobilization efforts
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of college-aged voters. To try and obtain a better understanding of the true causal process, if
one exists, I use an analysis of newspaper reports on each of the relevant election cycles using
the on-line search engine Lexis-Nexis.
For both the 1992 and 2008 elections, several searches were conducted for articles
addressing the “presidential election and youth turnout” along with searches which used the
candidate’s name “and young voters" in the relevant election year. 49 The first search returned
one article in 1992 and 62 articles in 2008. This suggests that youth voter turnout was a much
more salient topic in 2008 than it was in 1992. When each candidate’s name was entered along
with “young voters” a much larger number of articles were generated.
Table 17 displays article counts for each of the different searches conducted in 1992. As
noted there was only one article specifically addressing the presidential election and youth
turnout that year. The article notes, the day after the election, that Bill Clinton’s pitch to
younger and first-time voters paid off with record youth voter turnout.50 Although significant
attention was not paid to the possibility of high turnout of this group prior to the election, the
amount of attention Clinton was giving potential young voters, was. When examining the
amount of media attention each individual gave to the youngest voters, Clinton was referenced
with young voters in 108 articles, whereas Bush was only referenced in 75 articles. However,
these numbers do not tell the whole story. The articles with Clinton were overwhelming
positive, with discussions about how he is trying to connect with youth. Articles which
mentioned both President Bush and “young voters” talked about his lack of willingness to
appear at venues which bring in younger crowds.
Search parameters were from January 1 to December 31 and included “Bill Clinton and young voters,” “George
Bush and young voters,” “Barack Obama and young voters,” and “John McCain and young voters”.
50
USA Today, November 4 1992. “Exit Poll: Economy is Clinton’s Magic Wand”
49
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Table 17
Newspaper Article Results and Search Terms for the 1992 Presidential Election
Search Terms for 1992 (Jan. 1 – Dec. 31)
Presidential election AND youth turnout
Bill Clinton AND Young Voters
George Bush AND Young Voters

Number of News Articles
1
108
75

Source: LexisNexis Academic

Of particular note, several articles allude to the idea that 1992 was a critical election 51
for young Americans. Immediately prior to this election, in the 1980s, a majority of young
voters had consistently been voting for the Republican Party. 52 While examining many of these
articles it is reasonable to assume that the shift in party support among young voters, which
took place in 1992 is largely due to the attention Clinton gave this age group. Then, Governor
Clinton appeared on television networks such as MTV and late night talk shows such as the
Arsenio Hall Show.53 While Clinton was appealing to youth in their domains, President Bush
and his campaign noted that he would never go on any shows like that and, “at 68, he was too
old to become a teeny-bopper.”54 In newspaper reports the Bush campaign acknowledged that
youth get the message that he is out of touch, that he fails to connect with what their life is
about,55 and that their generation has been forgotten or dismissed by national leaders. 56

51

For a discussion of critical elections see Key (1955).
The Washington Post, September 15,1992, “Young Voters Appear to Be Shifting Away From the Republican
Party”
53
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri), September 20, 1992, “Economy Keeps Bush Behind in Poll Assorted
Pressures Lead Younger Voters to; Take Interest in Presidential Election”
54
The Globe and Mail (Canada), October 31, 1992, “Republicans Find Ray of Hope in Latest Polls, Bush Gaining
Ground, But Clinton far Ahead in Electoral College Vote”
55
The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, February 28, 1992, “What They’re Saying on the Campaign the Comics
Carson and Company Skewer the Candidates”
56
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 13, 1992, “Dim Future Some Young Voters Not Optimistic, Claim Leaders
Ignored Generation”
52
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Connecting with this population went beyond appearing on certain television shows.
Governor Clinton visited college campuses, such as University of New Mexico (UNM), and
had a much better organization for registering voters of all ages. When Clinton visited UNM, a
total of 4,114 new voters were registered, with only 40 of that total registering as
Republicans.57 Just over a month before the election the Clinton campaign was signing up 200
volunteers a day at Ohio University.15 Although President Bush seemed to be ignoring the
youth population, it was believed that Vice President Dan Quayle was popular with younger
voters and should have helped shore up this segment of the potential voting population in the
Midwest.58 This may have been the case in 1988, when younger voters favored the
Republicans, but with the actions of the Bush administration during its time in office, and its
lackluster desire to connect with these voters in 1992, just having a younger vice presidential
running mate did not seem sufficient to persuade many youth to stay with the Republican Party.
While Bush seemed to be ignoring young voters, newspaper reports suggested the
College Republicans organization was actively working on his behalf. The organization took a
one-on-one approach when it came to recruiting, and criticized the media for its lack of fairness
in their coverage of their conservative beliefs.59 In the end, strategies by Bush and the
Republican Party failed to connect with the youngest voting population, creating a perception
of a greater effort on Clinton’s behalf. In hindsight, the new strategies of the Clinton campaign
and the impact of MTV’s Rock the Vote, may have greater explanatory power than candidate
age or the age gap. It remains to be seen if candidate age alone, without a concerted
The Guardian (London), September 22, 1992, “ First-Time Voters Tune into Clinton; The Usually Apathetic
young are Flocking to the Democrats”
58
The Washington Post, January 5, 1992, “Dan Quayle: The Premeditated Surprise; How Young Senator Executed
Game Plan to Become Bush’s Running Mate in 1988”
59
The Globe and Mail (Canada), September 30, 1992, “Swinging to a Democratic beat U.S. Election: In a Year in
which Arsenio Hall Carries as Much Clout as Ted Koppel, Young Voters are Registering in Increasing Numbers”
57
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mobilization effort, will be sufficient to increase youth voter turnout. I turn now to an analysis
of the 2008 campaign, which also had a young candidate, a large age gap, and a strong youth
mobilization strategy.
The experiment reported earlier suggests that age is sufficient for mobilization, but
evidence from the 1992 and 2008 presidential elections suggests that there might be other
conditions which have led to the record turnout of youth and its overwhelming support for the
Democratic Party. It will be the analysis of the control cases and the state-wide races, which
will demonstrate more completely the way the age of candidates’ influences youth voter
turnout in these real world scenarios.
In 2008, Barak Obama and John McCain were in the battle for the White House. With
high youth turnout being credited for helping Bill Clinton win the presidency in 1992, the
media gave significant attention during the 2008 presidential campaign to candidates appeal to
the youngest voting segment, as is evident from the findings reported in Table 18. Overall,
there were 62 news articles which discussed the turnout of youth, with most of these articles
focusing on whether or not it was going to be another record turnout on Election Day, and
articles written after the election gave reasons why it had reached record levels. The amount of
attention which was given to each candidate and their appeals to the youngest voting group
increased greatly from 1992, with Barack Obama being identified with young voters in 1939
articles, 150 percent more than John McCain.
It seems that candidate Obama had studied youth and had some understanding of the
reasons why youth turned out in record numbers in 1992 and why they had failed to turnout for
Al Gore in 2000. With whatever knowledge he had, Barak Obama put into place many
initiatives that mobilized young voters like no other presidential candidate in the contemporary
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Table 18
Newspaper Article Results and Search Terms for the 2008 Presidential Election
Search Terms for 2008 (Jan. 1 – Dec. 31)
Presidential election AND youth turnout
Barack Obama AND Young voters
John McCain AND young voters

Number of News Articles
62
1939
1290

Source: LexisNexis Academic

period. Obama engaged youth in their environment and with technology, both on Facebook
and text messaging.60 Obama spent a considerable amount of time on university campuses and
at the beginning of October in 2008, Michelle Obama, the presidential candidate’s wife visited
the University of Colorado campus in a concerted effort to mobilize young Americans.61 Her
topic of choice was the burden of paying off student loans and how she and Barak Obama had
just finished paying off their own loans. Additionally Joe Biden, the Democratic vicepresidential candidate, visited college campuses in Florida to increase youth turnout in a “must
win” state.62
Obama’s youth mobilization efforts did not stop with campus visits, he also spent a
considerable amount of money on youth mobilization, sending youth volunteers to campaign
workshops across the country in order to educate them on campaign work and organization.
While McCain’s campaign failed to organize college volunteers in states like Wisconsin,

Sarasota Herald-Tribune (Florida), November 3, 2008, “Election to test youth strategy; Payoff: Obama
campaign has engaged young voters, but will they vote? Election will put youth strategy to test”
61
Daily Camera (Boulder, Colorado), October 2, 2008, “Obama: get out that vote; Candidate’s wife addresses
young voters at CU rally”
62
Sarasota Herald-Tribune (Florida), November 3, 2008, “Election to test youth strategy; Payoff: Obama
campaign has engaged young voters, but will they vote? Election will put youth strategy to test”
60
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Obama had over 100 students educated, through a workshop in Milwaukee, early in the
campaign.63
Overall, the articles which mentioned John McCain in 2008 noted how his campaign
was not actively targeting youth. The overwhelming number of these articles also mentioned
Senator Obama and compared each candidate’s appeal to this voting group. Each of these
articles mentioned McCain’s lack of support among young voters. The few positive mentions
of McCain and youth focused around his message concerning global warming, 64 as well as his
selection of a younger “hockey mom” as his vice presidential running mate.65 Yet, without a
direct appeal to youth, any opportunity that might have existed with this group was lost.
The analysis of the 1992 and 2008 elections show that in addition to a young candidate
running, each had a younger candidate who employed extensive mobilization efforts targeted at
youth. An analysis of these two elections, seem to show that actively pursuing the youth vote
by candidates can mobilize this traditionally poor performing group. But just as importantly,
these two elections suggest that age might not be the only factor which increases youth turnout.
Yet, nothing in the analysis of newspaper reports suggests that the youth of the candidate is not
an important predictor of whether a candidate will work to mobilize youth at greater than
average rates. All that being said, I move next to an analysis of the presidential elections with
the lowest youth turnout, 1996 and 2000.
In 1996 only 34.3 percent of eligible 18-24 year-old voters cast a ballot, and in 2000
turnout decreased slightly to 32.3 percent. As with the previous two elections I ran a Lexis–

The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin), July 30, 2008, “Advantage Obama; Young, Trained Political
Organizers are Blanketing the State for Barak. Where is John McCain’s Field Organization?”
64
The Philadelphia Daily News, October 9, 2008, “They’re Registered, But Will Young Voters Vote?”
65
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania), September 14, 2008, “Gambling on the Youth Vote; If Obama Wins
the White House, Chances are that Young Voters Will Have Put Him There”
63
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Nexis search for each election with the same key phrases “presidential election and youth
turnout,” as well as candidates’ names in each election cycle with “young voters”. Table 19
reports the number of articles for each of the search criteria. With the record turnout in 1992,
the media still did not give much attention to youth in 1996 with the search of “presidential
election and youth turnout,” returning only 1 article.

Table 19
Newspaper Article Results and Search Terms for the 1996 Presidential Election
Search Terms for 1996 (Jan. 1 – Dec. 31)
Presidential election AND youth turnout
Bill Clinton AND Young Voters
Bob Dole AND Young voters

Number of News Articles
1
89
69

Source: LexisNexis Academic

In 1996, President Bill Clinton was running for reelection against Bob Dole. Although
high youth turnout was credited for the President Clinton’s win in 1992, the media still did not
give significant attention to this particular voting segment in his re-election campaign. Only
one article was written mentioning the election and youth turnout levels. Another surprising
element is the amount of articles that discussed President Clinton and young voters. In 1996,
there was a decrease of 18 percent in the number of articles that mentioned President Clinton
and this youngest voting population from his first presidential campaign. This decrease is
suggestive of the decline in the Clinton campaign to mobilize and connect with youth. Overall,
by looking at the number of articles written about each candidate, neither really sought out to
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connect with this voting segment. Political experts were well aware that neither of the main
party candidates were appealing to the young generation.66
The 1996 election was the second presidential election that MTV’s Rock the Vote was
actively working to get younger people to vote. With the supposed lessons learned by the
Republican Party in the 1992 election, Bob Dole tried to connect better with youth by
appearing on MTV’s Choose or Lose bus. However, this did not work well for him and
commentators claimed the appearance just made him look like an old dinosaur, failing to create
any positive connection with potential young voters.67 Regardless of this attempt, Dole was
still perceived by young Americans as not putting forth any effort to reduce the generational
gap between himself and potential youth voters.68 While Dole failed in his attempt to connect
with youth, Clinton was also giving it only a halfhearted attempt.
It seems the huge impact that Clinton had with this segment of the population in 1992
made him complacent in 1996, taking young voters for granted. 69 Such sentiments were echoed
by youth, noting that the politicians are not speaking their language or addressing their issues. 70
The low turnout of youth in 1996 was foreshadowed by reports that young voters were largely
disappointed in the work of the Clinton Administration.71 Additionally, in 1996 the approach
that the Clinton campaign used to connect with this voting population was almost a rerun of the
1992 election. Specifically, Clinton went on MTV and other talk shows but failed to do

The New York Times, March 30, 1996, “Young Voter, Diverse and Disillusioned, Are Unpredictable in ’96
Race”
67
The Guardian (London), February 20, 1996, “As Youth Vote Swells, Activists Take up the Slack; Jonathan
Freedland in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Unravels the Mystery of Generation X”
68
Lincoln Journal Star (Nebraska), October 28, 1996, “Issues, Candidates Keep Young Voters from Polls”
69
The Philadelphia Inquirer (Pennsylvania), October 1, 1996, “Youngest Voters are Ready to Make Their X, But
This Election, None of the Presidential Candidates is Courting Their Favor”
70
Lincoln Journal Star (Nebraska), October 28, 1996, “Issues, Candidates Keep Young Voters from Polls”
71
USA Today, August 27, 1996, “Youth Vote Still is up for Grabs, Poll Analysts Say”
66
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anything new to connect. It seems, based on comments made in the media, that youth found
these attempts boring and that they consequently disengaged in the electoral process. 23
In 2000, the media started to pick up on the importance of young voters, as can be seen
by the search results reported in Table 20. For example, the search of “presidential election and
youth turnout” returned 64 articles, as opposed to the previous search results of one article for
1996. Additionally, each candidate saw an increase in the number of articles in which they
were mentioned with young voters. With the potential to learn so much from the 1992 and
1996 election cycles, it is surprising the candidates in 2000 did not try to engage youth at a
greater rate. As the narrative continues, it will be clear that many of these articles painted a
bleak picture about the connection between the candidates and individuals between the ages of
18 and 24.

Table 20
Newspaper Article Results and Search Terms for the 2000 Presidential Election
Search Terms for 2000 (Jan. 1 – Dec. 31)
Presidential election AND youth turnout
Al Gore AND Young voters
George Bush AND young voters

Number of News Articles
64
131
148

Source: LexisNexis Academic

After the election, some journalists believed that the historically close election between
Al Gore and George W. Bush in 2000 could have swung one way or the other, if either
candidate would have focused less on family values and not ignored issues of importance to
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younger single individuals72 who failed to turn out to vote at an alarming rate. At one point, Al
Gore attempted to connect with the youth, by having his 27-year-old daughter address potential
young voters at the Democratic National Convention. Nevertheless, this attempt failed
because instead of focusing on topics important to youth, she focused on her baby and the
future of young children. Another failed attempt by the Gore campaign was the website
(gorenet.com) which his campaign set up to energize young voters. 73 Yet, its inability to
mobilize could have been due to the website being before its time, or that a just having website
targeting college-aged individuals is too little to mobilize this group. However, it was not only
Al Gore who could not connect with the youth, both candidates failed to gain any traction with
the youngest voting bloc.
When it comes to Bush’s appeal to young voters the news reports reveal a similar
strategy as Gore’s. In an attempt to get young voters onboard with the Bush campaign, his
handlers deployed his nephew George P. Bush. 74 George P. Bush was a young, attractive man
born with a Mexican mother. Although Governor Bush pushed his nephew to connect with
young voters, his nephew made the same mistake as Gore’s daughter. When interacting and
talking with young voters he emphasized his uncle’s commitment to family, failing to address
any issues which were important to young single individuals. 32
These attempts at connecting with youth were failures for two reasons. First, neither
candidate attempted to connect with the youngest voters themselves, instead sending family
members. And second, the messages conveyed a disregard for young single people and their
issues, focusing instead on young families. With each of these attempts both candidates sent
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania), August 2, 2000 “Families Valued, Singles Ignored”
Ledger (Lakeland, Florida), April 10, 2000 “Young Adults Tuning Out Election”
74
The Straits Times (Singapore), August 4, 2000 “The Bush Dynasty”
72
73
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the same message to youth single voters. Specifically, that they were not important because the
candidates themselves could not be bothered to interact with or address issues which were
important to this group. The lack of appeal to this group was greatly noticed since
approximately 65 percent of advertising, by both candidates, was specifically targeted toward
the 50 and older crowd.75
Table 21 reports a qualitative summary of the four presidential elections examined.
Each table lists each candidate, their age on Election Day, the extent of their campaign’s youth
mobilization efforts, and whether or not a new Get Out The Vote Campaign (GOTV) was
embraced.
The combination of races examined here shed light on three possible explanations into
whether or not youth turnout at higher than average rates on Election Day. First, there must be
a nominee which is significantly younger than the average presidential candidate, with the other
nominee being significantly older. Second, youth voters must actively be appealed to,
addressing issues and concerns which are important to them. And third, a new method must be
embraced by a candidate in their GOTV campaign. Most clearly the evidence suggests that
there must also be a mobilization effort in addition to a large age gap between the candidates in
order to increase the rates at which youth turnout. Although, the analysis of these presidential
elections shows that mobilization is an intervening consideration on youth voter turnout, the
following examination of state-wide elections will demonstrate that such efforts are not
necessary.

The Ottawa Citizen, November 4, 2000 “American youth ignore election: With voter apathy at an all-time
higher, Generation Y leads the way”
75
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Table 21
Qualitative Summary of Presidential Elections Examined
Age Youth Mobilization Effort

New GOTV Campaign

High Turnout Races
1992
Bill Clinton
George H.W. Bush

46
68

High
Low

Yes
No

2008
Barack Obama
John McCain

47
72

High
Low

Yes
No

Low Turnout Races
1996
Bill Clinton
Bob Dole

50
73

Moderate
Low

No
No

2000
Al Gore
George H.W. Bush

52
54

Low
Low

No
No

Midterm Elections

In an effort to examine the impact of age on races besides presidential elections, I look
to all state-wide races across the 50 states which took place in mid-term election years from
1994 to 2010. I choose mid-term elections because it removes the effect of the age of the
presidential candidates and their mobilization efforts from tainting the analysis. This process
yields a total of 230 elections, 50 standalone Senate races, and 63 standalone gubernatorial
elections, and 117 where there were both governor and Senate races appear on the same
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ballot.76 Unlike the presidential elections I have a greater number of elections to examine and
better variation on the key explanatory variable (candidate age). Instead of allowing the races
and candidates dictate what is considered a “young candidate” I am afforded the opportunity to
better define at what age a politician can be considered young. The average age of the
youngest candidate in each of the 230 elections is just over 49, with a standard deviation of
seven. So, in order to limit the number of cases to a manageable qualitative analysis I look at
any races where the youngest candidate is younger than 35, or two standard deviations away
from the average age of the youngest candidate. Consequently, any individual running for
office under the age of 35 is significantly young, when compared to those who run for high
offices.
I must note upfront that of the 698 individuals in the elections I examine there are only
four candidates under the age of 35. The small number of candidates facilitates a qualitative
analysis but does raise issues of generalizability. There simply is not a lot of young people
running at the top of the ballot in the United States. Obviously, there are younger candidates
running for state and local offices, but it is difficult to imagine that these races down the ballot
will aggregate youth voter turnout. Table 22 exhibits youth voter turnout figures in the four
cases with young candidates and compares this to youth voter turnout in the previous mid-term
election, along with the voter turnout of people 25 and older. By a matter of chance each of the
four races where there is an individual below the age of 35, is a Senate race. Overall, I expect
to see a smaller voter turnout gap between the two age groups (18-24 and 25+) when there is a
young candidate running. Put differently, evidence of SIT, based on age, will be present if the

76

There is a possible sample size of 250 (50 states x 5 mid-term election periods), however, some cases have been
dropped because no state wide elections were held in some mid-term election years.
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turnout of young people more closely mirrors the turnout of the remaining voting population
when a candidate under the age of 35 is running.
By examining Column 5 in Table 22 I note that in three of the four cases, voter turnout
for the youngest age group is higher than it had been in the previous mid-term election, when
there was not a candidate below the age of 35 running; nearly 15 percentage points higher in
South Carolina. In the one instance where voter turnout was not higher, the under-35 candidate
in Illinois was running in an open seat race against a relatively young (for a Senator) Mark Kirk
(R-IL), 51 years of age at the time of the election. The candidate age gap would have been less
obvious in this race than it was in the other three races, which had a younger candidate facing
off against incumbent senators who were 59, 68, and 74 years of age. Yet, in all four instances
(see Column 6) the difference between the two age groups drew closer when a candidate under
35 was running. In Illinois, where young people did not turn out at a higher rate, compared to
the previous election, the difference with the other age group in 2010 was still smaller than it
had been in 2006. This suggests that there may have been some other aspect of the 2010
Illinois election which dissuaded individuals from all age groups from turning out to vote.
To begin a more through qualitative analysis of how age affects youth turnout in these
Senate races, I will first look at the 2002 Senate Election in Michigan, where a young Andrew
Raczkowski (33) was running against incumbent Carl Levin (68). This 35 year age gap
highlights the youthfulness of Raczkowski. A Lexis-Nexis search did not result in any articles
linking Carl Levin or Andrew Raczkowski and young voters. 77 Moving on to an examination
of 1998, the top elected office on the Michigan ballot was for governor, with no Senate seat up

77

Additional searches were also conducted to try and connect each candidate to younger voters, such as adding
“college” and “university” to the search criteria, instead of “young voters”.

110
Table 22
Youth Voter Turnout Compared to Other Ages and Previous Elections:
Young Candidate Running
1824
year
old
TO

Youngest
Age78

25 +
year
old
TO

TO

Year

State

Gap

2002

Michigan

33.8

Young
Candidate
Running

21.5

54.7

33.2

1998

Michigan

47.8

Previous Midterm Election

18.1

56.1

38.0

2010

Arizona

32.4

Young
Candidate
Running

27.1

52.0

24.9

2006

Arizona

64.3

Previous Midterm Election

17.5

50.5

33.0

2010

Illinois

34.6

Young
Candidate
Running

20.6

49.5

28.9

2006

Illinois

49.8

Previous Midterm Election

20.8

51.3

30.5

2010

S.
Carolina

33.2

Young
Candidate
Running

33.5

53.2

19.7

2006

S.
Carolina

46.4

Previous Midterm Election

18.6

49.0

30.4

Note: TO = Turnout of eligible voters expressed as a percentage.
Source of voter turnout data: U.S. Census Bureau
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All four candidates under the age of 35 were running for Senate seats, only the Illinois race was an open seat. In
the other three races the young candidate was facing an incumbent senator. The young candidates were Andrew
Raczkowski (MI-R); Rodney Glassman (AZ-D); Alexi Giannoulias (IL-D); and Alvin Greene (SC-D).
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for election. Governor John Engler (50) was running against Geoffrey Fieger (47). The search
of this race turned up one article, where Geoffrey Fieger discussed his campaign strategy of
targeting individuals who live in college towns because of their progressiveness, but not
because of their youthfulness. Otherwise, no other articles were found addressing any of the
four candidates and a direct appeal to young or college aged voters. The lack of news coverage
suggests that media reporting and or campaign strategies are not likely the cause of more young
voters appearing in the 2002 Michigan election.
The next race I look at is the 2010 Senate election in Arizona, where John McCain (74)
was running for reelection against a young Rodney Glassman (32). Because John McCain ran
against President Obama in 2008, greater attention was given to his lack of connection with
youth in 2010. A Lexis-Nexis search brings up a total of 38 articles that link “McCain and
young voters” in his race against Glassman. However, in reading each of these articles, none
talk about the efforts of McCain to connect with youth for his 2010 campaign. The
overwhelming majority of articles discuss how he was not able to connect with youth in the
2008 election, why the majority of youth lean democratic, and why youth were less likely to
show up in the mid-term election. No results were found linking Glassman to younger voters.
The 2006 Senate race in Arizona was between John Kyl (64) and Jim Pederson (64). With the
same search criteria, no evidence could be found of either candidate actively pursued younger
voters during the campaign.
In 2010 Mark Kirk (51) was running for reelection against a young Alexi Giannoulias
(34) in Illinois. A news search of the two senatorial candidates reveals that Giannoulias
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attempted to reach out to young voters by scheduling a campaign stop at Illinois College. 79
This article was the only one linking Giannoulias to actively courting young college aged
voters. When the same search was conducted for Kirk, no articles mentioned any active appeal
to college students or young voters. As a comparison, I look to the 2006 Illinois Gubernatorial
race, because no Senate race was on the ballot. In this race Rod Blagojevich (49) was running
against Judy Baar Topinka (62). Although there is a reasonable age gap between the two
gubernatorial candidates, Blagojevich is not considered young by the criteria adopted by this
analysis. The same Lexis-Nexis search which I conducted for previous races was also
conducted for this race and did not produce any evidence that either candidate targeted youth
during their campaign. Again, the lack of news coverage that mentions young voters I am
assuming means there is little in the way of mobilization efforts taking place.
The final two races I examine are in South Carolina. In the 2010 Senate race, youth
turned out at a rate closer to that of the remaining voting population, when a young Alvin
Greene (33) was running against an older Jim DeMint (59). In 2006, the comparison election
was for the governor’s seat, where Mark Sanford (46) was running against Tommy Moore (56).
As was the case for the majority of the searches for the previous elections examined, no news
reports were posted about any candidate in these South Carolina races and there were no
mentions of appeals to young college aged voters.
Through the examination of these mid-term state-wide elections, I find that besides the
presence of a young candidate, there is no other significant driver for youth to turnout. By
conducting a newspaper search for each race, it reveals that only one candidate pursued
connecting with youth with a campaign stop at a college. Besides the one event for Alexi
79

Jacksonville Journal-Courier (Illinois), February 22, 2010, “U.S. Senate Hopeful Giannoulias Stops Here”
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Giannoulias, no other news articles mention any other candidates making noteworthy appeals
to younger voters. Although Giannoulias stopped at one college to appeal to the students there,
it is unlikely that this campaign visit mobilized youth as a group, throughout the state, in any
significant way. The lack of evidence for any significant appeal to youth voters by these
Senatorial and gubernatorial candidates suggests that having a young candidate present in a
race is a significant motivating factor for youth to turnout at rates closer to the older voting age
population on Election Day.

Conclusion

The preponderance of evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates a link between
candidate age and youth voter turnout. Results from the experiment reveal that young college
aged students are more likely to commit to vote when a younger candidate is running in a given
election. Students were most likely to commit to vote when two significantly young candidates
were running against one another, and just slightly less likely to commit when only one young
candidate was in a race. The lowest commitment to vote among those in the experiment was in
the race with two older candidates. Since it seems that many high profile races typically have
two older candidates running against each other, this helps explain the traditionally low turnout
of youth. These results, however, beg for a more complete examination of real world races.
In order to see if such results are mirrored in the real world, I examined four
presidential races and eight state-wide mid-term elections. The presidential elections included
two with high youth turnout (1992 and 2008), and two with low youth turnout (1996 and 2000).
Through the examination, I find that the two presidential elections that have the highest turnout
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have several similarities. Both in 1992 and 2008, Bill Clinton and Barack Obama were more
than one standard deviation below the average age of a presidential candidate, while their
challenges, George W. Bush and John McCain more than one standard deviation above the
average age. However, this does not seem to be the only factor for the high turnout in these
two elections. In both elections, Clinton and Obama appealed to, and aggressively sought out
the youth vote through the use of new media outlets. President Bill Clinton, was the first to
appear on a late night television show and MTV, whose target audience was younger
individuals. While, President Obama also appeared on late night talk shows, he additionally
sought to reach young people by using social media platforms.
The examination of the two presidential elections with the lowest youth turnout also
reveals some important information. In 1996 Bill Clinton was still significantly younger than
his Republican competitor, yet his age moved closer to the average age for a presidential
candidate. Not to mention, his reelection campaign seemed to take the youth vote for granted
because he had won it so handedly in 1992. Specifically, he used the same strategy as in 1992,
appearing on television shows. However, since this approach had already been used, its
effectiveness with the youth diminished. In 2000, there was only a two year age gap between
Al Gore and George Bush, with both close to the average age of a presidential candidate. Each
also attempted to reach out to youth, with an appeal from a younger family member, but these
efforts fell short because the family member failed to address issues concerning single collegeaged individuals. Most notably, media reports explain the extremely low turnout and lack of
engagement of youth in part because he overwhelming majority of money spent on advertising,
aimed at voters over the age of 50. Such evidence suggest that youth were not an important
demographic to both candidates, and any effort to appeal to this group was half-hearted.
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Although, the examination of the high profile presidential elections suggest that there
may be more to youth mobilization than social identity theory suggests there is nothing in the
analysis that runs contrary to the contention that younger candidates bring out younger voters.
Moreover, the examination of state-wide races suggests that candidate age is a sufficient
condition to spur greater youth mobilization. In the final section of this chapter, I examine
eight races in four different states. Because the experiment pointed to age as being a factor in
turnout and the analysis of presidential elections suggested that the candidate age gap is
consistent with variation in youth turnout, I moved to an analysis of four Senate races where
one candidate was under the age of 35. To get the best indicator of the effect of age, I also
examined the top of the ballot race, in each state, preceding the elections with the young
candidate running. This approach brought in two gubernatorial races into the analysis. By
examining the elections prior to these races, it allowed me to hold variables constant within
each state. For each race I conducted a Lexis-Nexis search with each candidate’s name and
“young voters/college/university.” In total only one candidate made a noteworthy appearance
at a college, trying to appeal to college aged voters. The overall lack of results demonstrate
that gubernatorial and senatorial candidates in these races did not target or try to appeal to the
youngest voting population. With state election laws being held constant, very little
explanation can be given for the increase in young voters in one election over another, besides
the presence of a candidate under the age of 35 in the race. Therefore, these results lend
additional support to the idea that age is a sufficient condition for increasing youth voter
turnout.

CHAPTER 5

A CULMINATION OF EFFECTS: A MORE COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF YOUTH VOTER
TURNOUT

Up this point there have been many interesting insights uncovered that speak to the
broader issue of youth mobilization, and youth voter turnout, specifically. In this chapter I turn
to a more comprehensive analysis, which tries to develop a model of youth voter turnout with
real-world implications. Even more specifically, I incorporate the new measure of youth
unemployment (Chapter 2), the new cost of voting index (Chapter 3), as well as the age gap
between the candidates and the youngest candidate (Chapter 4), in an attempt to create a
definitive model of youth voter turnout.
I look to explain variation in youth voter turnout in U.S. Senate seat and governor’s
races during the four most recent midterm election cycles (1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010).
Again, the analysis of midterm elections, prevents contamination from the age and mobilization
efforts of presidential candidates. I will test the candidate age gap, the COVI, and the new
unemployment measure against youth voter turnout while controlling for a host of other
considerations that might influence youth mobilization. As with the entire dissertation, I focus
my efforts on variation in voter turnout of the voting eligible population from 18 to 24 years of
age, as measured by the Current Population Survey and reported by the Census Bureau. In the
end, the analysis reveals that among the three key explanatory variables the COVI and
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candidate age gap are found to have a statistically significant effect on youth voter turnout.
The lack of statically significant findings for the new measure of youth unemployment is
revealed to be the result of the overbearing effect of the COVI and the candidate ages, which
are both positively correlated with the youth unemployment measure (r = .20; p < .01 for the
COVI and r = .06; p < .43 for the age gap).
To begin the analysis, I construct an original dataset which includes all gubernatorial
and Senate races in the four election cycles. As noted, I include the The New Measure of
Unemployment for those 18 to 24,80 the COVI,81 the Age Gap between the two candidates, and
the age of the Youngest Candidate. The completed dataset includes 183 elections, 38
standalone Senate races, 50 standalone gubernatorial elections, and 95 elections where there is
both a gubernatorial and Senate race on the same ballot.82
As I demonstrate in Chapter 2, the traditional measure of unemployment is negatively
correlated with voter turnout of eligible voters 25 and older (r = -.18; p < .006); however, it
produces a positive association with turnout of those 18 to 24 years of age. Inclusion of the
COVI is also important because many of the values included in the construction of the Index
have been shown to have a profound effect on the turnout of individuals across the United
States. Although, Chapter 3 demonstrated that youth are the least affected by the costs
associated with voting, the model still returned a statistically significant negative coefficient for
80

The new measure of unemployment data were calculated using the November reports from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics website: (http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/laus_nr.htm#1994 last accessed 1/20/2016).
81
Because laws regarding registration and procedures associated with casting a ballot change over time, COVI
values had to be calculated for each Presidential Election dating back to 1996. However, in this chapter I am only
examining midterm election, therefore the COVI values assigned to each state in each midterm were the values
calculated for that state in the Presidential Election year prior to the election. For example states in the 1998
midterm election received the state’s COVI value from the 1996 Presidential Election. Exact values for each state
can be found in Appendix C.
82
The sample size is 183 (not 200—4 election cycles*50 states) because not every state had a statewide (either a
gubernatorial nor Senatorial) election in the midterm years examined.
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this age group. The findings in Chapter 4 also demonstrate that the age of the candidates is an
important mobilizing factor for youth.
Although the values for the new measure of youth unemployment and the COVI are
straight forward, the findings in Chapter 4 dealing with candidate age are more ambiguous.
Therefore, I collect data on two unique considerations of candidate age. Specifically, I measure
the age of the Youngest Candidate and the Candidate Age Gap.83 I use the ages of the two
candidates who finished first and second, nearly always one Republican and one Democratic
Party candidate. In standalone gubernatorial and Senate races the measurement is
uncomplicated. For the elections where there were concurrent gubernatorial and Senate races I
use the age of the youngest of the four candidates to capture “Youngest Candidate.”
Given so few instances of young candidates running I turn to an analysis of the
candidate age gap. Arguably, the presence of a “younger” candidate becomes more obvious
when they are juxtaposed in a race with a considerably older candidate.84 Recall in the
experiment, in Chapter 4, when college aged respondents saw pictures of one young and one
old candidate running they were more likely to commit to vote than when they saw pictures of
two old candidates; although the commitment to vote was not as strong as it was when viewing
two young candidates.

Each gubernatorial and Senate candidate’s age is determined by calculating the number of days between his or
her Birthdate and Election Day and dividing this number by 365.25 to obtain yearly values. Exact dates of birth
were available for every election winner but the birthdates of some challengers could not be acquired for all 560
candidates involved. In 55 instances candidate ages were approximated. When we could learn the month and year
but not the date, we used the 15th of the month to calculate his or her age. For some candidates, only birth years
could be ascertained and in these instances we use June 30th of that year to gauge his or her age. Last, in four
instances, after repeated Internet searches and telephone calls no birth year was available. In each of these cases
we were able to ascertain the year the candidate graduated from high school. I assume the candidate was 18 years
old at the time and use a corresponding birth year and June 30th to calculate his or her age.
84
When there was single gubernatorial or senatorial race, the age gap between the top two vote getters was used.
However, when there were concurrent races I used the difference between the oldest and the youngest candidate,
among the four candidates running.
83
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Given observed anecdotes and the results of the experiment in Chapter 4, my suspicion
is that the candidate age gap can be a motivating factor bringing young people to the polls in
gubernatorial and Senate races. Specifically, I hypothesize that as the difference in candidate
ages grow, eligible voters between 18 and 24 years of age, in the aggregate, will be more likely
to turnout to vote. Importantly, I know the candidate age gap has no relationship to voter
turnout of the eligible population 25 and older. In the four elections cycles I examine, the
bivariate correlation between Voter Turnout 25+ and the candidate age gap is insignificant and
actually negative (r = -.10; p < .17). If I am able to uncover a significant positive association
between the age gap and youth voter turnout this will be occurring independent of any
influence the age gap has on voter turnout of older voters.
Also included in the model are variables associated with voting allowances, most
specifically: pre-registration, online registration, and all mail voting. Although the results from
the model run in Chapter 3 do not indicate any of these variables as being statistically
significant at the 95 percent confidence level, they are being included for internal validity,
because they are theoretically important, and for consistency across models.
Finally, because the act of voting is not solely based upon the costs associated with
voting, but also benefits I have included the most competitive race. State-level electoral
competition has been shown to increase turnout (Durden and Gaynor 1987; Tucker 1986)
because the benefit of turning out and being the deciding vote increases. This variable was
calculated by finding the smallest winning margin for a top of the ticket race. If there was only
a Senate race or only a gubernatorial race that margin was used. However, if a state had both a
Senate and a gubernatorial race running concurrently, than the smallest margin of the two races
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was used. Smaller margins are expected to increase turnout so a negative coefficient is
anticipated.
The following model is tested:
(Random Effects): Youth Voter Turnoutit = constant + βNew Measure of Unemploymentit +
βCOVIit + βCandidate Age Gapit + βYoungest Candidateit + βPre-registrationit + βOnline
Registrationit + βAll Mail Votingit + βMost Competitive Raceit + between errori + within errorit
Note: “i” indicates each of the American states and “t” indicates each of the four election cycles
analyzed (1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010).
Because my data are arrayed over time and across the same fifty states, there is the
possibility that values on the dependent variable may be correlated with one another in a
manner that unexplained variance in the dependent variable, or error, is not random. For this
reason, I adopt a Random Effects Generalized Least Squares (GLS) model specification.
Footnote 6 provides more complete information on the modeling decision.85
Table 23 reports the results of the comprehensive test. The sample size drops from 183
to 129 because I eliminate races where the winning candidate had over a 25 percent margin of
victory. Elections that are lopsided often are the result of a popular incumbent running against
an unknown challenger, these uncompetitive races arguably require an alternative model
specification. One might imagine that controlling for the election margin would be sufficient to
85

There are considerable gaps in the data, not every state had a gubernatorial or Senate election every year and the
electoral competition limitation creates additional breaks in the data. The temptation is to run a simple Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regression, but I opt for Generalized Least Squares (GLS), which explicitly makes use of
information contained in the possible equal variability of the dependent variable across states and time. Support
for this decision is based upon the results of a Breusch-Page/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity. The test
was employed after running the OLS regression and reports a chi2 of 3.98 with a p < .05. Achieving a statistically
significant chi2 value means that I have to reject the null hypothesis that there is constant variance in the error
terms. Therefore, GLS gives me the best opportunity to produce coefficients that are the “best linear unbiased
estimator(s)” (Gujarati 1995, 362). Additionally, I run a Hausman Specification test to determine if there is
systematic difference between coefficients obtained when running the model using either a Random Effects or
Fixed Effects specification. The Hausman test produces a Chi2 value of 11.17; p < .19, which indicates that I
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two coefficient vectors are equal, therefore I adopt the random effects
model. Last, I must acknowledge the possibility of heteroskedasticity in error terms that might result from the
Census Bureau using different sample sizes in each election year and across the 50 states. I have included the
Census Bureau’s elaboration of issues regarding sampling and non-sampling error in Appendix E, as well.
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account for these anomalous cases but this variable alone is insufficient to account for the
idiosyncratic nature of lopsided elections. Importantly, when I use an alternative cut point I
obtain coefficients similar to those reported in Table 23. The results of the alternative model
run are provided in Appendix E. When I run the models using all 183 cases I cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the candidate age gap has no influence on youth voter turnout. However,
not unlike a youngest candidate that is over twice the age of the 18 to 24 year old population, it
is difficult to imagine the age of candidates influencing voter turnout rates when there is little
electoral competition or expectation that one’s vote will make a difference.
When I truncated the analysis, as explained above, and look at just those races that in
the end, were reasonably competitive I can report that two of my three key explanatory
variables come out in the expected direction and are statistically significant as hypothesized.
The variable used to capture unemployment among those 18 to 24 years of age, did not produce
a statistically significant association with youth voter turnout after controlling for the other
factors. The lack of statistical significance for the new measure of youth unemployment is
interesting, given the findings in Chapter 2, which were robust.
In order to see if it was data from the presidential elections driving the statistically
significant results in Chapter 2, I rerun Model 7 from Table 3, using only data from midterm
elections.86 When presidential elections are excluded from the model, the coefficient for the
new measure of unemployment for youth is increased to .14 (.04) and is statistically significant
at the p < .01 level. Results for this model can also be found in Appendix E. This suggests that
it is not the set of elections analyzed that created the statistically significant findings reported in

86

The model tested mirrors Model 7 in every way, except the variable associated with the identification of
presidential elections was dropped because only midterm elections were examined.

122
Table 23
Youth Voter Turnout in Midterm Elections and Key Explanatory Variables from Previous
Chapters87

Variable Name
Key Explanatory Variables
New Measure of Unemployment
COVI
Candidate Age Gap
Youngest Candidate

Expected Sign

Random-Effects
Coefficient (s.e.)

+
+
-

.01 (.07)
-10.58 (5.68)*
.16 (.07)*
.07 (.08)

+
+
+

1.35 (2.83)
1.17 (3.19)
-4.31 (3.46)

-

-.05 (.08)

Allowances
Pre-Registration
Online Registration
All Mail Voting
Benefits of Voting
Most Competitive Race (smaller
margins)
Constant
Chi2
R2
n

23.75 (5.66)***
11.76
.10
129

Note: Random-effects Generalized Least Squares regression. *** p < .001; * p < .05 (one-tailed tests)
Source of voter turnout data: U.S. Census Bureau. COVI and New Measure of unemployment constructed by
author.

Chapter 2. Regardless if I use all elections or only midterm elections the unemployment
consideration is significant, hence; the lack of statistical findings for the new unemployment
measure, must be due to the inclusion of other variables that are collinear with the
unemployment consideration. The most egregious autocorrelation is between the COVI and the
new measure of unemployment for youth at r = .20; p < .01.

87

Post-hoc election margin is 25 percent or closer.
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Indeed, there are numerous examples, where the COVI or the candidate age gap seem to
have a greater effect on the turnout of youth. Specifically, in 1998, Minnesota has an
extremely robust turnout of young voters (40.42 percent), with the new measure of youth
unemployment being quite low and a relatively low COVI value (.373). In fact, it seems that
the COVI has a significant influence on turnout, because Minnesota again has a relatively high
turnout in 2002. However, in conjunction with Minnesota’s lower COVI (.409), in 2002 it also
had a large age gap (21.7 years) between its two Senatorial candidates, with still a low youth
unemployment rate of 7.12 percent. Two more examples are Montana in 2006 and Indiana in
2010. In Montana, youth turned out at higher than average rate of 34.03 percent, but had a low
rate of youth unemployment (5.19 percent) and had a significant age gap (21.6 years) between
their senatorial candidates. On the other hand Indiana in 2010, had extremely low turnout (9.93
percent) among youth, when their unemployment rate was extremely high (27.92 percent) but
the COVI was also significantly high (.688). In each of these cases, either the COVI or the
candidate age foreshadow the value or importance of the new measure of youth unemployment
and its effects on variation in youth voter turnout.
In this more comprehensive model, the COVI is easily statistical significant (p < .05).
However, when taking each of the key explanatory variables and additional controls into
account, the value of the COVI drops from what is reported in Chapter 3. The coefficient now
suggests a -10.58 percent drop in youth voter turnout for an increase in “1” on the Index. The
range of the COVI does not span from zero to one, hence the overall effect is reduced. For
instance, in 2012, the Index has a range of .55, between the low value found in Hawaii and the
high value found in Washington. Therefore, according to this model, youth turnout in Hawaii
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would be 5.81 percent lower (10.58 * .55) than Washington because of the cost its institutional
policies placed on voting.
Additionally, in midterm elections the candidate age gap is statistically linked to higher
youth voter turnout. The substantive significance is considerable. Considering the age gap, my
results suggest an increase in one year in the candidate age gap associates with about a .16
percent increase in youth voter turnout, on average. Put differently, an increase in the candidate
age gap of ten years will approximately increase youth voter turnout by just over one and one
half percent, ceteris paribus. A 20 year age gap, which is not uncommon associates with an
increase of youth voter turnout of over three percent. The average age gap for cases in this
analysis is 9.5 (10.71 years in all 183 races) years, with a minimum age difference of .2 years
and a maximum age difference of 41.8 years.
Another important explanatory variable included in this model was the age of the
youngest candidate. This variable failed to produce a statistically significant coefficient in this
model. However, given what was learned in Chapter 4, there is not significant variation on this
variable in all of the elections and among the candidates examined. With an overall lack of
young candidates running for office, and individuals more likely to be older when running for
higher level political offices, failure to reach a statistically significant coefficient is not
surprising. Until there is a greater variation in the age of the candidates running for political
office, with a significant number of them being “young,” it is unlikely that this variable will
produce statistically significant results.
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Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to bring together all of the findings from previous chapters
into one single model. Chapter 2 demonstrated a positive statistically significant relationship
between the new measure of youth unemployment and the turnout of those under the age of 25.
Chapter 3 created a single variable for the cost of voting and demonstrated its varied effect
across different age groups. And finally, in Chapter 4, through the use of an experiment and
qualitative inquiry, the research produced evidence that the age of candidates can motivate
young adults to vote. Here I incorporated all of these explanations into a model which
examined midterm elections from 1998 to 2010. The use of midterm elections was determined
to be best for testing the relationship between these variables and youth voter turnout because
the tests would exclude contamination from more high profile presidential electoral politics.
After running a more fully specified model, two of the three key explanatory variables
come out as statistically significant, the COVI and the candidate age gap. The COVI
coefficient, although smaller than what was reported in Chapter 3, still demonstrates the
negative effect the costs associated with voting has on this young age group. The candidate age
gap, on the other hand, suggests that Social Identify Theory can be useful in helping one
understand the mobilization of young Americans. The most surprising result was that the new
measure of youth unemployment did not have any effect on turnout, given the results in
Chapter 2. However, diagnostic tests suggest that unemployment levels in the American states
are often correlated with either the COVI or the candidate age gap. These three very distinct
considerations would normally not be correlated – or at least there is no theory which can be
used to link the alternative explanations to one another. Hence, the correlations are the
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unfortunate result of chance sampling bias. This suggests more work needs to be done in other
time periods or perhaps with a different set of races in order to better gauge the effect of youth
unemployment on youth voter turnout.

CHAPTER 6

THE FUTURE OF THE YOUNG AMERICAN VOTER

The research examined throughout this dissertation demonstrates that some traditional
variables have a significantly different effect on the youngest voting group (those 18-24), when
compared to the remaining voting-age population (25-44, 45-64, and 65-90). Additionally, the
value of Social Identity Theory, experimentally, and through a follow-up analysis of real-world
election scenarios, is solidified. Young voters, not unlike African Americans, Latino/as, and
women, are found to turnout to vote at higher rates when candidates for public office are drawn
from their group.
In Chapter 2, I begin with an examination of economic hardship and its effect on young
voters. A review of the prevailing literature uncovers considerable theoretical and empirical
disconnection. Scholars have yet to forge a consensus on the overall effect that economic
hardship, and specifically unemployment, has on voter turnout. I posit that the desperate
findings of previous research may be the result of an age group effect, suggesting that
unemployment has varying effects on different age groups. Relatedly, research suggests the
accumulation of life experiences increases the political activity of individuals (Denver 2003).
Although unemployment is not traditionally seen as one of these political motivating life
experiences, I now believe that such an event at a formative point in a young person’s life can
increase the likelihood they will choose to participate in elections.
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When testing the effect of the traditional measure of unemployment on the overall
voting population in midterm and presidential elections from 1994 through 2012, I find a
demobilizing effect, giving support to the withdrawal hypothesis (Basinger, Cann, and Ensley
2012; Brody and Sniderman 1977; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Rosenstone 1982; Southwell
1988). However, when this measure is used to explain the turnout of each of four different age
groups, results become less conclusive. Only the 25-44 and 45-64 year-old age groups are
found to be negatively affected in a statistically significant manner. Both the youngest and
oldest age groups, on the other hand, do not experience the same negative demobilizing
influence. In fact, the sign reverses for the youngest group and the research suggests this group
is mobilized by economic hardship. This is the case in both bivariate and multivariate testing.
Traditionally, unemployment, as calculated by the government, only counts individuals
who are currently out of work and actively looking for a job. Yet this criteria leaves out
important segments of the population, most specifically, the discouraged and the
underemployed. Therefore I test a new measure of unemployment, which includes individuals
who are either discouraged or underemployed. Incorporating these individuals in a new
measure of economic hardship is important, especially for young Americans, because they
typically hold part-time jobs while attending school (Lucas and Ralston 1997), or may continue
their education if they graduate during a time period defined by poor economic conditions
(Kahn 2010).
When incorporating these additional groups in the new measure of unemployment, the
new coefficient remains positive for the youngest group and becomes statistically significant,
indicating a mobilizing effect. This increase in voter turnout suggests that youth behave
differently to poor economic conditions than older generations. In the end, the model using the
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new measure reports an overall increase in voter turnout of .10 for every one percent increase
in the new measure of unemployment for those 18-24. When one considers this group has
unemployment rates at least two times greater than other age groups, and traditionally turns out
at much lower rates (approximately 31.5 percent from 1994 to 2012), the overall effect is
impressive. The average rate of the new measure of unemployment for those 18-24, during the
time period studied, was 15.5 percent, moving zero unemployment to average unemployment
results in an increase of 1.55 percent. A one and one half percent increase may not seem like
much, but with the low turnout of young Americans, it results in a relative increase of almost
five percent for this group.
In the end, Chapter 2 demonstrates the two ways in which youth differ from the
remaining voting population. First, the traditional measure of unemployment, theoretically and
empirically, is not an adequate measure of economic hardship for those 18 to 24 years old.
Second, and perhaps most important, once a more inclusive measure of unemployment is used,
this youngest age group is the only segment of the voting population which sees a mobilizing
effect from economic hardship or unemployment. The other two age groups which dominate
the working force (25-44 and 45-64), are demobilized.
Chapter 3 continued with the goal of showing how youth are different, with a focus on
the costs associated with voting. Examining the literature on institutional barriers to voting, it
is widely accepted by scholars that as the cost increases, the likelihood of an individual voting
decreases (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). However, the vast literature has yet to
take a comprehensive look at the myriad of possible “costs” associated with casting a ballot. In
previous research it was common to look at only one or a few institutional barriers to voting
(Katosh and Traugott 1982; King 1994; Leighley and Nagler 2014; R. E. Wolfinger and
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Rosenstone 1980). In one instance, King (1994) attempted to create an index, which captured
the costs associated with registering to vote using three variables (the closing date for
registration, time purged for nonvoting, and where a citizen may register). However, this index
is no longer useful for three reasons. One, since 1995 states have not been allowed to purge
voters for nonvoting and are required to accept mail-in registration, due to the passage of the
1993 National Voter Registration Act (a.k.a. “Motor Voter”). Two, because the weights he
assigns to each component are equal, he fails to acknowledge that each component has a varied
effect on the cost of voting. And three, since the passage of the Motor Voter, states have been
passing additional laws that side step the national mandate, increasing the cost to vote for their
citizens.
Before examining the relative cost each age group incurs due to the registration and
voting policies of their state, I created a comprehensive Cost of Voting Index (COVI). A total
of 35 different variables were considered for their inclusion in the construction of the index. In
the end, up to 19 different variables are reduced to five issue areas (registration deadline, ID
restrictions, polling location hours (avg.), registration drive requirements, and absentee voting),
which are then weighted and combined to create the COVI. The construction of the COVI is
accomplished by reducing related components into a single measure, through Correspondence
Analysis or the creation of a correspondence score. These composite measures were than
combined with two interval indicators (days before election you must register and poll hours)
through the use of Principle Component Analysis which effectively weighs each component.
In the end, each state received a COVI score for each presidential election, since 1996. Values
for the COVI range from a low of .177 for Utah in 1996 and to a high of .986 for Montana in
2004. Higher COVI scores represent a greater cost and lower scores suggest lower institutional
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barriers to voting. After the construction of the Index, its robustness was tested using aggregate
and individual level data. Both the aggregate and individual level checks preform as expected,
showing a negative effect on voting as the value of the COVI increases.
With the COVI performing as expected I then examine aggregate data in an effort to
determine if the costs associated with voting affect various segments of the population
differently. Specifically, the COVI was tested on the turnout of four different age groups.
Because youth lack the familiarity of voting and the process associated with registering, it was
hypothesized that they would be the greatest affected by the costs associated with voting.
However, both a pairwise correlation and regression output demonstrate that youth are the least
affected of the four age groups. Most specifically, individuals between the age of 45 and 64
experience the greatest drop off in voting when the COVI is higher. Presumably, the younger
generation is more technologically savvy in a manner that allows them to navigate some of the
institutional barriers more effectively.
Although Chapter 3 does not show that youth are affected differently than older age
groups, the results of the model tested in Chapter 3 reveal that the costs and benefits of voting
do a poor job of explaining variation in turnout among youth when compared to other age
groups. This suggests there are other variables which influence youth participation rates. In the
end, the COVI demonstrates the power and ability of states to pass legislation which can
directly increase or decrease overall voter turnout even though this does not place a
disproportionate burden on young Americans.
In Chapter 4, I move away from examining traditional measures of mobilization and
focus on the age of the candidates running for high office. Through the lens of Social Identity
Theory (SIT), I hypothesize that younger voters are more likely to vote, if a young candidate is

132
present in a high profile race. To best examine the possibility that SIT can be used to
accurately predict youth voter turnout I conduct an experiment and compliment this with
qualitative analyses of a dozen real world electoral competitions.
The experiment consisted of sampling 691 college students, enrolled in a general
education class, over a three semester time period. Each student was exposed to a different set
of photographs of two candidates running in a hypothetical race, one set of photographs
showed two young candidates running, another set had two old candidates running, and the
third set of photos displayed both a young and an old candidate. Results from the experiment
show that college-aged voters are more likely to commit to vote when there is at least one
young candidate running for office and most likely to commit to vote when there are two young
candidates.
With supportive results from the experiment, I put SIT to task by examining real-world
election scenarios. I begin the real-world examination by choosing four presidential elections,
based upon values on the dependent variable (youth voter turnout). In both of the cases where
youth voter turnout was the highest (1992 and 2008) I find a substantial age gap between the
presidential candidates, with one being significantly younger and the other significantly older
than the average age of all presidential candidates in the modern era. However, in both of these
races each of the young candidates made a significant attempt at mobilizing youth, contributing
substantial resources while using new methods of connecting with college-aged voters. When
examining the two elections which had the lowest levels of youth turnout (1996 and 2000), one
race had a significant age gap between the candidates (1996), while the candidates in the 2000
election were close in age to one another and the average age of a presidential candidate in the
modern era. In both of these elections, none of the candidates made a concerted effort to
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mobilize youth and failed to implore new methods of engagement. Analysis of these four
presidential elections suggests that candidate age and a candidate age gap can be consequential
but it is not clear whether this needs to also be accompanied by mobilization efforts. It may be
that age is an antecedent consideration and that mobilization efforts are intervening between
age and voter turnout. However, I continued my real-world examination with state-wide midterm elections across the 50 American States, from 1994 to 2010.
With a greater variety of races to choose from, I selected cases based upon my
independent variable (candidate ages). Unlike in the presidential elections I had a better
opportunity to define at what age a candidate can be considered young. Among the 230
elections examined the average age of the youngest candidate was 49. However 49 can hardly
be considered young by those 18 to 24, so I opt to examine races in which the youngest
candidate is no older than 35, or more than two standard deviations away from the average age
of the youngest candidate. This resulted in four Senate races (Michigan 2002, Arizona 2010,
Illinois 2010, and South Carolina 2010) to examine. In order for the best comparison, I
compare each election to the state-wide mid-term election preceding it, in each state (two
Senate and two gubernatorial). Through an examination of newspaper articles, only one of the
young candidates in the eight races examined made an appeal directly to young voters.
However, not one candidate made any significant, sustained youth mobilization effort. With a
lack of mobilization efforts by the candidates, I can be certain that any variation in the turnout
of young voters can be related to the presence of a young candidate. In fact, when there is a
young candidate present, the turnout among 18-24 year-olds is higher, because the turnout rates
of young people draw closer to the turnout of those over the age of 25. More specifically, this is
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the case when compared to races where there is no candidate under the age of 35 running. The
analysis suggests that age alone can, in fact, be a mobilizing factor.
In the end, Chapter 4 shows that SIT is a plausible explanation for increasing turnout
among those 18 to 24. The results from the experiment and the findings in the qualitative
analyses both demonstrate there is a link between candidate age and youth turning out to vote.
This is the case in the experiment, in presidential elections, and in state-wide races. Although
SIT has been shown to explain the electoral behavior of other demographic groups (Latin
American: Jackson 2011; African Americans: Bobo and Gilliam 1990; and Women: Dolan
1998), before now it has not been used to explain the behavior of young voters. With such
encouraging results, in Chapter 5, I continue by attempting to construct a comprehensive model
of youth mobilization incorporating the logic of SIT and other important findings from earlier
chapters.
The final empirical chapter, Chapter 5, tests each of the findings from the previous
chapters in a single quantitative analysis of mid-term elections from 1998 to 2010. Mid-term
elections are once again chosen in an effort to circumvent the influence of high profile
presidential electoral politics.88 The primary goal here was to find the culmination of effects on
youth voter turnout with a model which incorporated each of the key explanatory variables
from earlier chapters. When all of the key explanatory variables were included in the model,
(New Measure of Unemployment, COVI, and Candidate Age Gap) all tests produce
coefficients in the hypothesized correct direction , but only two were statistically significant
(COVI and Candidate Age) at the 95 percent confidence level. Through further exploration it
88

1994 has been dropped from the analysis, although it was used in earlier chapters, because COVI values were
only calculated for presidential elections and because the assigning of values for midterms were given for elections
proceeding the presidential election.
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was determined that the reason for the lack of statistical findings for the new measure of
unemployment was due to collinearity with the COVI. This correlation between these two
considerations is not theoretical but instead seems to be a product of sample bias. This suggests
the need for further testing using an alternative set of elections or perhaps a surrogate variable
to tap the theoretically sound expectation that unemployed, underemployment, and discouraged
young workers are more likely to be mobilized than older age groups. The COVI for its part is
unaffected by the collinearity suggesting a very robust relationship to lower youth voter
turnout.

Areas for Future Research

The greatest promise for important discovery associated with this dissertation is the
construction of the Cost of Voting Index. Creation of the COVI will allow tracking the costs
associated with voting. Although the scale changes from each presidential election, the
intended effects are not expected to stay consistent from each election to the next. In Chapter 3
I demonstrate the varying effect of the COVI across different age populations however, the
effect of these costs were not considered over time. For example, prior to the 2012 presidential
election there were no restrictions on registration drives and since this method of registration
most often targets youth and certain minority groups, it is expected to have a greater effect on
the turnout of these populations. Therefore it would be expected that the effect on youth would
be smaller in election years prior to 2008 when compared to elections taking place after 2012.
Beyond using the COVI to examine the costs associated with voting on turnout
specifically, the Index can be expected to be used in additional areas of research. One can
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imagine that the COVI could be used as a dependent variable in an effort to examine how the
partisan homogeneity of a state legislature affects the costs associated with voting. Another use
for the Index as a dependent variable could be to examine the extent to which a state’s level of
liberalism affects the cost of casting a ballot. In the research throughout this dissertation, the
Index was used as an independent variable to examine the cost of voting and its effect on the
turnout of different age groups however, this newly created measure could be used to explain
additional dependent variables, such as: the descriptive representation of minorities or the
policy representativeness of legislation passed at the state level. Beyond the contributions of
this research in the area of youth voter turnout, the COVI is expected to have the furthest
reaching impact in political science research.
My results from the real-world test of SIT would benefit from a larger sample of young
candidates. Perhaps an analysis of young mayoral or U.S. House candidates would be a suitable
testing ground for further inquiry into SIT as it relates to candidate age; however voter turnout
data limitations and long ballots with many races will present obstacles that will need to be
navigated.
Although my current research demonstrated support of SIT, I also wonder if the mere
presence of nontraditional candidates increase turnout among youth. In fact, one could
consider a young candidate as a nontraditional candidate, but I also wonder if the desire within
youth for a change within government (as it relate to the type of individuals who predominately
hold elective office) also increases turnout among this group. President Barack Obama, as an
African American, also fits into this category, so too might women, and other minorities
running for office. Reports from the media, show that younger generations are becoming more
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diverse,89 and this increase in diversity may result in greater turnout when a non-middle aged
white male is running for office. Although an examination of presidential elections is not
helpful, a reexamination and the creation of a new variable for my midterm elections could be
useful in this inquiry.

Automatic Voter Registration

During the writing of this dissertation, two states (Oregon and California), have passed
legislation which greatly reduces the cost associated with voting, by implementing automatic
voter registration. In March 2015, Oregon passed legislation allowing the automatic
registration of eligible citizens who have driver’s license (Brennan Center for Justice 2015).
Several months after the passage in Oregon, California passed a similar law.
The legislation in Oregon is ground breaking, because the new law streamlines voter
registration though the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Specifically, the legislation
puts the burden of registering eligible voters on the government and not on the individual
(Brater 2015). Any individual who has a driver’s license and is eligible to vote is automatically
transferred to the voting rolls in their district. When this bill passed, approximately 300,000
eligible voters were added to the rolls. Passage of this legislation is expected to give Oregon
the highest voter registration rates in the country (Brater 2015).
Similar to the legislation in Oregon, California passed a bill automatically registering
voters when they interact with government agencies, such as the DMV, unless they make it

NBC News, March 7, 2014, “Millennials: Most Racially Diverse Generation in U.S. History”
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/millennials-most-racially-diverse-generation-u-s-history-n46361
89
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known that they do not want to be registered (Brater and Schuit 2015). However, this bill is
somewhat different from the Oregon legation, in the way, that registration only takes place
when the individual interacts with a government agency, and is not done automatically based
upon government records. Although this new law is not as comprehensive as the Oregon
legislation, its impact is expected to be dramatic, considering California is the most populous
state.
Both Oregon and California have streamlined the registration process by bringing it into
the 21st Century. However, these laws will not register the entire voting eligible population.
Since the Oregon law focuses on DMV records, any individual who does not have a driver’s
license will not be automatically registered. It is common for younger individuals, elderly, and
those who live in urban area with good public transit not to have driver’s licenses. In the case
of California, individuals will only be registered when they interact with a government agency.
Therefore, those who have driver’s licenses and are not registered, will not be automatically put
on voting rolls until they renew their license. Regardless of the problems with these laws, these
policies are a significant improvement in decreasing the costs associated with registering to
vote. Both states have the legislation in place, registering voters for the upcoming 2016
Presidential Election.

Youth Voter Turnout in the 2016 Presidential Election

With all of the work in this dissertation focused on youth voter turnout, I would be
remiss not to examine the landscape for the 2016 Presidential Elections and prognosticate about
turnout of this youngest age group. In the paragraphs that follow, I will apply my findings to
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the current Democratic and Republican Party candidates in an effort obtain a sense of whether
or not youth will turnout at record highs or record lows in the upcoming presidential election.
At the time of the writing of this conclusion, the field for the Republican Party is still
vast, with 12 candidates still in the race, and Donald Trump as the front runner. Surprisingly,
there is significant variation in the age of the candidates, with Donald Trump being the oldest at
69 and Marco Rubio the youngest at 44. Given the findings from Chapter 4, I would expect
turnout among youth to be higher if a younger candidate such as Marco Rubio won the
nomination. However, the examination of the presidential races also indicates that the
youngest candidate needs to put in a substantial effort in the mobilization of youth, while also
incorporating new methods to connect with this group. Even if Rubio wins the nomination, in
order for turnout to come close to the record high, his campaign must actively court college
aged voters. However, this is something that none of the Republican candidates have actively
shown to date.
On the Democratic side, voters have little choice with arguably only two viable
candidates, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders. Both of these candidates are in their 70’s and
would lack any connection with youth based solely on their age. However, Bernie Sanders
seems to be the only candidate making a significant appeal to young voters, addressing issues
that are important to them such as college affordability. Hillary, on the other hand, has
addressed some of the issues that Sanders focuses on with youth, but so far has failed to
actively court young voters in any methodical way. At this point, many argue that the viability
of Bernie Sanders winning the nomination is slim, however at this time in 2008, the same was
said about Barack Obama. Obama’s appeal to young first time voters is what has been credited
for his win over Clinton in the primaries. Despite his lack of connection based upon age,
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Bernie Sanders is trying to replicate Obama’s enthusiasm among youth voters by putting in
substantial effort to mobilize this segment of the population. Sanders’ presence on the internet
and social media has greatly outpaced many candidates thus far and this presence shows his
dedication to mobilizing young voters.90 If he is successful at mobilizing youth in the primary
elections, Hillary could have Deja Vu of 2008.
Besides the age and mobilization efforts of the presidential candidates, it is also
important to take into account the percent of young people who are experiencing economic
hardship. Throughout the Obama administration, the unemployment rate has been decreasing
and all measures which indicate a stronger economy have been increasing. However, as
Chapter 2 demonstrated, the traditional measure used by the government is not adequate for
assessing the economic hardship among those 18 to 24. In fact, the unemployment of youth
tends to be twice as high as the unemployment for the overall population, even without taking
into account those who are discouraged or underemployed.
With the national government’s lag of several months for the publication of Current
Population Surveys which are used to measure unemployment, I must rely on the monthly
report released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for the most current information
regarding measures of economic hardship. The most current report, December 2015, 91 shows a
seasonally adjusted unemployment rate of five percent for the population 16 and older. This
rate has been decreasing steadily since its peak in 2010, with an overall unemployment rate of
just over eight percent. Although the report does not list the unemployment rate for those 18 to
24, it does report the unemployment rate for those 16 to 19. Admittedly, this does not mirror
New York Times, May 18, 2015, “Seeking the Presidency, Bernie Sanders Becomes Facebook Royalty Through
Quirky Sharing”
91
The December 2015 BLS Unemployment report can be accessed at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf (last accessed 1/28/2016).
90
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the youngest age group examined throughout this dissertation perfectly, however, it is the only
current data I have access to, that most closely overlaps my 18 to 24 year-old group. The
unemployment rate reported by the BLS for those 16 to 19 is 16.1 percent. Arguably, this rate
is higher than the rates reported for those 18 to 24, but I believe that once those under the age
of 18 are taken out and those 20 to 24 are taken into account, it is reasonable to believe that the
youngest group’s unemployment rates should still be around double the rate of the overall
unemployment, or just about 10 percent. In fact, 10 percent is the average unemployment
across the 50 states for each October of an election year from 1994 to 2012. This rate is
expected to fluctuate across the 50 states.
With a brief examination of the data, election years with an unemployment rate of 10
percent for youth most often corresponds with an average increase of just over four percent
when discouraged and underemployed workers are also taken into account. Although 14
percent is an educated guess of the current rate for my newly suggested calculation for finding
the unemployment of youth, it is still considered the average since 1994. Therefore, if the
current trend endures and this rate continues to fall, my research suggests that youth turnout
will decrease when compared to elections where economic hardship is greater, perhaps setting
the stage for another record low.
One other consideration to take into account when trying to predict the turnout of youth
is the costs associated with voting. Although Chapter 3 demonstrates that this group is the least
affected, increased costs still decrease turnout. When examining the prospects for youth
turnout in 2016, the policies which have been put into place since the record turnout in 2008
must be taken into consideration. In 2008, Obama’s success was largely credited to his
targeting of youth, getting these individuals registered and motivated to turnout. Since then,
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numerous states have passed legislation which directly targets registration drives. The policies
targeting this specific area, in my view, is a specific attempt to increase the costs associated
with registering to vote among youth. The reason I believe these policies are targeting youth
specifically is because individuals who are of college age and self-identify as Democrats are
most likely to be registered through a group drive (Cain and McCue 1985). With an increase in
the regulation of registration drives, I expect the number of youth to be registered to be
substantially lower than in 2008 and therefore decrease the overall turnout of this group.
In addition to the COVI, states have also been implementing allowances which were not
included in the index. More specifically, states have been adopting online registration,
preregistration, and several have adopted all mail voting. In targeted studies, each of these
have been shown to increase voter turnout, yet in my research all failed to reach the minimal
level of statistical significance primarily due to the lack of observations over the time period
studied.
One can expect the positive effects of preregistration to be delayed because the policy
targets individuals prior to the eligible voting age. As this policy progresses and as more states
move to adopt this form of (pre)registration, it should result in greater turnout among college
aged individuals. When examining preregistration, there are five distinct levels at which states
have started to allow young people to preregister (16, 17, 17.5, 90 days before turning 18, and
60 days prior to turning 18). Although some states have adopted preregistration by allowing
young people to preregister 6 months, 90 days, and 60 days prior to turning 18, these laws, in
my view, do not differ appreciably from regular registration laws. Previous research has shown
that preregistration does increase youth turnout (Holbein and Hillygus 2016; McDonald and
Thornburg 2010), however the effect lags because youth that preregister are not allowed to vote
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right away. States which allow 16 year-olds to preregister require a 2 year waiting period and
states which allow 17 year olds to preregister require a 1 year waiting period. Additionally,
implementation across these states might also vary and the implementation must be sustained
for a significant period of time before one might see the results in an aggregate analysis of the
50 American states. Therefore it is very unlikely for states, which allow 16 and 17 year-olds to
preregister, to see a significant increase in their youth turnout rates unless this policy has been
in place for some time.
Although online voter registration is slowly becoming a more acceptable method of
registration throughout the U.S., any positive effects are expected to take some time, for several
reasons. First, this method is still relatively new and the variation in the number of states
which allow this form of registration is still fairly low when examining panel data. Second, this
method may be accepted by a state, yet the knowledge of this policy may be limited among the
citizen population within a state. Having online registration is not enough to increase turnout,
citizens must actively be aware of the option for it to be effective.
As far as the influence of all mail voting, the effect fails to see any statistically
significant results in my aggregate analysis because only two states allowed this voting method.
Not only is the number of states which allow all mail voting only limited to two, but these
states have only used this method in a small number of presidential and mid-term elections.
Such a limited number of observations are surely the reason for the lack of statistically
significant results. However, in the upcoming 2016 election there will be three states which
allow all-mail voting (Colorado, Oregon, and Washington). It is expected that the states which
allow all mail voting will have higher voter turnout among youth compared to states which do
not allow this practice.
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With the application of the information covered in this dissertation to the upcoming
2016 Presidential Election, it is very unlikely that youth will turnout at record high rates.
However, I also believe that this group will not turnout at abysmal rates, like they did in 1996
and 2000. In the end, I believe that the youngest eligible voting group will turnout at rates
slightly below the Presidential Election average of 42.5 percent (since 1972).
If I am correct and the turnout of youth does not increase in the next election, as well as
in subsequent elections, it is unlikely that politicians will start paying attention to youth issues.
One can only imagine, if politicians paid attention to youth issues how much better off these
groups would be as they age. However, this trend has persisted since Converse’s work in 1971
which examined election data in the 1950s. Although other research has criticized youth for
their abysmal levels of political participation at the polls, this work has shown that youth are
inherently different and motivated by different factors than the rest of the voting population.
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APPENDIX A
RERUN OF FOCAL CHAPTER MODELS OF YOUTH VOTER TURNOUT USING AGES
18 TO 29
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As mentioned in the introduction, there is some variation in the literature about what
ages constitute the youngest voting population, either 18 to 24 or 18 to 29. I argue that due to
the ages at which young individuals experience major life events, such as: moving out of their
parents’ home, marriage, buying a home, and having a first child; individuals over the age of 24
are more likely to have things in common with those up to age 44. However, in order to
construct a more complete picture about the topics explored in this dissertation and their overall
effects on young voters,92 in general, this appendix will rerun the major models from Chapters
Two, Three, and Five using a different measure of “young” voters.
By increasing the age of youth, to include those 25 to 29, I am including a segment of
the older population adjacent to my original age group of 18 to 24 year-olds. Since the
dependent variable, in this appendix now includes slightly older individuals, up to the age of
29, it is expected that the effects found in the main body of this work will be somewhere
between the coefficients of those 18 to 24 and those 25 to 44.

Unemployment

In Chapter 2, I explore the effect of the traditional measure of unemployment on 18 to
24 year-olds, and conclude that this measure does not accurately capture the economic hardship
of this population as it relates to predicting voter turnout. Specifically, those 18 to 24 are
reported to have a positive, but not statistically significant coefficient as it relates to
unemployment and voter turnout. On the other hand, those in the 25 to 44 age group are

92

In this appendix, any mention of young voters or youth, refers to individuals between the age of 18 and 29,
unless otherwise described.
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reported to have a negative and statistically coefficient. Table A1 reports a positive statistically
significant coefficient of .13 compared to the .09 coefficient of those 18 to 24, in Table 2, when
using the traditional measure of unemployment. These findings keep the positive association as
reported in Chapter 2, for the youngest voting group, and improve on the statistical significance
of the coefficient.
Additionally, in Chapter 2 I put forth a new measure of unemployment/economic
hardship and test it in order to find its ability to predict youth voter turnout. When using this
new measure for the expanded age group, the value of the coefficient and its level of statistical
significance does not change from the original age group. Both the old age group, 18-24, and
the new age group, 18-29, see a statistically significant coefficient of .1 for every increase of
one in the rate of the new measure. However, in Chapter 2 my new measure of unemployment
increases both the coefficient and its statistical significance over the traditional measure, were
as when examining these two measures with those 18 to 29, my new measure coefficient is
slightly lower than the traditional measure of unemployment.

Cost of Voting Index

In Chapter 3, I create a Cost of Voting Index in an effort to see the extent that the costs
associated with voting have on the youngest voting population. After including the COVI in an
analysis of presidential elections from 1996 to 2012, I find that those 18-24 see a decrease of
13.10 percent for every increase of one in the index.93 However, once the age group is

93

Yet, it must be remembered that the index does not span zero to one completely, therefore once taking into
account the range of the COVI the effect will only be a fraction of the reported coefficient.
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Table A1
Voter Turnout and Different Unemployment Measures of 18 to 29 Year-olds in Midterm and
Presidential Elections

18-29 Voter Turnout Regular
Unemployment
Key Explanatory Variable
18-29 Unemployment Rate
18-29 New Measure Rate

18-29 Voter
Turnout - New
Unemployment
Measure

.13 (.07)*
.10 (.04)*

Controlling for Age Group:

30-44 Turnout
45-64 Turnout
65-90 Turnout

.56 (.05)***
.23 (.06)***
.03 (.05)

.57 (.05)***
.23 (.06)***
.03(.05)

% Black
% College
Same Day Registration
Gubernatorial Election
Presidential Election
Number of Open Seats
Most Competitive Race (smaller margins)

.16 (.04)***
.16 (.04)***
.03 (.01)***
.003 (.01)
.08 (.01)***
.004 (.004)
.0001 (.0002)

.16 (.03)***
.15 (.04)***
.03 (.01)***
.003 (.01)
.08 (.01)***
.004 (.004)
.0001 (.0002)

Constant
Chi2
R2
n

-.22 (.03)***
2882.19***
.86

-.22 (.03)***
2890.81
.86

Additional Control Variables:

477

Note: Random-effects Generalized Least Squares regression. *** p < .001; *** p < .01; * p < .05
(two tailed tests)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
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expanded to include those over the age of 24 but under the age of 30, the effect of the COVI
increases slightly. Table A2 reports that the COVI decreases turnout among those in the new
youth age group by 13.31 percent, with a statistical significance of .001.

Table A2
The Cost of Voting and the Voter Turnout of 18 to 29 Year-olds in Presidential Elections from
1996 to 2012

Variable Name
Cost of Voting Index

18-29
Turnout
-13.31 (3.72)***

Cost Reducing Policies
Preregistration
All Mail Voting
Online Registration

-1.65 (1.64)
7.77 (3.71)*
1.89 (1.90)

Benefits of Voting
Most Competitive Race
(smaller margins)
Constant
F
R2
n

-.1 (.05)*
53.69 (2.21)***
4.38***
.06
250

Note: Ordinary Least Squares regression. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
(two-tailed tests)
Source of voter turnout data: U.S. Census Bureau

Culmination of Effects

Finally, in Chapter 5 I examine the effects of all of the key explanatory variables,
explored throughout this dissertation, in a quantitative analysis in an effort to find the overall
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effect of each, when everything is included in a model. The second column in Table A3 reports
the results for the model when the post-hoc election margin is less than 25 percent. When this
model is compared to the model in Table 23, there is significant change in the values of the
coefficient and their statistical significance. For example, in the original model tested in
Chapter 5, both the COVI and Candidate Age Gap variables come out as statistically
significant. Where as in this model, nothing comes out as statistically significant.

Table A3
Voter Turnout of 18 to 29 Year-olds and Key Explanatory Variables From Chapters 2-4

Variable Name
Key Explanatory Variables
New Measure of Unemployment
COVI
Candidate Age Gap
Youngest Candidate
Cost Reducing Policies
Pre-Registration
Online Registration
All Mail Voting
Benefits of Voting
Most Competitive Race (smaller
margins)
Constant
Chi2
R2
n

Post-hoc Election
Margin < 25%

Post-hoc Election
Margin < 20%

-2.3 (7.68)
-7.61 (5.62)
.11 (.06)
.03 (.07)

2.46 (7.90)
-8.62 (5.73)
.05 (.07)
-.04 (.07)

.34 (2.83)
2.48 (3.08)
-5.00 (3.33)

.81 (2.86)
3.20 (3.07)
-5.39 (3.32)

-.04 (.07)

-.03 (.09)

28.50 (5.33)***
7.97
.05
129

32.27 (5.90)***
6.01
.03
113

Note: Random-effects Generalized Least Squares Regression. *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests)
Source of voter turnout data: U.S. Census Bureau.
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Conclusion

In the end, changing the makeup of the youngest voting population, to include all
individuals under the age of 30 has had some mixed results. When this new age group was
used in determining the effect that economic hardship has on youth voter turnout, the
traditional measure showed a positive, statistically significant relationship, which was not
found when only using individuals between 18 and 24. Additionally, when the new measure of
unemployment was used there was no notable difference between the coefficients, among the
two different age ranges for youth. However, there was a significant change when one
examined the new age group 18 to 29 as it relates to the costs associated with voting. Although
the new groups’ coefficient for the COVI stayed at the same statistically significant level, the
value of the coefficient decreased slightly more. This decrease was expected because the costs
associated with voting was shown to affect those over the age of 24 at a greater rate. The most
noticeable difference, when using the larger age range, could be seen in the model which
included all of the key explanatory variables. Once the larger age group was used in the final
model, the statistical significance of all variables disappeared.

APPENDIX B
TESTING ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT
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The initial attempt, in Chapter 2, creates a new measure of unemployment and this
indicator produces different results than the standard or more commonly used measure of the
unemployment rate. When considering citizens 18 to 24 year of age, the new measure is
statistically linked in a robust manner to higher voter turnout values in a 50 state analysis. This
attempt to create a “better” measure of economic hardship or unemployment for youth is not
the first time a different measure has been suggested. Scholars in the past have questioned
whether or not the way unemployment is measured by the government is the best measure for
young Americans. In their research, Singell and Lillydahl (1989) put forth more than a dozen
different possible measures for calculating the unemployment of younger Americans.
Although they argue these measures, theoretically, are better, they fail to follow through and
test the measures empirically. The remainder of this chapter will use their insights and subject
nine of their fourteen alternate measures of youth unemployment to practical testing.
Only nine measures of the 14 were tested because three of the remaining five measures
primarily focused on the employment level, not unemployment, while the final two lack face
validity in the ability to accurately measure youth unemployment because each measure
excluded a vast majority of the population in its calculation. The following theoretical
measures put forth by Singell and Lillydahl (1989, 464) will be tested using the same voter
turnout model presented in the chapter.94
M1: Unemployment divided by labor force + school + military; U/(L+S+M-(S L))
M2: Unemployment divided by labor force + school + military + family
responsibilities; U/(L+S+M+F-(S L))

94

All data was gathered from the November Current Population Survey supplements (1994-2010), through the
Census Bureau’s Data Ferrett program (last accessed 7/27/15).
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M3: Unemployment of enrolled youth divided by labor force + school + military;
(U S)/(L+S+M-(S L))
M4: Unemployment of enrolled youth divided by labor force + school + military +
family responsibilities; (U S)/(L+S+M+F-(S L))
M5: Unemployment of non-enrollees divided by labor force + school + military;
(U-(U S))/(L+S+M-(S L))
M6: Unemployment of non-enrollees divided by labor force + school + military +
family responsibilities; (U-(U S))/(L+S+M+F-(S L))
M7: Unemployment divided by population
M8: Unemployment of enrolled divided by population
M9: Unemployment of non-enrollees divided by population
*note: expression (S L) references youth who are in school and in the labor force
simultaneously. “School” references youth who are either enrolled in high school or
college. “Military” refers to individuals who report being enlisted in the military.
“Family responsibilities” references young people who are not employed, enrolled in
school, or a military member because they are actively taking care of a family member,
either a child or another individual who cannot take care of themselves.

The nine different measures can be grouped into three different subcategories, based
upon the target group for the numerator. Target groups for the numerator include the number
of individuals who are unemployed, by the traditional definition (M1, M 2, and M7), those who
are unemployed and enrolled in school (M3, M4, and M8), and those who are unemployed and
not enrolled in school (M5, M6, and M9). Each subgroup is then divided by a combination of
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the 18 to 24 year–olds in the labor force, as well as those who are enrolled in school, currently
serving in the military, 95 or out of the labor forces because they are taking care of family.
Table B1 shows the output for each of the nine alternative measures of youth
unemployment and its effect on the voter turnout of 18-24 year-olds. Looking at the results by
subgroup reveals an interesting trend. The three measures which centered on the traditional
measure of unemployment (M1, M 2, and M7) as the numerator perform as well as the standard
measure, returning a coefficient and standard error similar to the output for Model 2 (.09 with a
s.e of .06) in Chapter 3. However, the measures which focused on the unemployment of youth
enrolled in school (M3, M4, and M8), produced coefficients which were significantly larger
than the coefficient produced by the traditional measure. Although the coefficients were
substantially larger than the traditional measure, standard errors were also significantly larger,
indicating that none of the measures were approaching an acceptable level of statistical
significance. The last subgroup, the measures associated with the unemployment of youth not
enrolled in school (M5, M6, and M9), also produced coefficients substantially larger than the
traditional measure, but also produced acceptable statistical significance levels of .05. Put
differently, the unemployment of young individuals who are not currently enrolled in school,
correlated most significantly with the turnout rate of 18 to 24 year olds in the elections
examined.
These findings indicate that unemployed youth, who are not enrolled in school, and are
more likely to be self-reliant will be motivated to turnout on Election Day. Of greater note, is
95

All data related to the number of individuals currently serving in the military is not weighted and reported by the
Census for security reasons. In order to obtain weighted values of youth serving in the military, a calculation of
equal proportions was utilized. The weighted value for each state was obtained by taking the actual number of
individuals who responded in the affirmative that they were currently serving in the military multiplied by the
weighted population for 18-24 year-olds and divided by the total unweighted number of 18-24 year-olds that
participated in the survey.
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that these results lend support to my hypothesis, that this young segment of the population will
be mobilized to vote when they become unemployed in the first stages of starting a life on their
own. Unemployment has a greater ability to mobilize the 18-24 year-old segment of the
population, when they are not enrolled in school, and have already entered the phase of life
where they must work to support themselves. Each of the three significant findings suggest
that youth voter turnout will increase from one fifth to one quarter of one percent, when there is
a one percent increase in unemployment of young individuals who are not attending high
school or college, regardless of whether or not individuals who are in school, the military, or
taking care of a family member are included in the calculation.

Table B1
Youth Voter Turnout and Alternate Measures of Unemployment for 18-24 Year-olds for Midterm and Presidential Elections:
1994-2012
Variable Name
Alternate Measure of
Unemployment
Controlling for Age Group:
25-44 Turnout
45-64 Turnout
65-90 Turnout
Additional Control Variables:
% Black
% College
Same Day Registration
Gubernatorial Election
Presidential Election
Number of Open Seats
Most Competitive Race
(smaller margins)
Constant
Chi2
R2
n

M1

M2

M3

M4

M5

.10 (.08)

.11 (.09)

.19 (.20)

.21 (.21)

.22 (.09)*

.62 (.06)***
.13 (.07)
.06 (.06)

.62 (.06)***
.13 (.07)
.06 (.06)

.63 (.06)***
.12 (.07)
.06 (.06)

.63 (.06)***
.11 (.07)
.06 (.06)

.62 (.06)***
.15 (.07)*
.06 (.06)

.14 (.04)***
.21 (.04)***
.02 (.01)**
-.003 (.01)
.07 (.01)***
.004 (.004)

.14 (.04)***
.21 (.04)***
.02 (.01)**
-.003 (.01)
.07 (.01)***
.004 (.004)

.14 (.04)***
.20 (.04)***
.02 (.01)**
-.003 (.01)
.07 (.01)***
.004 (.004)

.14 (.04)***
.20 (.04)***
.02 (.01)**
-.003 (.01)
.07 (.01)***
.004 (.004)

.14 (.04)***
.20 (.04)***
.02 (.01)**
-.003 (.01)
.07 (.01)***
.004 (.004)

.0001 (.0002) .0001 (.0002) .0001 (.0002) .0001 (.0002) .0001 (.0002)
-.23 (.04)***
2215.29***
.82

-.23 (.04)***
2214.71***
.82

-.21 (.04)***
2197.36***
.82
477

-.21 (.04)***
2196.20***
.82

-.24 (.04)***
2196.20***
.83

Note: Random-effects Generalized Least Squares regression. *** p < .001; *** p < .01; * p < .05 (two tailed tests)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
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(continued on next page)

Table B1 (continued)
Variable Name
Alternate Measure of
Unemployment

M6

M7

M8

M9

.24 (.1)*

.10 (.09)

.20 (.21)

.23 (.10)*

Controlling for Age Group:
25-44 Turnout
45-64 Turnout
65-90 Turnout

.62 (.06)***
.15 (.07)*
.06 (.06)

.62 (.06)***
.13 (.07)*
.06 (.06)

.63 (.06)***
.11 (.07)
.06 (.06)

.62 (.06)***
.14 (.07)
.06 (.06)

Additional Control Variables:
% Black
% College
Same Day Registration
Gubernatorial Election
Presidential Election
Number of Open Seats
Most Competitive Race (smaller margins)

.14 (.04)***
.21 (.05)***
.02 (.01)**
-.003 (.01)
.07 (.01)***
.004 (.004)
.0001 (.0002)

.14 (.04)***
.21 (.05)***
.02 (.01)**
-.003 (.01)
.07 (.01)***
.004 (.004)
.0001 (.0002)

.14 (.04)*** .14 (.04)***
.20 (.04)*** .21 (.05)***
.03 (.01)**
.02 (.01)**
-.003 (.01)
-.003 (.01)
.07 (.01)*** .07 (.01)***
.004 (.004)
.004 (.004)
.0001 (.0002) .0001 (.0002)

Constant
Chi2
R2
N

-.24 (.04)***
2241.49***
.83
477

-.23 (.04)***
2215.10***
.82
477

-.21 (.04)***
2199.36***
.82
477

-.24 (.04)***
2238.76***
.82
477

Note: Random-effects Generalized Least Squares regression. *** p < .001; *** p < .01; * p < .05 (two tailed tests)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
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APPENDIX C
COST OF VOTING INDEX SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
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The eight issue areas not included in the COVI are listed in Table B1. Previous
research, or intuition, suggest these considerations might be relevant to the ‘costs’ of voting so
it is important to consider each in turn.96 The first is the deadline for mail-in registration.
Earlier in history, the acceptance of mail-in registration varied by state. However, since the
NVRA every state must now allow mail-in registration. There is some variability in the
deadlines state’s use for mail-in registration, but because the deadline for in-person registration
is already included in the COVI and these deadlines correspond with the mail-in deadlines the
consideration of a mail-in deadline is already being captured in the Index.

Table C1
Variables Not Included in the Cost of Voting Index: 1996-2012
Mail Registration

No. of days prior to election that mail-in registration must occur.

Residency Required

Residency required for voter registration.

Early Voting a

Early voting allowed.
The number of early voting days.

Registration Roll Purges

The removal of voters from registration rolls.

Time Off

Time off from work to vote.
Time off from work to vote with pay.
Number of hours off from work to vote.

a

Early voting is not absentee voting. State absentee voting laws are part of the COVI.

96

In the past, it was widely known that selection for jury duty was obtained from voter registration lists. And
because registration came with the additional possibility of serving as a juror, along with the notion that many
Americans detest jury duty, it has been argued that this could be an additional cost associated with voting.
However, a more in-depth inquiry of jury duty selection reveals that the process in which possible jurors are
selected not only varies by judicial district but also that many districts now pull volunteers using many different
government lists. Because there is no uniformity within a state, as it relates to how jurors are selected, it cannot be
included in the index.
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The next consideration that I exclude from the index construction is a residency
requirement. The requirement sets a fixed number of days an individual is required to establish
residency prior to registering to vote. This had been a popular consideration some years back
because there was considerable inter-state variability. Today, there is less variability and there
are no longer any outlining observations that might prompt a real concern. Moreover, previous
research, that is over 35 years old, has demonstrated that residency requirements do not affect
the probability of voting in any state (R. E. Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 76).
The third consideration is early voting, or allowing citizens to show up at a particular
location to preemptively cast their ballot. Today, most all states allow early voting and the
length of time each state allows can vary from as little as a few days to eight weeks prior to
Election Day. Although many supporters argue that early voting decreases the cost to cast a
ballot on Election Day, by allowing voters to skip long lines, research which has examined
early voting over a 24 year period has suggested that it does not increase participation rates
(Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, and Miller 2007). Other research also notes that any increase in
turnout disappears by the second presidential election, after early voting is implemented, and
that it only creates an additional convenience for those already planning to vote (Giammo and
Brox 2010).
The fourth consideration left out of the COVI is registration roll purges. Some may see
the exclusion of this variable somewhat surprising because of the emphasis put on it in previous
research (Blomberg 1995; Highton and Wolfinger 1998; King 1994; Rhine 1996). Prior to the
passage of the NVRA, states had various laws which allowed districts to purge registration rolls
for nonvoting. Some states did not purge nonvoters at all, while others set out requirements for
the length of time before one is purged from the voting rolls. The length of time a state allowed
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before purging a nonvoter from its rolls was anything but standard, prior to the passage, in
1993, of the NVRA.
Since the passage of the NVRA, states are no longer able to purge for nonvoting in
federal elections. Yet they are allowed to purge voter rolls of deceased and those that have
moved in order to ensure accuracy. Including this later consideration is compromised because
of incomplete or non-existent record keeping in some of the states. Although high profile
purges such as what occurred in Florida prior to the 2000 presidential election have garnered
considerable media and some scholarly attention there is little in the way of standardized
reporting of the type, frequency, or quantity of voters who are purged from registration rolls.
The fifth issue area that was tested for its inclusion in the COVI was a series of laws
that allow individuals to take time-off from work to vote. Because Election Day in the United
States takes place on a workday, and it is not considered a holiday, this consideration,
theoretically, could easily factor into the ‘cost’ of voting. Some state legislation stipulates the
number of hours off an employee should be given to vote, as well as if they should be paid
during the time they are absent. Although one would believe that giving employees time off to
work, especially paid time off, would increase voter turnout, research has failed to come to
form a consensus, with some (Zinser, Dawson, and Hausafus 1978) suggesting that it does
increase turnout, while others suggest there is no such effect (Sterling 1983). Our tests find this
consideration negatively associated with voter turnout and consequently it is left out of the
COVI.
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COVI Values and Ranking by State: 1996-2012

Table C2 reports the COVI values for each state, for each presidential election cycle
since 1996. Along with the COVI values, each state is also ranked based upon its relative ease
of voting or the reciprocal of the ‘cost of voting.’ The state with the lowest COVI value was
ranked one and the state with the highest COVI value was ranked fifty. The column after the
reported 2012 values, reports the median rank for each state, indicating their relative position to
other states over the five election cycles.
The final column reports the change in rank of each state since 1996. States with
positive values have increased their costs associated with registration and voting, in relation to
other states. In other words, these states have made the act of voting more inconvenient; or
more costly. On the other hand, states with negative values (in bold) have decreased the costs
associated with voting, when compared to the other states. In other words, these states have
made the act of voting more convenient. By looking at the change in rankings, it can be seen
that since 1996, North Dakota has increased its cost of voting the most, thus making it more
difficult to cast a ballot. North Dakota was ranked 2nd in 1996 and with its change in policies
over the past 16 years, its rank declined to 30th in 2012. Colorado made the most progress over
this time period, greatly reducing the cost of voting, and making it much easier to cast a ballot.
In 1996 Colorado was ranked 41st and then moved to 2nd by 2012.

Table C2
COVI Values and Ranking for the 50 American States by Presidential Election: 1996-2012

State
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE

1996
COVI
Rank
0.325
6
0.676
44
0.543
31
0.676
43
0.543
32
0.576
41
0.235
3
0.363
9

2000
COVI
Rank
0.349
7
0.748
46
0.615
35
0.724
43
0.615
36
0.623
39
0.331
4
0.435
13

2004
COVI
Rank
0.469
19
0.748
47
0.708
40
0.709
41
0.428
8
0.743
46
0.451
17
0.435
12

2008
COVI
Rank
0.445
14
0.748
49
0.708
39
0.709
40
0.428
8
0.743
48
0.451
15
0.435
11

FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS

0.708
0.724
0.769
0.370
0.543
0.545
0.241
0.343

47
48
50
11
33
37
4
8

0.756
0.772
0.793
0.430
0.615
0.594
0.337
0.415

47
48
50
11
37
32
5
10

0.741
0.772
0.778
0.430
0.601
0.594
0.337
0.428

45
48
49
9
34
33
2
7

0.740
0.718
0.777
0.430
0.601
0.688
0.527
0.428

47
42
50
9
31
37
22
7

KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS

0.563
0.503
0.268
0.543
0.408
0.496
0.373
0.544

40
28
5
34
16
25
12
36

0.610
0.653
0.340
0.561
0.479
0.568
0.409
0.592

34
41
6
24
19
25
8
31

0.623
0.679
0.340
0.508
0.479
0.568
0.409
0.592

36
39
3
22
20
27
5
32

0.623
0.680
0.341
0.508
0.479
0.688
0.410
0.592

32
36
2
21
18
38
5
30

2012
COVI
0.511
0.731
0.684

Rank
21
48
42

0.683
0.398
0.337
0.431
0.432
0.667
0.698
0.739
0.541
0.565

41
6
2
12
13
37
43
50
25
28

0.674
0.406
0.606
0.708

38
8
33
47

0.682
0.456

39
17

0.496
0.455
0.701
0.442
0.603

20
16
45
15
32

1996-2012
Median Rank
14
47
39
41
10
41
6
12

1996-2012
Rank Change
+15
+4
+11

47
48
50
11
33
37
5
8

-10
-5
0
0

36
39
5
23
19
27
8
32

+7
+11
+12

-2
-26
-39
+9
+4

-5
+1
+4
0

-14
0
+20
+3
-4

(continued on next page)
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Table C2 (continued)
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ

0.469
0.764
0.364
0.559
0.430
0.543

20
49
10
39
19
35

0.541
0.776
0.412
0.607
0.430
0.615

20
49
9
33
12
38

0.661
0.896
0.412
0.607
0.430
0.591

38
50
6
35
10
31

0.661
0.497
0.412
0.652
0.430
0.591

35
20
6
34
10
29

NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK

0.532
0.333
0.489
0.204
0.556
0.479

30
7
24
2
38
23

0.581
0.453
0.561
0.252
0.628
0.572

29
18
23
1
40
28

0.581
0.453
0.561
0.354
0.628
0.585

29
18
26
4
37
30

0.625
0.453
0.537
0.353
0.721
0.585

33
17
23
3
44
28

OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY

0.408
0.496
0.472
0.664
0.404
0.700
0.679
0.177
0.409
0.469
0.496
0.511
0.394
0.394

17
26
22
42
15
46
45
1
18
21
27
29
13
14

0.311
0.568
0.556
0.712
0.452
0.736
0.727
0.290
0.446
0.541
0.568
0.583
0.442
0.442

3
26
22
42
17
45
44
2
16
21
27
30
14
15

0.325
0.568
0.544
0.712
0.554
0.721
0.727
0.450
0.434
0.555
0.488
0.450
0.442
0.442

1
28
23
42
24
43
44
15
11
25
21
16
13
14

0.324
0.568
0.544
0.712
0.553
0.721
0.728
0.495
0.359
0.555
0.732
0.451
0.442
0.442

1
27
24
41
25
43
45
19
4
26
46
16
12
13

0.655

36

0.527
0.398
0.481
0.352
0.490
0.534
0.429
0.543
0.572
0.682
0.698
0.341
0.571
0.584
0.733
0.532

22
7
18
4
19
24
11
26
30
40
44
3
29
31
49
23

0.702
0.633
0.563
0.427

46
35
27
10

0.608
0.190

34
1

0.437
0.425

14
9

0.356

5

35
49
9
34
10
31
30
17
24
3
40
28
3
27
23
42
21
45
44
15
11
25
27
18
13
14

+16
-27
-3
-21
-15
-16
+6
+4
+2
+28
+2
+21
-14
+3
+9
+7
+8
0
-10
+26
-8
-13
-26
-15
-4
-9
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APPENDIX D
ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTAL INFORMATION
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Figure D1 illustrates the photographs used in the first wave of the experiment.
Two Young Candidates

Young Candidate versus Older Candidate

Two Older Candidates

Figure D1. Photographs used for the Experiment: 1st Set of Photo Pairs
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Figure D2 illustrates the photographs used in the second wave of the experiment.
Two Young Candidates

Young Candidate versus Older Candidate

Two Older Candidates

Figure D2. Photographs used for the Experiment: 2nd Set of Photo Pairs
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The following is the form students were asked to fill out after being exposed to one set of the
above photograph groups.
This research recognizes that there is insufficient information provided to determine a vote
choice. However, our interest is purely in the effect that candidate image has on voting
behavior. Hence, we are going to ask you to respond to two questions using only a set of
pictures to base your answers on. First, we need to know a little about you. Please answer the
following questions about your background.

Date of Birth: ______ ______ _______
Month Day Year

Circle the Appropriate Category:
Party Affiliation: Strong Republican
Republican Independent Leaning Republican
Independent Independent Leaning Democrat
Democrat
Strong Democrat

Gender: Male Female

Which candidate you would you be more likely to vote for. Circle either Candidate A or
Candidate B
Candidate A

Candidate B

Now, based on the photos how likely would you be to turnout to vote? Please circle a number
on the scale from 1 to 10.
1
2
Definitely
would not
vote

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
Definitely
would vote

NOTE: Institutional Review Board exemption was granted because the research was conducted
anonymously without any threat to participants. Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46)
46.101b, paragraph 2. (February 1, 2012)
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Ordered-Logit Model Run for Experiment

Table D1 exhibits the results reported on the 8th page of the manuscript and are used to
elaborate the substantive significance of the relationship between the age of candidates, as
presented in photographs, and the commitment to vote by students between the ages of 18 and
24.
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Table D1
Youth Commitment to Vote and Young Candidates: An Experiment
Exp. Sign

Odds Ratio

95% Confidence Interval

Old v. Young

+

1.33 *

.97 to 1.82

Young v. Young

+

1.49 **

1.08 to 2.06

1st Set of Pictures

-

.50 ***

.38 to .68

Participant Age

+

1.07

Strong Party Identifiers

+

1.18

Republican

+

2.02 ***

1.48 to 2.76

Independent

-

.54 ***

.38 to .78

Treatment Variables

(Old v. Old Omitted
Group)

Control Variables

Chi2

67.24 ***

Pseudo R-Squared

.02

Sample Size

691

Note: Ordered Logit. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 (one-tailed tests)

APPENDIX E
CANDIDATE AGE, CENSUS BUREAU, AND ROBUSTNESS CHECK INFORMATION
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Difference in Mean Youth Voter Turnout in Gubernatorial and Senate Races:
Midterm Election Years 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010

As indicated in the text the relationship between youth voter turnout in midterm
gubernatorial and Senate races is compromised by the overall lack of young candidates running
in these races. Results reported in Table 22 suggest, on average, when there were candidates
under the age of 35 running young people did turnout at a higher rate. However, this
relationship is based on only four cases. There are some other interesting findings that can be
gleaned from the data, but much of this is also based on small sample sizes; albeit under
theoretically agreeable circumstances. For instance, I learn that when I use only the races in
2006 and 2010 that youth voter turnout, on average, is 23.4 percent when the youngest
candidate is less than 48 years old, the mean value for the age of the youngest candidate.
Youth voter turnout drops to 22.0 percent when the youngest candidate is over 48 years of age.
Unfortunately, the sample size is so small that this difference in mean turnout is not statistically
significant.
When I consider all races and when the youngest candidate is under the age of 55 there
is statistically higher youth voter turnout than when the youngest candidate is over 55 years of
age, although I have to use a liberal definition of statistical significance. Results are reported in
Table E1.
Again, using a liberal definition of statistical significance I can also report that youth
voter turnout in all five election cycles and 230 cases, on average, is higher when the candidate
age gap if greater than ten years than it is when the candidate age gap is less than five years.
Table E2 reports these results.
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Table E1
Youth Voter Turnout when Youngest Candidate is Less Than 55 Years of Age
Age of Youngest Candidate

Sample Size

Stnd.
Dev.

Mean

t-test of difference

< 55

196

6.69

21.9

t= 1.47; p < .08

>= 55

34

5.19

20.1

(one-tailed test)

Table E2
Youth Voter Turnout when Candidate Age Gap is either Less than Five Years or Greater than
10 Years
Candidate Age Gap

Sample Size

Stnd.
Dev.

Mean

t-test of difference

< 5 years

37

6.46

20.1

t= 1.24; p < .11

> 10 years

150

6.59

21.6

(one-tailed test)
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Census Bureau Elaboration of Issues Regarding Sampling and Non-Sampling Error

I must acknowledge the possibility of heteroscedasticity in error terms that might result
from the Census Bureau using different sample sizes in each election year and across the 50
states. For the sake of transparency, I have included below, the Census Bureau’s elaboration of
issues regarding sampling and non-sampling error in the Current Population Survey (CPS). The
complete narrative can be found at
(http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2010/CPS2010Voting_S&A.pdf last accessed 8/16/2014).
ACCURACY OF THE ESTIMATES
A sample survey estimate has two types of error: sampling and nonsampling. The accuracy of
an estimate depends on both types of error. The nature of the sampling error is known given the
survey design; the full extent of the nonsampling error is unknown.
Sampling Error. Since the CPS estimates come from a sample, they may differ from figures
from an enumeration of the entire population using the same questionnaires, instructions, and
enumerators. For a given estimator, the difference between an estimate based on a sample and
the estimate that would result if the sample were to include the entire population is known as
sampling error. Standard errors, as calculated by methods described in “Standard Errors and
Their Use,” are primarily measures of the magnitude of sampling error. However, they may
include some nonsampling error.
Nonsampling Error. For a given estimator, the difference between the estimate that would
result if the sample were to include the entire population and the true population value being
estimated is known as nonsampling error. There are several sources of nonsampling error that
may occur during the development or execution of the survey. It can occur because of
circumstances created by the interviewer, the respondent, the survey instrument, or the way the
data are collected and processed. For example, errors could occur because:
• The interviewer records the wrong answer, the respondent provides incorrect information, the
respondent estimates the requested information, or an unclear survey question is misunderstood
by the respondent (measurement error).
• Some individuals who should have been included in the survey frame were missed (coverage
error).
• Responses are not collected from all those in the sample or the respondent is unwilling to
provide information (nonresponse error).
• Values are estimated imprecisely for missing data (imputation error).
• Forms may be lost, data may be incorrectly keyed, coded, or recoded, etc. (processing error).
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To minimize these errors, the Census Bureau applies quality control procedures during all
stages of the production process including the design of the survey, the wording of questions,
the review of the work of interviewers and coders, and the statistical review of reports.
Estimating Standard Errors. The Census Bureau uses replication methods to estimate the
standard errors of CPS estimates. These methods primarily measure the magnitude of sampling
error. However, they do measure some effects of nonsampling error as well. They do not
measure systematic biases in the data associated with nonsampling error. Bias is the average
over all possible samples of the differences between the sample estimates and the true value.

Check on the Robustness of Results Reported in Table 23

As indicated in the chapter, the systematic test of the relationship between the candidate
age gap and youth voter turnout returns results that are sensitive to model assumptions. For
instance, I do not find a statistically significant relationship when considering all 230
observations. However, when I truncate the analysis to include only those races with some
semblance of electoral competition I find that the hypothesized effect is present. The cut-point I
employ suggests that the level of electoral competition needs to produce a post-hoc election
margin of 25 percentage points or less. This cut-point is sensitive and as evidence of this I
include Table E3, which uses a different cut- point, those races where the post-hoc election
margin is 20 percentage points or less.
Once the cut point is changed, the effect of the candidate age gap is no longer
statistically significant. However, the value of the COVI and its level of statistical significance
is barely unchanged. The failure to obtain statistically significant results could stem from the
reduction of cases used in the analysis. Although the candidate age gap is statistically
significant in Chapter 5, with the new cut point the coefficient is no longer statistically
significant.
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Table E3
Youth Voter Turnout and Candidate Age Gap: Post-hoc Election Margin is 20 Percent or
Closer
Random-Effects
Variable Name

Expected Sign

Coefficient (s.e.)

New Measure of Unemployment

+

.08 (.07)

COVI

-

-10.87 (6.05) t

Candidate Age Gap

+

.10 (.08)

Youngest Candidate

-

.01 (.08)

Pre-Registration

+

1.25 (3.01)

Online Registration

+

1.92 (3.28)

All Mail Voting

+

-4.23 (3.58)

-

.02 (.1)

Key Explanatory Variables

Cost Reducing Policies

Benefits of Voting
Most Competitive Race (smaller margins)

Constant

25.45 (6.3)***

2

Chi

9.03

2

.06

R
n

113
t

Note: Random-effects Generalized Least Squares regression. p < .1 (one-tailed tests)
Source of voter turnout data: U.S. Census Bureau.

Reexamination of the New Measure of Youth Unemployment in Midterm Elections

The lack of statistical findings for the new measure of youth unemployment in Chapter
5, brings into question if the findings from Chapter 2 are due to the inclusion of Presidential
Elections. Therefore, I went back and reran Model 7, from Chapter 2, using only midterm
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elections. Table E4 reports these findings. When only taking midterm elections into account,
the coefficient for the new measure of unemployment for youth increases from .1 in Model 7 to
.14 here. Additionally, the statistical significance also increases, moving from the p < .05 level
in Model 7 to the p < .01 level. These findings demonstrate that the trend uncovered in Chapter
2 are not the result of including presidential elections. Therefore, the failure of the new
measure of unemployment in Chapter 5 to reach an acceptable level of statistical significance,
is not a result of only examining midterm elections.

Table E4
The New Measure of Youth Unemployment and Youth Voter Turnout: Midterm Elections
1994-2010
Key Explanatory Variable
18-24 New Measure Rate

Overall Turnout
.14 (.04)**

Controlling for Age Group:

25-44 Turnout
45-64 Turnout
65-90 Turnout

.39 (.08)***
.27 (.09)**
.09 (.07)

Additional Control Variables:

% Black
% College
Same Day Registration
Gubernatorial Election
Number of Open Seats
Most Competitive Race
(smaller margins)
Constant
Chi2
R2
n

.13 (.04)**
.01 (.05)
.03 (.01)**
-.01 (.01)
.00 (.01)
-.00 (.00)
-.19 (.04)***
2246.27***
.60
227

Note: Random-effects Generalized Least Squares regression.
*** p < .001; ** p < .01 (two tailed tests)
Source of voter turnout data: U.S. Census Bureau.

